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The Emerging Article 2: The Latest Iteration
John E. Murray, Jr.*
"[What] we are attempting to say, whether we got it said or not

I.

INTRODUCTION

The sacrosanct product of the great Karl Llewellyn has joined
its relatives in undergoing major surgery.2 At the time of this
writing, the most recent draft of a revised Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code was presented for discussion at the July
1996 meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL"). While this draft, like earlier
drafts, was emphatically promulgated for discussion only, it is
the latest iteration from the Drafting Committee and suggests a
number of important changes in Article 2 that are likely to
remain in the final product.3
Formal discussions considering the revision of Article 2 began
eight years ago.4 Many had assumed the new version would
have been well on its way toward final review and approval by
the summer of 1996. 5 The surgery, however, proved to be more
difficult than some had imagined, particularly with respect to
knotty issues 6 and policy questions.7 In addition, there was a
President and Professor of Law, Duquesne University.
KARL LLEWELLYN, 1954 NEW YoRK LAW REVISION HEARINGS, 117 (181) (emphasis added). See John E. Murray, The Chaos of the "Battle of the Forms:' Solutions, 39
VAND. L. REV. 1307, 1323 (1986).
2. Notwithstanding substantial revision and reorganization of its sections, apparently the final version of a new Article 2 will retain the underlying philosophy of its creator, the unique Karl Llewellyn.
3. U.C.C. § 2 (Proposed Draft 1996).
4. These discussions began with the Article 2 Study Project, which was asked to
consider whether Article 2 should be revised. Richard E. Speidel, Contract Formation
and Modification UnderRevised Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1305 (1994). Professor
Richard Speidel of the Northwestern School of Law chaired this committee, and now
serves as a member of the Article 2 Drafting Committee.
5. Id. Professor Speidel wrote, '[tihe Committee should complete the revision
project by August, 1996." Id. Professor Speidel further explained that "the revision must
work its way through the American Law Institute ("ALI"), which had reviewed the Study
Group Report in 1990 and a proposed draft of Article 2 in 1993. Id.
6. Id. at 1314. See, e.g, the notorious "battle of the forms," U.C.C. § 2-207 (1995),
and the products liability question, U.C.C. § 2-318 (1995), in relation to tort theory.
7. Richard E. Speidel, The Revision of UCC Article 2, Sales in Light of the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the InternationalSale of Goods, 16 J. INT'L. L. &
Bus. 165, 168 (1995). For example, what effect should the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (ratified by the United States and
*

1.
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very ambitious draft that would have reengineered Article 2 into
separate chapters, opening with underlying principles and followed by chapters on sales law and licensing of intellectual property. This "hub and spoke" approach 8 could have eventually
included another "spoke" on leases of goods by transplanting
Article 2A into a fourth chapter of a new Article 2 paradigm.
The controversial "hub and spoke" design was rejected. The
newest paradigm confronts the burgeoning issues surrounding
the licensing of intellectual property through new Article 2B. 9 A
return to the drawing board produced the latest draft of an Article 2 relegated to sales of goods. This draft features refined sections from earlier drafts, as well as resolutions of contested
changes. Notwithstanding the necessary caveat that substantial
changes may still occur, and that the latest draft expressly
leaves some matters unsettled, the final design of Article 2 is
beginning to emerge. Awareness of the new design and analysis
of some of its more important changes, therefore, is no longer
premature.
more than forty countries and, where applicable, displacing Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code) have on the new Article 2? Professor Speidel notes that:
From the beginning, the Drafting Committee questioned the extent to
which Article 2 should be revised to harmonize with CISG. Although state law
cannot vary CISG, state law can be revised to clarify the relationship . .. with
CISG ....[Tihe Drafting Committee has not embraced CISG as a model for revision. This stance partially reflects NCCUSL's historical ambivalence toward international commercial unification. Ironically, the desire for horizontal uniformity in
sales law among the states of the United States and among nations has not been
translated into strong pressure for vertical uniformity between domestic (state)
and international sales law (federal). At best, the process of harmonization to date
has been ad hoc and reflects highly selective borrowing.
Id. at 168-69.
Professor Speidel suggests seven reasons why the Drafting Committee chose not
to use CISG as a model for the revision of Article 2: "(1) the absence of compatible background law; (2) Article 2 is part of an integrated commercial code; (3) the nature of the
code; (4) limitations in scope; (5) differences in the drafting process; (6) differences in
substance; and (7) technological and transactional obsolescence." Id. at 171. He suggests
that the most notable CISG influence in the draft revision of Article 2 is found in the
repeal of the Statute of Frauds, U.C.C. § 2-201 (1995), U.C.C. § 2-201 (Proposed Draft
1996); clarifications of the confusion over "no oral modification" clauses, U.C.C. § 2-209
(1995), U.C.C. § 2-210 (Proposed Draft 1996); the addition of a "general mitigation of
damages policy," U.C.C. § 2-703(b) (Proposed Draft 1996); the deletion of"complex delivery terms" in part 3 of the UCC, U.C.C. § 2-309 (Proposed Draft 1996); and the expansion
of the seller's right to cure, U.C.C. § 2-508 (1995), U.C.C. § 2-610 (Proposed Draft 1996).
Id. at 168 n.18.
8. For analyses and criticism of the "hub and spoke" approach, see Marion W.
Benfield & Peter A. Alces, Reinventing the Wheel, 35 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 1405 (1994);
and Raymond T. Nimmer, Intangible Contracts:Thoughts of Hubs, Spokes and ReinvigoratingArticle 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1337 (1994).
9. U.C.C. § 2 (Proposed Draft 1996). This article will deal only with the draft of
Article 2-Sales.
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DEFINITIONS

A curious change in the "short title" of Article 210 is followed by
the "definitions" section 1 ' rather than the "scope" section, which
is moved to section 2-103. The original 12 definitional section
presents only four definitions 3 followed by references to twentyfive definitions in other sections of Article 2,"4 six definitions in
other Articles of the Code' 5 and the incorporation of Article 1 definitions. 16 Instead of referring to other sections, the draft 7 contains forty definitions as well as the residual reference to Article
1 definitions.'8 The new list repeats many of the current definitions without change, modifies others and also includes a number
of new definitions. Alternate definitions of "good faith" begin
with the current Article 1 definition of "honesty in fact,"' 9 the
current Article 2 definition adding the requirement that
merchants observe reasonable commercial standards 20 or the use
of a similar standard from Article 3.21
Among the familiar definitions that have been changed, the
meaning of "conspicuous" has been enlarged. 22 The current definition appears only in Article 1.23 The draft definition begins
with the familiar test that a term or clause is conspicuous when
"a reasonable person against whom it is to operate would likely
have noticed it." 24 The definition is then enlarged to deal with
10. The new section 2-101, "Short Title," merely states that the article "may be
cited as Uniform Commercial Code-Sales," U.C.C. § 2-101 (Proposed Draft 1996), as contrasted with the original version, which provides that the article "shall be known and may
be cited as Uniform Commercial Code-Sales." U.C.C. § 2-101 (1995). The change is curious in that there is no longer an official identity of Article 2 though it "may" be cited as
the section suggests.
11. U.C.C. § 2-102 (Proposed Draft 1996).
12. "Original" refers to the present version of Article 2 as enacted throughout the
United States. "Draft" refers to the revised version.
13. U.C.C. § 2-103(1) (1995).
14. Id. § 2-103(2).
15. Id. § 2-103(3).
16. Id. § 2-103(4).
17. 'Draft" refers to the "Discussion Draft" of Article 2 at the July meeting of the
National Conference on Uniform State Laws discussed throughout this article.
18. U.C.C. § 2-102 (Proposed Draft 1996). The residual provision in subsection (b)
of the draft incorporates Article 1 "principles of construction," but unlike its U.C.C. § 2104(4) (1995) predecessor, says nothing about principles of "interpretation." See U.C.C.
§ 2-102(b) (Proposed Draft 1996).
19. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1995). This is "alternative A" in draft section 2-102(24).
20. U.C.C. § 2-102(1)(b) (1995). This is "alternative B" to draft section 2-102(24).
21. Good faith arises from "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the conduct or transaction concerned." Alternative C
of U.C.C. § 2-102(24) (Proposed Draft 1996) (based on U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4) (1995)).
22. U.C.C. § 2-102(9) (Proposed Draft 1996).
23. U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (1995).
24. U.C.C. § 2-102(9) (Proposed Draft 1996) (as contrasted with "ought to have
noticed it" in the current U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (1995)).
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electronic messages, including those that will not be reviewed by
an individual but only by a computer. 25 There is no reference to a
"writing" since electronic message systems now require the more
generic term, "record," which includes any tangible or electronic
medium.2 6
How does one "sign" an electronic record? The definition of
"sign" begins with the familiar test, "any symbol executed or
adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate the
record." 27 The definition then adds the method of authentication
for an "electronic record:" identifying the originator of the record
and indicating the originator's approval of the information in the
record, if the parties had agreed upon that method or the method
was "reliable" under the circumstances. 2 8
Other necessary "electronic" definitions had to be added, thus,
"electronic agent,"29 "electronic message,"3 0 "electronic transaction"3" and "electronic intermediary" 2 are newly included among
the forty definitions in section 2-102(a). Other new entries are

25. Id. § 2-102(9) (Proposed Draft 1996). This section provides: "[Inthe case of an
electronic message intended to evoke a response without the need for review by an individual," "conspicuous" means that the message must be "in a form that would enable the
recipient or the recipient's computer to take it into account or react to it without review of
the message by an individual." Id. See also section 2-102(19) (Proposed Draft 1996),
which adds a definition of "electronic agent," a computer program designed to initiate or
respond to electronic messages or performances without review by an individual. Such an
"agent" operates "within the scope of its agency if its performance is consistent with the
functions intended by the party who utilizes the electronic agent." Id. § 2-102(19). It is
inevitable that such changes will produce references by courts to "reasonable electronic
agents" or even "reasonable computers."
26. U.C.C. § 1-202(33) (Proposed Draft 1996). "Record,' when used as a noun,
means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form." Id. Generations of new
lawyers will undoubtedly refer to "perceivable retrievables."
27. Id. § 2-102(36). In original section 1-201(39), the definition of "signed" is the
same with the exception of "a writing" for "the record." See U.C.C. § 1-201(39) (1995).
28. U.C.C. § 1-201(36) (Proposed Draft 1996).
29. Id. § 2-102(19). See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
30. Id. § 1-201(20). This term is defined as: "[A] record generated or communicated by electronic, optical, or other analogous means for transmission from one information system to another. The term includes electronic data interchange and electronic
mail." Id.
31. Id. § 1-201(21). An "electronic transaction" occurs when the parties "contemplate that an agreement may be formed through the use of electronic messages or
responses, whether or not either party anticipates that the information or records
exchanged will be reviewed by an individual." Id.
32. Id. § 2-102(26). An "electronic intermediary" is "a person or entity that, on
behalf of another, receives, transmits, stores or provides other services with respect to a
record of information." Id. "Intermediary with respect to an electronic message" would
not include a common carrier used in that capacity. Id.
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"standard form," "standard terms"3" and "substantial performance," 34 which, standing alone, could lead to the assumption that
the "perfect tender" rule in rejecting goods35 is eschewed in the
draft. As will be seen, however, such an assumption is
unwarranted.
III.

SCOPE

The original "scope" section simply applies Article 2 to generic
"transactions in goods," distinguishing security interests to
which Article 9 would apply while preserving consumer and
farmer protection. 6 The draft "scope" section, however, deals
with consumer protection and preempting law in a separate section.37 Instead of the somewhat amorphous "transactions in
goods," the draft describes Article 2 as applying to any "transaction, regardless of form, that creates a contract for the sale of
goods," but adds the important distinction, "including a contract
in which a sale of goods predominates." 3 Even where the sale of

goods does not predominate, Article 2 would apply to the goods
portion of the contract where the goods "fail to conform to the
39
terms of the contract."
These elaborations, however, are only necessary clarifications
as contrasted with the enlargement of Article 2 where the seller
is contractually obligated "to install, service, repair, or replace
the goods sold at or after the time of delivery."40 This explicit
extension of Article 2 to service contracts is limited to service by
the "seller" rather than a third party. Standards of performance
for such sellers are found in new draft sections 2-501 through 233.

U.C.C. § 2-102(37), (38) (1995). These definitions will be discussed in a later

analysis of the "battle of the forms" and related matters. See section VIII, infra at note
201 et. seq. and accompanying text.
34. U.C.C. § 2-102(39) (1995). "Substantial performance" is "performance of a contractual obligation in a manner that does not constitute a material breach of contract."

Id.
35. With certain exceptions, the right to reject is provided for any nonconformity in
the goods or their tender. U.C.C. § 2-601 (1995). The exceptions, however, are substan-

tial and include contrary agreement by the parties, installment contracts, the implied
limitation of good faith, the limitation of a reasonable time to reject and the seller's overriding right to cure under original section 2-508. Id.
36. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1995).
37. U.C.C. § 2-104 (Proposed Draft 1996). The notes to this draft section are particularly emphatic about the application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), which, as "federal law," preempts the UCC
when applicable, as it would be, for example, in a contract between a Canadian seller
suing a United States buyer in the Southern District of New York. Id. at note 4.
38. Id. § 2-103(aX). This important clarification of the test to be used in mixed

sale of goods/services contracts is very desirable.
39.
40.

Id. § 2-103(a)(2).
Id. § 2-103(a)(3).
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504, which deal with such subjects as material versus "nonmaterial" breaches, 41 a "quality of performance" standard to supplement other warranty standards, the scope of a seller's support or
instruction to the buyer, and the maintenance and repair of
goods. This elaboration of the application of Article 2 might be
viewed as an effort to frame its precise boundaries, but a note to
this section expressly invites courts to continue the extension of
Article 2 by analogy.42 The remainder of the "scope" section
attempts to distinguish the application of new Article 2B, i.e.,
transactions where goods and information licensed under Article
2B are involved. The notes reveal a lack of confidence if not anxiety as to these efforts.43
IV.

UNCONSCIONABILITY

It is sensible to move the unconscionability section from part 3
of Article 24 to part 1 because it is an underlying and pervasive
standard 45 like the standard of "good faith." There is precious
little difference between the current language and the draft.46
The unconscionability section in Article 2A (leases) replicates the
language of the current law, but adds provisions on consumer
leases involving unconscionable conduct in the collection of
claims arising from a lease contract as well as claims for reasonable attorney's fees.47 The draft rejects this expanded treatment
41. Id. § 2-501-2-504. Draft section 2-602 expressly provides for a material breach
analysis to be used as the test for "substantial impairment of the value" as courts and
writers have been suggesting for a number of years. Id. § 2-602.
42. U.C.C. § 2-103 note 4 (Proposed Draft 1996) (citing with approval Barco Auto
Leasing Corp. v. PSI Cosmetics, Inc., 478 N.Y.S.2d 505 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1984)).
43. See id. § 2-103 note 5 (providing: "To each his own on this one."); Id. § 2-103(c)
note 6 (setting forth: "More work should be done here.").
44. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1995).
45. U.C.C. § 2-105 (Proposed Draft 1996). Symmetry may suggest that just as
there is a requirement of "good faith" in all contracts, there should be a requirement of
'conscionability" in all contracts. Presumably, there is, since unconscionability is banned.
This change would then augur a definition of "conscionable" along with the definition of
.good faith." There is neither a definition of"bad faith" nor a section devoted to its effects.
Precluding unconscionability is undoubtedly desirable, though neither the current section
2-302 nor the draft section 2-105 makes the slightest attempt to define unconscionability.
The same difficulty would attend any effort to define "conscionability."
46. Compare U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1995) [in brackets] with U.C.C. § 1-205(a) (Proposed Draft 1996) [italicized]:
If the court finds as a matter of law [finds] that a [the] contract or any
clause thereof [of the contract] was [to have been] unconscionable at the time it was
made or was induced by unconscionable conduct, the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, [or it may] enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or [it may] so limit the application of any unconscionable clause
as to avoid any unconscionable result.
47. U.C.C. § 2A-108 (1995). The phrase "induced by unconscionable conduct" in
draft section 2-105(a) is taken from the current section 2A-108(2), which addresses consumer leases. See U.C.C. §2-105(a) (Proposed Draft 1996); U.C.C. § 2A-108(2) (1995).
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because it is a particularized application of unconscionability
found elsewhere in the draft.4 The Drafting Committee continues the limitation of unconscionability to the time the contract
was made 49 and the remedy to avoidance or limitation of the contract or clause rather than damages. Like its predecessor, the
determination of unconscionability in the draft is a "matter of
law" and a party will have "a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence as to the setting, purpose, and effect of the contract or
clause thereof or of the conduct." 50
The decision to leave the language of the unconscionability
section in vague terms of principle may be problematic. Like the
original section, the draft unconscionability section is conclusory:
if a court discovers unconscionability, it should be excised, i.e.,
there is no attempt to provide standards or tests to guide courts
in determining whether a contract or clause is unconscionable. A
note attempts final resolution of whether a disclaimer of warranty meeting the formal or threshold requirements of the disclaimer section may still be unconscionable. 5 ' Not surprisingly, it
resolves the question in accordance with the prevailing case law
and commentary; i.e., such a clause may still be unconscionable
on other grounds.5 2 Again, however, there is no attempt to establish even a basic test in the section language.
Absent such guidance in the original section, courts and commentators scurried to the "official" comments for assistance as
evidenced by the oft-cited language of "one-sided" contracts, as
well as the evils of "oppression and unfair surprise," the "basic
test" found in an "official" comment. 53 Induced by the desire to
Section 2A-108(4) allows reasonable attorney's fees to the consumer lessee when the court
finds unconscionability. U.C.C. § 2A-108(4) (1994). If the consumer lessee knowingly
makes a groundless claim of unconscionability, however, the court may award reasonable
attorney's fees to the party against whom such a knowingly groundless claim was made.

Id.
48. U.C.C. § 2-206 (Proposed Draft 1996). For example, draft section 2-206 deals
with "standard form records" and subsection (b) therein provides a special rule for consumers. See id. § 2-206, 2-206(b). Similarly, draft section 2-316(e) applies a special rule
for the exclusion or modification of implied warranties for consumers. See id. § 2-316(e).
49. See id. § 2-105. The Drafting Committee, however, added that a contract
"induced by unconscionable conduct" is also within the scope of the section. See id. The
lines between unconscionability and other abuses of the bargaining process such as

duress, undue influence, misrepresentation and bad faith are sometimes ignored. This
additional language in the draft unconscionability section may suggest a form of quasi or
incipient duress.
50. Id. § 1-205(b). This subsection also allows the court to consider such evidence
on its own motion. Id.
51. Id. § 2-316.
52. Id. § 1-205 note 2. See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS
§96(e) & nn. 63 & 64 (3rd ed. 1990) for a discussion of the case law and commentary.
53. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1995).
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unravel the mysteries of this "emotionally satisfying incantation," 4 courts parsed and extrapolated this comment language.
Myriad tests and analyses have been suggested by courts and
commentators over the last four decades. 55
Presumably, extensive comments to the draft version of unconscionability will address numerous questions such as: is there
merit in the "substantive"/"procedural" dichotomy suggested by
some courts and writers? What about "apparent" versus "genuine" assent, or "unexpected" versus "no choice" forms of unconscionability? What about a "contract of adhesion?"56 Should the
principles of famous cases such as Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc. 57 or Williams v. Walker-Thomas FurnitureCo.58 be
codified as reliable guides? What about the application of unconscionability in cases involving merchants, which courts have studiously rejected except for those "merchants" who demonstrate
the contractual understanding of consumers?59 What about the
use of unconscionability in cases where the buyer claims a gross
disproportion between price and value with an allegation of overreaching?60 Extensive comments explicating myriad applications
of the unconscionability standard are not only desirable but necessary. Yet, a general statement of the basic elements of unconscionability in the section, aided by such comments, may be even
more desirable, notwithstanding the formidable challenge such
an effort would present.
At first blush, a new draft section on the allocation or division
of risks immediately following the unconscionability section
allows complete freedom to reallocate risks and shift burdens
otherwise imposed under Article 2.61 This addition, however,
54. This is the well-known characterization by the late Professor Arthur Leff,
Unconscionabilityand the Code-The Emperor'sNew Clause, 115 U. PA. L. RaV. 485, 55859 (1967), who added, "[i]t is easy to say nothing with words." While I disagreed with
Professor Lefts analysis of the unconscionability concept, see John E. Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1969), his characterization of the language of the section remains accurate and, like all of his work, elegant in expression.
55. See MURRAY, supra note 52 at § 96(b)-(d).
56. See id. at § 96(b)-(c) for an elaboration of each of these concepts and others.
57. 161 A. 2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
58. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
59. See MuRRAY, supra note 52 at § 96 nn. 55-60.
60. See id. at § 96 nn. 51-53.
61. U.C.C. § 2-106 (Proposed Draft 1996). Draft section 2-106 states: "Whenever
this article allocates a risk or imposes a burden as between the parties, the agreement
may shift the allocation and apportion the risk or burden." Id. This is somewhat reminiscent of a statement in the original comment to section 2-302, which insisted that "[tihe
principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise.. .and not of disturbance of the allocationof risks because of superiorbargainingpower." U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt.
1 (1995) (emphasis added). One explanation was that the mere existence or appearance
of superior bargaining power does not allow a court to declare a contract or clause to be
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must be read in conjunction with draft section 2-109. While continuing the general principle that parties are free to vary sections of Article 2 by their agreement, section 2-109 codifies clear
exceptions to the general principle of freedom of contract, including relief from unconscionable contracts or clauses.6 2
V.

"GOODS"

The definitions of "goods" and "future goods" in original section
2-105(1) are found among the many definitions in draft section 2102.63 Original 2-105 also distinguishes existing and identified
goods from future goods and clarifies contracts to sell future
goods as well as sales of part interests in goods and undivided
shares in an identified bulk of fungible goods. 64 These pieces of 2105 now occupy a separate section in the draft.6 5 The remaining
66
parts of original 2-105 defining "lot" and "commercial unit"
67
have been moved to the enlarged list of definitions.
There is something to be said for the original section.
Unfolding distinctions among "goods," "existing goods," "identified goods," "future goods" and "undivided shares in a bulk of fungible goods" as well as distinguishing "lot" and "commercial unit"
in one Code section may be less confusing than requiring these
definitions to be reassembled and compared from scattered
sections.6
unconscionable. Rather, it is the oppressive use of such power that activates judicial
power to declare unconscionability.
62. U.C.C. § 2-109 (Proposed Draft 1996). While generally reaffirming the right of
parties to vary provisions of Article 2 by their agreement (whether or not a phrase such
as, "or otherwise agreed," appears in such a provision), draft section 2-109(b) lists those
sections that may not be limited or varied by the agreement of the parties: (1) the obligation of good faith under 1-203 and new section 2-102(a)(24); (2) the effect on use of parol or
extrinsic evidence under new section 2-202(b); (3) the right to relief from an unconscionable contract or clause under new section 2-105; (4) the effect of new section 2-316 concerning the negation or limitation of express warranties; and (5) the effect of new section 2318 concerning the extension of warranties. Id. § 2-109(b)(1)-(6). Even this list is incomplete in the draft, which contains a blank section 2-109(b)(6) suggesting future additional
exclusions. A note to draft section 2-109 lists the sections that cannot be limited or varied
by agreement:
Other sections that cannot be limited or varied by agreement include the
scope of the parties' power to liquidate damages, Section 2-710(a), the right to
assign contract rights, Section 2-403, reduction of the statute of limitations to less
than one year, section 2-714, and the rights of persons not parties to the contract.
Id. § 2-109 note 1.
63. Id. § 2-102(23), (25).
64. U.C.C. § 2-105(2)-(4) (1995).
65. U.C.C. § 2-107 (Proposed Draft 1996).
66. U.C.C. § 2-105(3), (4) (1995).
67. U.C.C. § 1-201(2), (7) (Proposed Draft 1996).
68. U.C.C. § 2-106 (1995). This and similar criticisms of the new draft, however,
may sometimes be mitigated by recognizing that those very familiar with the original
sections and so used to finding certain concepts in one place cannot be totally objective as
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STATUTE OF FRAUDS

The Drafting Committee approved the repeal of the Statute of
Frauds on March 6, 1993. An effort to restore it was easily
defeated at the 1995 annual meeting of NCCUSL. Draft section
2-201 not only repeals the Statute of Frauds as it applies to contracts for the sale of goods, but also (1) repeals the application of
the Statute to modifications, 9 (2) repeals the application of the
one-year provision of the Statute to contracts for the sale of
goods, 70 and (3) integrates a separate section of the original Article 2 making seals inoperative. 7 1 All of these efforts are grouped
under the caption "No Formal Requirements" in the new section
2-201. Notwithstanding Karl Llewellyn's championship of the
Statute of Frauds, the negation of "formal requirements" is in
keeping with his philosophy of repudiating "technical" requirements that interfere
with the identification of the factual bargain
72
parties.
the
of
The stated rationale for the rejection of the Statute is the common view that under modern fact-finding processes, original 2201 "is frequently used to avoid liability in cases where there was
"
credible evidence of an agreement and no evidence of perjury. 73
to the worth of the reorganization of such concepts in different sections with new
numbers.
69. U.C.C. § 2-201(a) (Proposed Draft 1996). This section reads, "[a] contract or
modification thereof is enforceable, whether or not a record signed by a party against
whom enforcement is sought . . . . " Id. This change, alone, alleviates the confusion of
original section 2-209, which applied the original 2-201 Statute of Frauds to modifications. See U.C.C. §§ 2-201, 2-209 (1995). Among other confusing problems, questions
arose as to whether modifications of sale-of-goods contracts that would not require a writing if they had been original contracts were, nonetheless, subject to original section 2209(3). See John E. Murray, The Modification Mystery: Section 2-209 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 32 VLL. L. REv. 1 (1987).
70. U.C.C. § 2-201(a) (Proposed Draft 1996). Draft section 2-201(a) applies "even if
the contract or modification is not capable of performance within one year after its making." Id. Having repealed the Statute of Frauds as it applies to contracts for the sale of
goods, the proposed draft would frustrate the rationale for the repeal if such a contract
could be recaptured by the "one-year" provision of the statute.
71. Id. § 2-201(b). The negation of the seal as applied to contracts or offers is formerly found in U.C.C. § 2-203 (1995).
72. See John Murray, The Article 2 Prism: The Underlying Philosophy of the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 WASHBURN L. J. 1, 6 & n.30 (1981). Notwithstanding his aversion to "technical" requirements of classical contract law that interfered with the
discovery of the factual bargain of the parties, Karl Llewellyn remained one of the few
champions of the Statute of Frauds. See Llewellyn, What Price Contract-An Essay in
Perspective, 40 YALE L. J. 704, 747 (1931) (suggesting that the habit of reducing agreements to some permanent record in this age of literacy (compared to the illiteracy of 1676)
is supported by the Statute of Frauds).
73. U.C.C. § 2-201 note 3 (Proposed Draft 1996). Note 2 to this section indicates
the consistency of the draft with the law of England. With the exception of contracts for
the sale of land and contracts to answer for the debt of another, the Statute was repealed
in England by the Law Reform Act of 1954. Note 2, however, reminds us that the Statute
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Supplemental comfort is suggested by the assertion that "there is
no persuasive evidence that the valuable habit of reducing agreements to a signed record will be adversely affected by the
repeal."74 It is difficult to discover the empirical basis for this
assertion since we have never been without a Statute of Frauds.
Other support for the repeal, however, is found in the extremely
modest requirements of the current Statute. 75 The Drafting
Committee could have discovered further support for its position
in the judicial erosion of the Statute through the creation of a
reliance basis for satisfying the statute well beyond that which
can be carried by the statutory language.76
On balance, few should suffer from the passing of the Statute
of Frauds. As the great Arthur Linton Corbin suggested, if the
entire Statute of Frauds was repealed, he would suffer only to
the extent that one volume of his magnificent treatise would no
longer be sold.7 7
VII.

PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

The original version of the Article 2 parol evidence rule78 is a
significant improvement over earlier shibboleths that often left
the practicing bar, courts and law students in some confusion.79
lives with respect to leases of goods in section 2A-201, and the draft section 2B-201 on
intellectual property provides options for its application.
74. Id. § 2-201 note 3.
75. Any number of terms can be omitted from the writing. There need only be
evidence of the identity of the parties, what they intended to buy and sell and the quantity term. U.C.C. 2-201, cmt. 1. Price, time of delivery and other terms may be omitted.
Id. More recently, even the requirement of the quantity term has been questioned. See
Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3rd Cir. 1991).
76. U.C.C. § 2-201 (1995). Notwithstanding the opening phrase of section 2-201,
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section.. . " courts have discovered a new exception in the reliance of a promisee. See, e.g., Potter v. Hatter Farms, Inc., 641 P. 2 628 (Or.
1982). The single reliance exception in the statute is found in original section 2-201(3)(a),
which allows reliance as a substitute for a writing only in the very narrow situation of
specially manufactured goods. See U.C.C. § 2-201(3Xa) (1995). The use of a judicially
created general reliance satisfaction device for the Statute of Frauds further erodes the
application of the statute.
77. 2 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRACrs § 275 (1963).
78. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1995).
79. The parol evidence rule was often viewed as a legal concept whose mysteries
were "familiar to many but fathomed by few." Astor v. Boulos Co., 451 A.2d 903, 905 (Me.
1982) (quoting J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 94 (2d ed.1965)).

There is an oft-

quoted statement of James Bradley Thayer concerning the parol evidence rule, "[flew
things are darker than this or fuller of subtle difficulties." JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAw 390 (1898).

Shibboleths merely state the conclusion that evidence may not be admissible to
vary, contradict or alter the terms of a writing. The application of this "rule," however,
required courts to adopt one or more tests to apply the rule. See MURRAY, supra note 52
at § 84. The case law included the silly "appearance" or "four corners" test, the 'Wigmore"
test, and the "natural inclusion' or "natural omission" test, which was, by far, the domi-
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In particular, the original version supports the critical distinction between interpretation and the parol evidence rule and clarifies the admission of trade usage, prior course of dealing and
course of performance evidence. Unfortunately, the section language does not contain a workable test for the judicial application of the rule, though the comments feature an extremely
valuable test emphasizing a narrower application. The original
Article 2 test is found in a comment: "If the additional terms are
such that, if agreed upon, they would certainly have been
included in the document in the view of the court, then evidence
of their alleged making must be kept from the trier of fact." °
The "would certainly" test narrows the application of the
rule. 8 ' The Drafting Committee intends the same test to be
applied 2 but, like its predecessor, fails to include it in the section
language. Instead, it seeks to guide courts by suggesting a
change in the language of the original section in a curious way.
It begins with the original distinction between a writing or record that may be merely final (partially integrated) or final and
complete (fully integrated).8 3 If a writing is deemed only partially integrated, both the original and draft versions state that
the written terms "may not be contradicted by any prior ('previous' in the draft) agreement or a contemporaneous oral agreement." While both versions provide that trade usage, prior course
of dealing or course of performance evidence is always admissible
regardless of the finality or completeness (full integration) of the
writing, the original version allows a partially integrated writing
nant test: Would parties situated as were the parties to this contract, naturally and normally include the alleged extrinsic matter in the writing? Id. § 84(c)(1), (3), (6). This is
essentially the test ascribed to Professor Williston, the Reporter of the First Restatement
of Contracts. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 240(1)(b) (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CoNrAiCTs § 216(2)(b) (1971). See MuRRAY, supra note 52 at § 84 for an analysis of
these and other tests, including the Uniform Commercial Code test.
80. U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 3 (1995) (emphasis added).
81. This is a modified Williston test as found in the following analysis:
Under the Williston test ('natural inclusion' or 'natural omission'), if parties, situated as were the parties to the contract, would have naturally (normally or
ordinarily) included the alleged extrinsic matter in the kind of writing they executed, the evidence is excluded. Under the UCC test, only if such parties would
certainly have included such extrinsic terms in their writing is the evidence
excluded. Thus, less evidence of extrinsic agreements is excludable (or more evidence is admissible) under the UCC test than the Williston test.
MuRRAY, supra note 52 at § 84. See also the precocious statement of the great Justice
Roger Traynor in Masterson v. Sine, 436 P. 2d 561, 564 (1968): "The draftsmen of the
Uniform Commercial Code would exclude evidence in still fewer instances .... ." Id.
82. U.C.C. § 2-202 note 1 (Proposed Draft 1996).
83. The draft version uses "record" in 2-202(a) and "writing or record" in 2-202(b).
Hereinafter, for the purposes of this discussion, "writing" and "record" are used interchangeably, recognizing that the original version deals only with writings while the draft
deals with either in the same fashion.
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to be "explained or supplemented ... by evidence of consistent
additional terms."' The new version allows a partially integrated record to "be explained or supplemented by evidence of
noncontradictory additional terms."88 An explanatory note
states: "[Tihis latter ground for admissibility changes original
Section 2-202, which excluded evidence of 'inconsistent additional terms,' and arguably narrows the effect of partial integration." The same note adds that the change follows the test from
original comment 3, quoted above, but then emphatically dis86
closes that the parol evidence section of the draft of Article 2B
retains the "consistent additional terms" language found in the
original 2-202.87
The obvious question is whether there is any real difference
between "consistent additional terms" and "noncontradictory
additional terms." Both versions of the parol evidence section
preclude the admission of "contradictory" terms even where the
writing is only partially integrated. If an additional term is "consistent" or "noncontradictory," both versions would allow a partially integrated writing to be explained or supplemented by such
a term."8 The implication is clear that the original version precludes the admission of an "inconsistent" term. But if "inconsistent" means "contradictory," 9 it does not differ from the draft
version since the draft would allow only "noncontradictory"
terms to be admitted to explain or supplement a partially integrated record. 90 Yet, the draft insists that by allowing noncontradictory evidence to be admitted where the record is partially
integrated, the draft "changes original Section 2-202" because
the original section "excluded evidence of 'inconsistent additional
84. Id. § 2-202(b) (emphasis added). The inclusion of"course of performance" along
with trade usage and prior course of dealing evidence as admissible notwithstanding the
parol evidence rule is somewhat superfluous. Course of performance necessarily must
occur after the contract is formed and constitutes the strongest evidence of the meaning of
the agreement since it is the parties themselves who are engaged in such course of performance, and their manifestations of performance may be viewed as the best evidence of
what they meant by their written (or recorded) agreement. Moreover, course of performance evidence may be sufficient to constitute a waiver of the recorded terms of the agreement. U.C.C. § 2-208 (1995). Thus, even if course of performance was not mentioned in
the U.C.C. parol evidence section, evidence of such performance would be admissible
since the parol evidence rule has no application to subsequent as contrasted with prior or
contemporaneous agreements.
85. U.C.C. § 2-202(a)(2) (Proposed Draft 1996) (emphasis added).
86. Id. § 2B-301(a)(2).
87. Id. § 2-202 note 1.
88. If the writing is fully integrated (i.e., final and complete), even consistent or
noncontradictory terms will not be admitted. U.C.C. § 2-202 (Proposed Draft 1996).
89. One of the ordinary dictionary definitions of "contradiction" is "inconsistent."
See, e. g., WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 397 (1983).
90. U.C.C. §2-202 (Proposed Draft 1996).
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terms."' 9 1 This confusion is a prime candidate for clarification in
any final draft.
Even assuming that this distinction can somehow be clarified,
the draft could be more user-friendly to a trial judge who must
make parol evidence rulings in the trenches and to appellate
courts confronted with final decisions. Since the purpose of both
versions is to preserve the integrity of a record where reasonable
parties would certainly have included alleged extrinsic matters
in the record, why not state that test in the section language?
There is a splendid location for the insertion of such language, as
the draft adds a new subsection directing courts to consider all
relevant evidence of intention to "integrate the document." 92 It is
difficult to understand why this new subsection is added without
the critical test; the very test desired by the Drafting Committee.
In the draft's present form, it restates the obvious without the
critical assistance that a statutory test would provide.
Other important questions not considered in the original 2-202
continue to be left to future comments. An earlier (May 1994)
draft followed certain case law holding that a merger clause does
not create a conclusive presumption of a total (full) integration.
This statement was removed at a meeting of the Drafting Committee in March, 1995. A note in the latest version (July 1996)
states that "a merger clause creates a presumption that both parties intended a total [full] integration and puts a difficult burden
on one party to establish the contrary."93 Does this mean that a
merger clause almost creates a conclusive presumption-a
"quasi conclusive presumption"-or just a regular presumption?
The same note adds that an alternative draft to a section of Article 2B distinguishes merger clauses in standard forms from negotiated merger clauses. 94 The new Article 2 should certainly
emphasize this distinction since merger clauses in standard,
printed forms are so often ignored. To do so, however, raises
other complications because the draft includes a new section
without parallel in the original version dealing with the binding

91.

Id. §2-202 note 1. The original version does so by allowing the admission of

evidence of "consistent additional terms" to explain or supplement a partially integrated
writing. U.C.C. §2-202(b) (1995).
92. U.C.C. § 202(b) (Proposed Draft 1996). Since there is no statutory definition of
"document," which presumably refers to a "writing," the drafters apparently meant to say
"record."
93. Id. § 2-202 note 2.
94. See id. § 2B-301(b) (Alternative 2) (stating that a merger clause not in a standard form is "presumed to state the intent of the parties on this issue"). Thus, a standard
form merger clause would not create a presumption.
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effect of terms in a standard form. 95 It is tempting to suggest a
tidy solution: if a party assents to a standard merger clause in a
standard form in accordance with the new section on standard
forms, there is a rebuttable presumption that the parties
intended their document to be final and complete, i.e., totally or
fully integrated. If, however, the parties manifest assent to a
negotiated merger clause, the presumption is conclusive. 9
Two final matters deserve attention. An earlier (May 1994)
draft contained a subsection 97 invoking the incredible old notion
that a court must find a record ambiguous before extrinsic evidence is admissible to interpret it. Fortunately, this retrogression was deleted at the March 1995 meeting, which the current
draft happily reports. 9 Yet, the fact that this antediluvian view
reached draft status at any time may be sufficient evidence of the
need to place a final stake in its heart by clearly rejecting it in
the statutory language. 99 Notwithstanding the fundamental
nature of the distinction between interpretation and the parol
evidence rule, a short but clear expression of that distinction,
including the rejection of any requirement of finding ambiguity,
may be a worthwhile replacement for the properly deleted subsection of the earlier draft. 100 Such a clause could also finally and
irrevocably condemn the "dreaded 'plain meaning rule.""0 '

95. Id. § 2-206. See infra note 178 and accompanying text for a discussion of draft
section 2-206.
96. There were earlier discussions concerning the effect of standard merger clauses
in consumer contracts that included recommendations that such clauses be deemed inoperative or be enforced only if the consumer understood and expressly agreed to such a
clause. These recommendations were rejected. The present draft allows courts "to sort
out cases where there is unfair surprise or no real assent" to such printed merger clauses.
Id. § 2-202 note 5.
97. The subsection was denoted as subsection (c).
98. U.C.C. § 2-202 note 4 (Proposed Draft 1996).
99. At the very least, a strongly worded comment is essential.
100. A blurring of this fundamental distinction continues to occur with some
regularity.
101. The last paragraph of U.C.C. § 2-202 note 4 (Proposed Draft 1996) explains
that there was some concern that the phrase "terms may be explained" in the section
could give rise to the "dreaded 'plain meaning rule.'" Not surprisingly, the best statement
of the absurdity of the "plain meaning" rule emanated from the great Arthur Linton
Corbin:
It is sometimes said, in a case in which the written words seem plain and
clear and unambiguous, that the words are not subject to interpretation or construction. One who makes this statement has of necessity already given the words
an interpretation-the one that is to him plain and clear; and in making the statement he is asserting that any different interpretation is 'perverted' and untrue.
MURRAY, supra note 52 at § 81 (quoting Arthur Corbin, The Interpretationof Words and
the ParolEvidence Rule, 50 CoRNLL L. Q. 161, 171-72 (1965)).
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FORMATION, STANDARD TERMS, FORMS AND THE "BATTLE"

There was never any doubt that a new Article 2 would include
a substantial revision of section 2-207 dealing with the infamous
"battle of the forms." The clear consensus that this "byzantine" 10 2 section simply had to be changed established it as the
prime candidate for revision. 10 3 It was, however, more than predictable that the Drafting Committee would encounter considerable difficulty in meeting this challenge. 10 4
The changes are complex and require a lengthy analysis.
Before that analysis can be understood, the complexities of the
original 2-207 and its curious interpretation must be understood.
With apologies bordering on the abject to those who fully understand the "chaos" of the "battle," °3 it is necessary to sketch the
background for others.
A. Background-The Challenge
The original 2-207 attempts to revolutionize the agreement
process by directing courts to unearth the true or factual bargain
of the parties from layers of boilerplate in printed forms that
almost everybody used but almost no one read and fewer understood.10 6 The buyer's printed purchase order expressly or
102. This was the characterization of the court in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. BucyrusErie Co., 388 N.W.2d 584, 590 (Wis. 1986). Other characterizations include "a murky bit
of prose," Southwest Eng'g Co. v. Martin Tractor Co., 483 P.2d 18, 25 (Kan. 1970), and
"[a]n enigmatic section of the Code," Ebasco Servs. Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 460
F.Supp. 163, 205 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
103. As suggested in Murray, The Revision of Article 2: Romancing the Prism, 35
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1447 (1994), the awkward analysis of section 2-207 was the product
of the courts because Karl Llewellyn placed too much faith in the ability of judges to
elaborate his concept through the language of section 2-207. Such a radical change
required a much more carefully articulated section if it was to have the effect Llewellyn
sought. As in other matters, Llewellyn made the mistake of assuming that everyone, or
at least the courts in their common law tradition, were quite capable of sharing his ingenious vision.
104. Having written several articles analyzing 2-207 and its judicial progeny, my
students urged me to provide a draft of a new Article 2. The response is found in John
Murray, A ProposedRevision of Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 6 J. L. &
COM. 337 (1986). At page 355 of that piece, the following statement appears: "Discussing
the design of the new Section 2-207 is considerably easier than drafting it." Id. at 355. I
include a "working draft" as nothing more than an effort to begin the process of revision.
The actual revision process has confirmed the difficulty of restating the principles of section 2-207 without the confusion and manufactured difficulties in the current interpretation of that section. For example, at the 1995 NCCUSL meeting in Kansas City,
Missouri, the draft revision was followed by a note calling it "the latest draft in the constantly evolving Section 2-207." U.C.C. note to 2-207 (Proposed Draft 1995).
105. John Murray, The Chaos of the Battle of the Forms:Solutions, 39 VAnD.L. REv.
1307 (1986).
106. See MuRRAY,supra note 52 at §§ 48-50 for a complete analysis of the "battle of
the forms" and related matters.
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impliedly contained all of the normal warranty and remedial protection afforded by the law, while the seller's prefabricated
acknowledgment sought to strip away much of that protection
and, perhaps, add an arbitration clause to deny the buyer the
normal judicial process in the event of a dispute. Yet, as to the
consciously considered ("dickered") terms of the deal-identity of
the goods, price and quantity-that the parties had written,
typed or word processed in the blanks of the printed forms, the
forms were identical. The seller's typical response to the buyer's
offer was necessarily a counter offer, simply because it contained
different or additional boilerplate terms. The conclusion was
inescapable that the buyer's acceptance of the goods after receiving the "counter offer" constituted an acceptance of the seller's
terms. The seller, therefore, won the "battle of the forms"
10 7
because the seller fired the "last shot" in the battle.
Karl Llewellyn, however, believed that such parties intended
to form a contract to buy and sell certain goods at the price found
in both forms even though the unconscious, undickered terms in
the boilerplate did not match, i.e., the intended offer and the
intended acceptance did match. To discover a contract under
these circumstances, the "matching acceptance" rule, requiring
the acceptance to be the "mirror image" of the offer, had to be
modified. 0 8 This was accomplished by treating a "definite and
seasonable expression of acceptance" as an operative acceptance
even though such an "acceptance" contained different or additional terms. 0 9 While an early judicial reaction simply could not
assimilate this radical change, 10 courts finally perceived the
107. See Step Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91, 98-99 (3d Cir. 1991)
for an analysis of the "last shot" principle and the change effected in that principle by
original section 2-207.
108. There is a tendency to suggest that the "matching acceptance" rule was discarded. In fact, the rule remains with respect to any "dickered" term such as the price,
quantity and identity terms. Thus, an offer to sell goods for $10,000 is not accepted by a
response to buy the goods for $8,000 since such a response is clearly not a "definite and
seasonable expression of acceptance." Beyond this obvious distinction, it is plausible to
suggest that original section 2-207 was designed to effectuate the "true" matching acceptance rule, i.e., to treat an expression of acceptance that matched the dickered terms as a
real, substantive and intended acceptance even though the printed form used to accomplish such an acceptance contained nonmatching boilerplate terms.
109. Original section 2-207(1) provides:
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which
is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states
terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1995).
110. See Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962), where
the court could not bring itself to understand how an otherwise definite expression of
acceptance could operate as an acceptance since the "acceptance" contained a disclaimer
of warranty materially altering the terms of the offer. Yet, original section 2-207(2)(b)
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change in the "matching acceptance" rule, which they proudly
asserted as their sophisticated understanding of section 2-207."'
Unfortunately, there was precious little judicial understanding
of the Llewellyn design beyond this point.
Under original 2-207, a seller could no longer convince a court
that because its response to an offer contained different or additional terms in the fine print, such a response was a counter offer
when the dickered terms matched. Rather, it was deemed an
acceptance and the seller's materially altering terms were
excised." 2 Sellers were not pleased with this result, and resorted
to the use of ambiguous language to regain control of the "battle"
by making a counter offer. They accomplished this feat by a
clause providing that "acceptance" was "expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms," which
tracked the statutory language. 1 3 Though courts insisted that
such language in a seller's printed form must sufficiently track
the proviso in the statute,1 4 if the clause was virtually identical
to the statutory language, they were forced to characterize the
seller's response as a counter offer. The result was no contract,
though it is more than likely that the agents for both buyer and
seller assumed they had a contract and were without a clue as to
the legal effect of the "expressly conditional" formula language in
the seller's form. After all, the typical formula phrase, "this
acceptance is expressly conditioned on buyer's assent to any different or additional terms found on the front or reverse side of
this form," called itself an "acceptance." The normal operation of
counter offers would lead to the pre-Code, "last shot" result, i.e.,
after receiving such a formula counter offer, the buyer's acceptance of the goods would manifest acceptance of the seller's
counter-offer terms that stripped away the normal protection
otherwise afforded by the U.C.C. While nothing in the Code suggested any modification of such algebraic counter offer effects,
courts insisted that the mere acceptance of the goods rather than
expressly recognizes that such material alterations in otherwise definite expressions of
acceptance simply do not become part of the contract. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) (1995).

111. See, e. g., Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp., 794 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir.
1986); C. Itoh & Co. (American) Inc. v. Jordan Intl Co., 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1977);
Hohenberg Bros. Co. v. Killebrew, 505 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1974); Dorton v. Collins & Aik-

man Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972); Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp., 569 P. 2d 751 (Cal.
1977); Uniroyal Inc. v. Chambers Gasket & Mfg. Co., 380 N.E.2d 571 (Ind.App. 1981).
112. Between merchants, such terms became part of the contract unless they materially altered the terms of the offer. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) (1995).
113.

Id. § 2-207(1).

114. Courts became very sticky about different language that was arguably no different in substance from the statutory language, often holding that different language did
not create a counter offer. See Dorton, 453 F.2d at 1168.
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some manifestation of express assent to the seller's terms would
be insufficient. They arrived at this conclusion expressly because
the formula counter offer was "ambiguous," 1 5 i.e., the buyer
would not have understood the response as a counter offer. This
analysis ignored the fundamental principle of contract law that
an ambiguous response to an offer need not be treated as a
6
counter offer."
The flawed judicial analysis found an offer, rejected by a
counter offer," 7 that was not accepted by the conduct of the
buyer in accepting the goods. Since the goods had been shipped
and accepted by the purchaser, however, a contract had to be recognized-a contract by conduct that activated the notorious subsection (3) of 2-207.111 The terms of the contract were those that
matched on the forms that previously failed to create a contract,
while the nonmatching terms on such forms were excised.
Resulting gaps were filled with Article 2 terms. The net effect
was an offer that expressly or impliedly contained all U.C.C.
buyer protection (warranties, remedies, etc.), a counter offer that
unsuccessfully sought to remove much of that protection, a shipment of the goods, the acceptance of the shipment, and a resulting contract by conduct with all of the dickered (matching) terms
supplemented by U.C.C. buyer protection terms. The buyer won
the battle of the forms.
115. One court provided: "Since the seller injected ambiguity into the transaction
by inserting the 'expressly conditional' clause in his form, he, and not the buyer, should
bear the consequence of that ambiguity under subsection (3)." C. Itoh, 552 F.2d at 1238.
116. Such a response should not be effective as a counter offer. An offeror (buyer) in
such a case may be justified in treating the response as an equivocal acceptance from
which the offeror may infer assent. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 57, cmt.
b (1971).
117. At this point in the transaction, i.e., before any shipment of goods, millions of
buyers and sellers assumed they had formed a contract, but actually had not. As one
court noted, either party could "walk away from the transaction without incurring any
liability .... " C. Itoh, 552 F. 2d at 1238.
118. Original section 2-207(3) provides:
Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not
otherwise establish a contract. In such case, the terms of the particular contract
consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any
supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.
Id.
In a well known letter from the late Professor Grant Gilmore to Professor Robert
Summers, Gilmore suggested that the original (1952) version of 2-207, which contained
only subsections (1) and (2), "was bad enough.. .but the addition of subsection (3), without
the slightest explanation of how it was supposed to mesh with (1) and (2), turned the
section into a complete disaster." Letter from Professor Grant Gilmore to Professor Robert Summers, reprinted in RICHARD E. SPEIDEL ET AL., COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW
54-55 (3d ed. 1981). Gilmore also suggested that Llewellyn had nothing to do with the
addition of subsection (3). Id.
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Since sellers could no longer prevail by making even the most
precise formula counter offer, this almost comical exercise continued. Some sellers became convinced that victory in the battle lay
in their becoming offerors instead of offerees. By ascertaining
that a quote would be construed as an offer, the seller invited the
usual purchase order response by the unknowing buyer. The
quote/offer would disclaim warranties, exclude consequential
damages and perhaps add other clauses. Rather than its usual
characterization as an offer, the purchase order response would
be viewed as an "acceptance" containing different or additional
terms that materially altered the terms of the offer and were,
therefore, excised. This little trick allowed the seller/offeror to
prevail in the battle because it fired the "first shot." Thus, the
new but notorious "first shot" principle simply replaced the notorious "last shot" principle, which was one of the fundamental
evils original 2-207 was designed to overcome. 119
Beyond these chaotic pieces, there are other confusing, if not
mysterious, elements to section 2-207 such as why 2-207(1)
refers to acceptances containing "different or additional" terms
while 2-207(2) refers only to "additional" terms. Explanations
range from a printer's error to a conscious decision to apply subsection (2) only to additional terms. The ramifications include
different ways of dealing with "different" terms depending on
whether they are intended to be governed by subsection (2).12 °
Another fundamental rationale for the creation of 2-207 was the
necessity to confront the pervasive use of confirmations containing different or additional terms. The analysis of this effort,
where the statute pretends the confirmation is an acceptance,
was anything but clear. Less formidable challenges ask whether
variations in an acceptance are material or immaterial.
Karl Llewellyn attacked the fundamental unfairness caused
by the application of monistic principles of classical contract law
to the "battle of the forms." He was concerned about "unfair surprise" and "oppression"-concepts associated with unconscionability. Section 2-207 was an effort to nip unconscionability in the
bud because it manifests threshold or "incipient unconscionability."12 1 This singular section was designed to deal with a host of
119. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 373 N.W.2d 65 (Wis. Ct. App.
1985), rev'd on other grounds, 388 N.W.2d 584, 590 (Wis. 1986) (finding that the original
contract had been modified orally to include a warranty and describing entire section 2207 process as "byzantine").
120. For a complete analysis, see Murray, The Chaos of the Battle of the Forms:
Solutions, supra note 105 at 1354-65 n.103.
121. John Murray, Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Another Word
About Incipient Unconscionability, 39 U. Prrr. L. REv. 597 (1978).
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questions, including resolutions of the agreement process where
the forms did not match or a confirmation did not match the earlier agreement, and the fundamental question of whether one is
bound by the unread boilerplate. It also pursued an incomplete
effort to deal with complex issues surrounding the effect of standardized terms and forms in myriad circumstances. Llewellyn
depended much too heavily on the creativity of his favored common law tradition to deal with these and related questions pursuant to one section of the U.C.C. The Drafting Committee
decided that more than one section was necessary to meet these
challenges, but still experienced considerable difficulty in its
efforts to cure the chaos of the battle of the forms.
B.

The New 2-207

The new 2-207 in the draft is only one of several operative
draft sections that surround the "battle of the forms" and related
problems. The analysis begins with the new version of the section dealing with "formation in general."12 2 While this section
continues the original concept that a contract may be made in
any reasonable manner including conduct, and, if the parties so
intend, a contract will be found notwithstanding considerable
indefiniteness, "the issue of contract formation has been
detached from the original section 2-207 and is treated in sections 2-203(b) [the formation section] and 2-205(a)(1) [the modified section on offer and acceptance in the formation of
contract]." 12 3 Thus, the new section 2-207 "assumes a contract
for sale has been formed under sections 2-203 and 2-205. [New]
Section 2-207 does not deal with contract formation."' 24
The first critical portion of the new analysis begins in 2-203(b):
If the parties so intend, an agreement sufficient to make a contract
may be found even if the time when the agreement was made cannot
be determined, one or more terms are left open or to be agreed upon,
or standardterms
in the records of the parties do not otherwise estab125
lish a contract.

A note to this section confirms the origins of the italicized addition: "The test is taken from the first sentence of original section
2-207(3). Thus, if there is conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract but standard terms in their
26
records do not agree, a contract is still made under 2-203(b)."1
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

U.C.C. § 2-203 (Proposed Draft 1996) (replacing U.C.C. § 2-204 (1995)).
Id. § 2-203 note 1.
Id. § 2-207 note 3.
Id. § 2-203(b) (emphasis added).
Id. § 2-203 note 1 (emphasis added).
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Having dealt with the contract by conduct scenario from original
2-207(3), we are eager to discover the new analysis of the remaining formation problems from original 2-207(1). After a slightly
changed section on "firm offers," 27 the section dealing with "Offer
and Acceptance in Formation of Contract" 128 is virtually identical
to its predecessor except for an addition borrowed from original
2-207:
(a) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or
circumstances the following rules apply:
(1) An offer to make a contract must be construed as inviting
acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable under the
circumstances, including a definite expression of acceptance
contain1 29
ing standard terms that vary the terms of the offer.

The italicized language is the new version of original 2-207(1).
The remainder of 2-205 is a replication of original 2-206.130
To determine what the Drafting Committee intends by "a definite expression of acceptance containingstandardterms that vary
the terms of the offer,"13 ' it is important to begin with the Article

1 definition of "term," which is unchanged: "'Term' means that
13 2
portion of an agreement which relates to a particular matter."
127. U.C.C. § 2-204 (Proposed Draft 1996). The original section 2-205 required a
term of assurance that an offer would be held open in a form supplied by an offeree to be
"separately signed" by the offeror who may have otherwise unwittingly made a firm offer.
U.C.C. § 2-205 (1995). The new version states that such "[a] term of assurance in a record
supplied by the offeree is ineffective unless it is conspicuous." U.C.C. § 2-204 (Proposed
Draft 1996). There was also discussion concerning the continuation of the three month
limit on a firm offer that, without any stated time limit, is open for a reasonable time. Id.
§ 2-204 note 1. The three month limit continues in the draft of 2-204, but the notes indicate the issue remains open. Id. § 2-204.
128. U.C.C. § 2-205 (Proposed Draft 1996).
129. Id. § 2-205(a)(1) (emphasis added).
130. Unfortunately, draft section 2-205(b) replicates original section 2-206(2), which
caused confusion with respect to a notice requirement where the acceptance occurs
through the "beginning of performance." Such notice is not part of the acceptance, but
may be treated as such through the implication of the language in both the original and
draft versions allowing the offer to be treated as having lapsed absent such notice. U.C.C.
§ 2-206 cmt. 3 (1995). The original version confirmed that notice is part of the acceptance
in the comments. Notice is a condition to the duty of the former offeror created by the
contract that was formed via the beginning of performance. Moreover, this condition is
essential only where the former offeror would not promptly become aware of the beginning of performance. There is the additional problem of distinguishing such notice from
the notice required by a seller who ships the goods under original section 2-504, which is
unchanged under draft section 2-507. The shipping seller's notice requirement is
expressly different from the notice requirement when the acceptance occurs through the
beginning of performance. Moreover, under original section 2-504 (last paragraph), the 2507(b) notice requirement is not a ground for rejection of the goods unless it causes material delay or loss. See John E. Murray, Jr., The Revision of Article 2: Romancing the
Prism, 35 WM.& MARY L. RaV. 1447, 1456-63 (1994).
131. U.C.C. § 2-205(a)(1) (Proposed Draft 1996) (emphasis added).
132. U.C.C. § 1-201(42) (1995). This is one of the "key definitions" referred to in
U.C.C. § 2-207 note 3, para. 5 (Proposed Draft 1996).
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"Standard terms," however, is one of the new definitions following the definition of "standard form."133 "'Standard terms'
means terms prepared in advance for general and repeated use
by one party and used without negotiation with the other
party .134

"Standard terms," therefore, are "undickered" terms, the kind
found in boilerplate and not consciously considered by the parties. Under the new version, suppose an offeree includes the
formula counter offer language or similar language in the "standard terms" of a "standard form." Will that create a counter
offer? New 2-203 (the general formation section) requires such
conditioning language to be "clear and conspicuous."3 The new
offer and acceptance section does not contain similar language,
but a note to that section states that:
[While] an offeree can avoid a contract by stating to the offeror that no
contract exists unless the offeror agrees to the offeree's standard
terms . . . [1language in an offer or purported acceptance which
attempts to condition contract formation upon agreement by the other
to the terms proposed should be clear
and, when contained in a stan136
dard form record, be conspicuous.
While a future comment making this point is certainly desirable,
in light of the havoc caused by this question in the past, there
should be no reticence in emphasizing this requirement in the
section language. Even the examples in the draft could be made
abundantly clear.
Example 1 suggests a purchase order for 1000 units of
described goods at $500 per unit and an acknowledgment that
matches all dickered terms. '3 The reverse side of the purchase

order contains standard terms including an arbitration clause,
and the acknowledgment contains a standard term on the
reverse side excluding consequential damages. 3 8 After mailing
the acknowledgment, the market price rises and the seller faxes
a rejection to the buyer. ' 9 There is a contract pursuant to 2133.

See U.C.C. § 2-102(37) (Proposed Draft 1996). "Standard form" under draft

section 2-102(37) means:
[A] record prepared by one party in advance for general and repeated use
that substantially contains standard terms and was used in the transaction without negotiation of, or change in, the substantial majority of standard terms. Negotiation of price, quantity, time of delivery or method of payment does not preclude a
record from being a standard form.
Id.
134. Id. § 2-102(38) (emphasis added).
135. Id. § 2-203(d).
136. Id. § 2-205 note 2.
137. Id. § 2-205 Example 1.
138. U.C.C. § 2-205 Example 1 (Proposed Draft 1996).
139. Id.
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205(a)(1) (an acceptance is effective even though it contains standard terms that vary the offer), and the seller's record did not
unambiguously indicate that there would be no contract absent
the buyer's agreement with all proposed terms as required by 2203(d). 4 ° The example expressly states that if the seller had
"clearly and conspicuously indicated that it did not intend to conclude a contract unless [the buyer] agreed to all of [the seller's]
terms, both negotiated and standard," there would be no
contract.
This desirable example could be enhanced by focusing upon
the question, "clear and conspicuous" to whom? The example
should indicate that such an express statement must be clear
and conspicuous to a reasonable party under the circumstances,
and no ambiguous formula language such as that previously
found in original 2-207 should be effective to create a counter
offer that negates the formation of a contract. But is this what
the Drafting Committee intended?
The manifested intention of the Committee is found in its commendation of Judge Wisdom's rationale in Step-Saver Data Sys.
v. Wyse Tech., where this opinion clearly requires a "reasonable
offeror" to understand that the offeree intends to proceed with a
contract only on the terms of the offeree.' 4 ' Then, why didn't the
Committee say this, not only in the comment and example, but in
the section itself? Repeating the "clear" standard in 2-205 after
it has been stated in 2-203 may seem redundant, but it emphasizes the critical importance of ascertaining that an offeror is not
unfairly surprised or oppressed.
Example 2 makes one change in the fact situation: seller's
acknowledgment states the price at $600 per unit and also contains a standard term that the "seller reserves the right to litigate any dispute." 142 Seller ships the goods to the buyer with the
acknowledgment and buyer accepts the goods without objection.143 The example states, "[t]here is a contract under 2203(b)." 144 This is curious since 2-203(b) is the subsection that
allows a contract to be formed when terms are left open "or the
standard terms of the parties do not otherwise establish a con140. Id. § 2-203(d). "Language in a standard form or a standard term which conditions intention of that party to be bound upon further agreement by the other party must
be clear and conspicuous." Id. It should be noted that this example appears to mistakenly interchange buyer (B) for seller (S). Id. § 2-205 example 1.
141. 939 F.2d 91, 102-03 (3d Cir. 1991). This "well-reasoned opinion" is cited for
this concept in Note 3 following 2-207 (the "fifth" rationale for 2-207). See U.C.C. § 2-207
note 3, para. 6 (Proposed Draft 1996).
142. U.C.C. § 2-205 example 2 (Proposed Draft 1996).
143. Id.
144. Id.
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tract," i.e., it wars against indefiniteness. There is nothing indefinite about an attempt to "accept" a $500 offer at $600 per unit.
Example 2 correctly treats the $600 price in seller's form as a
negotiated term creating a counter offer that buyer accepted by
using the goods. Thus, the contract was not formed under 2203(b) as suggested in the example, but under 2-203(a), which
recognizes a contract by conduct. As to the variation in the standard terms, 2-203(b) allows a contract to be formed if the parties
so intend notwithstanding such variation. Whether the seller's
standard term varying the buyer's standard term (arbitration)
becomes part of the contract is not dealt with in either 2-203 or 2205. A contract has been formed under those sections, but the
question of which standard terms will be included in such a contract is determined by the new 2-207. Again, the new version of
2-207 has nothing to do with contract formation. From this
example, it is clear that 2-207 will deal only "with the narrow
question [of] whether the standard terms of one or both parties
are part of that agreement. " 145 This "narrow question" had been
formerly covered by original 2-207(2) to which the new 2-207 will
be relegated.
Example 3 to 2-205 has the buyer accepting the offer at the
offered price ($500) and the seller shipping the goods, which the
buyer accepts.'
Subsequently, a dispute arises and the buyer
insists on arbitration pursuant to the standard clause in the
purchase order while the seller points to the standard clause in
the acknowledgment "reserving the right to litigate." 4 7 Again,
there is no question as to whether a contract is formed. 14 It has
been formed "under either Section 2-205(a)(1) [which recognizes
'a definite expression of acceptance containing standard terms
that vary the terms of the offer'], or 2-203 [which recognizes an
intended contract though the standard terms in the records do
not otherwise establish a contract under 2-203(b)]." 1 49 Example 3
concludes with the interesting statement, "[ulnless the Buyer's
arbitration clause becomes part of the agreement under section
2-207, the 'default' rule is that the seller may litigate." 50 The
seller's clause reserving the right to litigate would generally be
superfluous since an aggrieved party' 51 would normally have the
145. Id. § 2-207 note 3, para. 4.
146. Id. § 2-205 Example 3.
147. U.C.C. § 2-205 Example 3 (Proposed Draft 1996).

148. Id.
149.

Id. § 2-205 Example 3.

150. Id.
151.

Original section 1-201 defines an "aggrieved party" as a party entitled to resort

to a remedy. U.C.C. § 1-201(2) (1995).
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right to litigate and pursue any of the buyer or seller remedies in
Article 2. If, however, the buyer's arbitration clause is included
as a term in the contract, the seller would lose the right to litigate. To discover how the new 2-207 would deal with this case,
consider a case to which the new 2-207 expressly applies.
Seller sends an offer in a record containing a "standard term
arbitration clause."'5 2 Buyer accepts via a record containing no
standard terms, i.e., the case involves standard terms in the record of only one party, the seller. 153 The seller ships and buyer
accepts the goods.15 1 Whether the arbitration clause is part of
the contract is determined by 2-207:
(a) In a contract to which 2-206 does not apply, 15 5 standard terms
in a record prepared by one party that materially vary the contract
are not part of the contract unless the party claiming inclusion establishes that the other party:
(1) expressly agreed to them; or
(2) had reason to know of them from course of performance, course
of dealing or usage of5 6trade and that they were intended for inclusion in the contract'1
(b) In cases governed by subsection (a), the terms of the contract are:
(1) standard terms included under subsection (a);
(2) other terms to which the parties have agreed, whether or not
contained in a record; and
(3) supplementary terms incorporated under any other provision of
this [article].' 5 7
Assuming that trade usage, prior course of dealing or course of
performance would not include arbitration in the contract absent
any express agreement to arbitrate between the parties, the
seller's standard term arbitration clause materially varies the
contract and is, therefore, not part of the contract, even though
the buyer accepted the goods. Buyer's conduct in accepting the
goods may be seen as "apparent assent," but apparent assent is
not sufficient if the requirements of 2-207(a) are not met. 5 8 The
152. U.C.C. § 2-207 illus. C, para. 1 (Proposed Draft 1996).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. The new 2-206 adds a section on "standard form records" where there is only
one such record to determine whether the party who did not prepare it is bound by all of
the standard terms contained therein. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
156. The phrase, "and that they were intended for inclusion in the contract," was
apparently added to emphasize that a "simple awareness" of such terms is not sufficient.
See U.C.C. § 2-207(a)(2) (Proposed Draft 1996). There must also be a reasonable understanding by the other party "that the party seeking inclusion intended the standard
terms to be part of the contract." See id. § 2-207 note 3, para. 6.
157. U.C.C. § 2-207 (Proposed Draft 1996).
158. Id. § 2-207 illus. C, para. 3. The next caption is also designated "C" instead of
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arbitration clause is a "varying term" 15 9 that is excluded from the
contract.
Another illustration again considers standard terms in only
one of the records. This time, the buyer sends an offer with no
standard terms and seller sends a definite acceptance in a record
containing standard terms that exclude liability for consequential damages. Seller ships and buyer accepts the goods, thereby
apparently assenting to the seller's standard terms. A contract
has been formed under 2-205(a)(1). When the seller suffers consequential damages, the question as to the inclusion of the
seller's exclusionary clause will be determined by an application
of 2-207(a). Again, the exclusionary clause appears to be a "varying term" that will not become part of the contract absent
express agreement, agreement via trade usage, prior course of
dealing or course of performance, of which the buyer had reason
to know and understand were intended for inclusion.
The most important 2-207 cases involve an exchange of the
records of both parties, each containing standard terms. There is
an express recognition that the parties actually handling these
records for their respective parties (e.g., purchasing agents and
sales managers) "rarely take the opportunity to review the forms
and this reality is well understood by all."16 0 Through their law-

yers, both parties strive to include advantageous terms in the
"boilerplate," knowing that they will not be read, and each proceeds to manifest "blanket assent" to such terms.' 6 ' How shall
courts deal with such "standard terms" in conflicting "standard
forms?" Illustrative cases are provided.
Case (1) deals with the obvious situation in which a buyer
orders 1000 units of goods at a certain price in a typical form
with standard terms, and seller "accepts" in a typical form with
162
standard terms except that the seller agrees to ship 900 units.
This is a counter offer because the "mirror image" or "matching
63
acceptance" rule continues to apply to "negotiated" terms.
Case (2) involves a buyer making an offer to buy 1000 units at
$50 per unit in a record containing a standard term arbitration
clause.16 Seller responds with a definite acceptance in a record
159. While a "varying term" is not defined in the draft, it is said to include "standard
terms which materially add to or are different from the agreement of the parties." Id. § 2207 note 3.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. § 2-207 illus. [the second] C.
Id.
U.C.C. § 2-207 illus. [second] C, case 1 (Proposed Draft 1996).
Id.

164.

Id. § 2-207 illus. [second] C, case 2.
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containing a standard term warranty disclaimer. 6 5 Seller ships
and buyer accepts the goods. 166 Neither objects to the other's
standard terms. Buyer later discovers the goods to be
unmerchantable and initiates arbitration. 6 7 Seller claims it is
not bound by the arbitration term and insists upon its disclaimer. 68 There is a contract, and whether either or both standard clauses will be part of the contract is determined by 2207(a).' 6 9 The illustration does not complete the analysis, presumably because the drafters concluded that the application of
the section is clear.
To include either or both standard terms under 2-207(a) the
party claiming inclusion would have to establish that the other
party expressly agreed to the standard term or had reason to
know of such a term from course of performance, course of dealing or trade usage, and that the term was intended for inclusion
in the contract. 70 These are, of course, fact-laden questions.
Case (3) (sic)'7 ' assumes standard term arbitration clauses in
both records that are materially different. 172 Here, neither
clause is included in the contract unless 2-207(a), again, is satisfied, but there is no automatic "knockout" of these conflicting
clauses 7 3 since one of the parties may have agreed to an arbitra74
tion clause.1
C.

Critique

The analysis of the "battle of the forms" presented in this latest iteration clearly demonstrates that the Drafting Committee
toiled long and hard in its quest, and that this quest may continue. The current result is conclusive evidence of the challenge.
At the moment, at least, this analysis is the leading candidate for
enactment throughout the country. It may be the most enactable
draft in the spirit of compromise among myriad possibilities and
desires. Then again, it may be improved.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. U.C.C. § 2-207 illus [second] C, case 2 (Proposed Draft 1996).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. § 2-207(a).
171. Id. § 2-207 illus. D, case 3 (illus. D is really listed as a second "C," and case 3 is
numbered as "4").

172. U.C.C. § 2-207 illus D, case 3 (Proposed Draft 1996).
173. Professor James White urged the "knockout" view where standard terms conflict. His co-author, Professor Summers, disagreed. More courts favored the White view.
See J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 33-35 (3d. ed. 1988).
174. U.C.C. § 2-207 illus. D, case 3 (Proposed Draft 1996).
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By the simple use of the term "vary," the draft quickly dispatches the confusion attending the "different versus additional"
controversy that plagued courts and commentators under the
original version. The draft properly clarifies the underlying purpose of 2-207, i.e., "to minimize unfair surprise and 'first' or 'last'
shot advantage where one party seeks to include a standard term
which varies terms in the agreement." 76 This express recognition that 2-207 is a species of unconscionability-incipient or
threshold unconscionability-is important. The elaboration of
this critical underlying philosophy, however, may be unnecessarily complex and confusing.
It is important to focus upon the detachment of the issue of
contract formation from original 2-207. Placing formation questions in the general formation section (2-203(b)) and the offer and
acceptance complement (2-205(a)) appears to be a logical separation and could allow a Drafting Committee to conclude that genuine progress has been made; but that would be an illusion. The
separation of these concepts provides no relief from the underlying questions that plagued courts attempting to apply the original section. Courts must still decide whether a response to an
offer constitutes "a definite expression of acceptance," albeit one
that contains standard terms that materially vary the terms of
"the contract." Whether a variation is "material" must still be
decided.' 76 Though these questions must be resolved before confronting the new 2-207, they must still be resolved. The fact that
these questions will be resolved under a different section provides little solace.
The complexity of the draft is exacerbated by the definition of
"standard terms," which are defined very simply as "terms prepared in advance for general and repeated use by one party and
used without negotiation with the other party."1 77 "Standard
terms," therefore, can be any terms that a party inserts in a
printed form or other record that will probably not be read or
understood by the other party. At this point, however, another
problem that is ignored in the original Article 2 must be
addressed.
D.

Excursus-StandardForm Records

Assuming no "battle," i.e., where only one record evidences the
contract and that record is a standard form, would the party who
did not prepare that form, but assents thereto, be bound by what
175.

Id. § 2-207 note 3, para. 5.

176.
177.

"Material breach" is discussed in part VI of this article.
U.C.C. § 2-102(38) (Proposed Draft 1996).
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he signs? The draft, quite properly, attempts to address this
issue in new section 2-206, "Standard Form Records," dealing
with a standard form-the kind of form that typically confronts
the consumer buyer of any significant product, 7 ' though it also
confronts merchants who accept it as the record of the contract.
The new section on standard forms presents the ancient question: am I bound by what I sign whether or not I have read or
understood the standard terms on that printed document? 1 79 The
draft provides the general answer: if I manifest assent to the
standardform by a signatureor other conduct, I am bound by the
standard terms in the standard form unless they are unconscionable. 8 0 This appears to adopt the old but simple "bound by what
one signs" rule. But it is not quite that simple. The section
requires a party to "manifest assent" to the standard form and
this phrase is defined as follows: "A party 'manifests assent' to a
record if, after having an opportunity to review the terms of the
record, the party engages in conduct that under the circumstances constitutes acceptance of the terms of the record and the
18
party had an opportunity to decline to engage in the conduct."'
The italicized phrase is itself defined as noted below:
A party has an 'opportunity to review' a record if the record is made
available in a manner designed to call the terms to the attention of
the party before assent to the record or is provided in such a manner
that the terms will be conspicuous
in the normal course of initial use
18 2
or preparation to use the goods.
A party may have an opportunity to review a record without taking advantage of that opportunity. He may, therefore, manifest
assent without any knowledge or understanding of the standard
terms of the standard form because he has not bothered to read
it. In such a situation, he will be bound by the standard terms
that he has ignored after being provided with a reasonable opportunity to review such terms.
These new sections manifest another attempt to avoid incipient or threshold unconscionability-the "unfair surprise" vari178. There is never a "battle of the forms" in a consumer transaction where the
seller presents the only form-a standard form-for the consumer to sign. "Standard
form" is defined in the new draft as "a record prepared by one party in advance for general
and repeated use that substantially contains standard terms and was used in the transaction without negotiation of, or change in, the substantial majority of the standard
terms." U.C.C. § 2-102(37) (Proposed Draft 1996). "Negotiation of price, quantity, time of
delivery or method of payment does not preclude a record from being a standard form."
Id.
179. The issue is often described as the "duty to read" issue.
180. U.C.C. § 2-206(a) (Proposed Draft 1996).
181. Id. § 2-102(28) (emphasis added).
182. Id. § 2-102(30).
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ety. The problems associated with determining whether a
merchant had an "opportunity to review" a record before "manifesting assent" to unread terms cannot be gainsaid. The best
prediction is that a merchant who has the opportunity to review
a record for some period prior to manifesting acceptance by
words or conduct will be bound to all except unconscionable
terms. There is no indication that the party presenting such a
record would be required to alert the merchant to any unexpected term. While unconscionability is still a theoretical salvation for a merchant, merchants will continue to have immense
difficulty in establishing it. The section establishes a quite different and more favorable standard for consumers by treating as
inoperative standard terms that the consumer "could not reasonably have expected . . . unless the consumer expressly (consciously?) agrees to them."8 3 To genuinely confront unfair

surprise in the case of a merchant, the same standard might be
applied to merchants who apparently assent to a standard form
presented by the other party.
Like 2-207, complexities abound when attempting to draft any
statute that relieves a signer from the standard terms of a record. The overriding reluctance to excuse a party from the terms
of a record he has signed continues as a brooding omnipresence.
The new Restatement attempt to deal with standardized agreements was anything but an overwhelming success. 8 4 Again, the
desire to preclude unfair surprise in standard forms or standard
terms is clear. The solution in the draft presents considerable
difficulty for courts in application. Is there a better solution-not
only for the single standard form agreement-but for the "battle"
as well?
E. A New Structure
To consider this possibility, return to the language of the draft
2-207:
183. Id. § 2-206(b).
184. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) CONTRACTS § 211 (1981). For an analysis, see Murray, The StandardizedAgreement Phenomena in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
67 CORNELL L. REv. 735 (1982). That article suggests, however, that the seeds of a highly
effective analysis are discoverable in the Restatement analysis. In particular, a statement in Comment f to Section 211 is of considerable significance: a party should not be
bound "to unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable expectation."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f. The similarity between that statement and the test for consumers who signed standard forms in the current draft is striking. In the 1994 draft of the new Article 2, however, three alternatives were suggested.
Alternative C followed Section 211 of the Restatement and was not followed in the latest
draft.
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[S]tandard terms in a record prepared by one party that materially
vary the contract are not part of the contract unless the party claim-

ing inclusion establishes that the other party expressly agreed to
them, or had reason to know of them.., and that they were intended
for inclusion in the contract.' 8 5
What terms of the contract may be materially varied by standard

terms? If there are no standard terms, what are the terms of the
contract?
There must be some manifested intention to create a contract
including a minimum number of dickered or negotiated terms,
e.g., subject matter and quantity.18 6 A contract, of course, does
not need to have "standard terms" as defined in the draft.
Absent such terms and assuming sufficient dickered terms, what
are the other terms of the contract? Trade usage and prior
course of dealing may supply terms, but such terms are part of
the contract ab initio. Course of performance provides the
strongest evidence of what the parties intended by the original
terms and can also operate as a modification of such terms, but it
is not present at the inception of the contract. What are the
"other" terms of the contract that are not supplied by trade usage
or prior course of dealing at its inception? As in the original 2207, the other terms are those "supplementary terms incorporated under any other provision of this [article]. s7 In the
absence of any number of terms, the "supplementary terms" of
Article 2 will supply terms such as place of delivery, 8 time of
performance, 9 options and cooperation respecting performance, 90 shipment terms,' 91 implied warranties 92 and the remedies of the buyer and seller in the event of a breach. 93 In the
absence of such terms, these Article 2 terms become the terms of
the contract-by default. Yet, these "default" terms are the normative terms established by Article 2 that remain essentially
unchanged in the draft. They are the terms of the contract
185.
186.

U.C.C. § 2-207(a) (Proposed Draft 1996) (emphasis added).
Quantity, of course, can be indefinite in a requirements or output contract.

U.C.C. § 2-306 (1995); U.C.C. § 2-304 (Proposed Draft 1996).
187. See U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (Proposed Draft 1996); U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (1995).
188. U.C.C. § 2-305 (Proposed Draft 1996); U.C.C. § 2-308 (1995).
189. U.C.C. § 2-306 (Proposed Draft 1995); U.C.C. § 2-309 (1995).
190. U.C.C. § 2-307 (Proposed Draft 1996); U.C.C. § 2-311 (1995).
191. U.C.C. § 2-309 (Proposed Draft 1996); U.C.C. §§ 2-319, 2-320 (1995).
192. U.C.C. §§ 2-312, 2-314, 2-315 (Proposed Draft 1996); U.C.C. §§ 2-312, 2-314, 2-

315 (1995). The warranty of title is not labeled "implied" because it contains its own
disclaiming requirements that are more stringent than the disclaiming requirements of
the implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. Id. Such
warranties, however, are implied. U.C.C. § 2-312(a) (Proposed Draft 1996); U.C.C. § 2312(1) (1995).
193. U.C.C. art. 2, pt. 7 (Proposed Draft 1996); U.C.C. art. 2, pt. 7 (1995).
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together with any negotiated or implied terms, as stated in the
19 4
draft version of 2-207, in the absence of any displacing terms.
If they are the norms that will be automatically supplied unless
the parties expressly agree to the contrary, these Article 2
"default" terms, themselves, are the "standard" terms of the contract in one sense. 19 5 The familiar use of "standard" or "standardized" to refer to unread printed clauses (boilerplate), however,
convinced the Drafting Committee to continue that usage in the
new draft rather than refer to Article 2 terms as "standard."
Nonetheless, it is critically important to call Article 2 terms
what they are. Thus, instead of "supplementary" or "default"
terms, it would be helpful to refer to them as the "normal" terms
of a contract since they are the established norms under the original version and have not been significantly changed in the draft.
The essential goal continues to be the best approximation of the
terms of the contract in accordance with the parties' presumable
194. U.C.C. § 2-207 (Proposed Draft 1996).
195. In my expressly fledgling attempt to redraft the original 2-207 as nothing more
than an attempt to pursue the "discussion," I used the term "standard." See Murray, A
Proposed Revision of Section 2.207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, supra note 104 at
355-56. Subsection (1) of my model captioned, "Factual Bargains Made Operative,"
attempted to do all that 2-207 attempts without its flaws. Id. at 355. My model subsection (1) reads:
(1) If a court finds exchanged written manifestations of an intention to be
bound to an agreement or one or more written confirmations of a prior oral agreement, they will be operative notwithstanding variations in the terms of the writing(s) if there is a reasonable basis for giving a remedy. [If separation is desirable,
this portion could be moved to the general formation and offer and acceptance sections as in the NCCUSL draft. U.C.C. §§ 2-203, 2-305 (Proposed Draft 1996). "Record(s)" could be substituted for "writing(s)." The subsection continues:]
The terms of the resulting contract will be the terms the parties have consciously considered [the "dickered" terms] and the standard terms of this Act
[which would include trade usage, prior course of dealing and trade usage as
well as all other implied terms]. Terms deviating from the standard terms of
this Act will be operative only in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).
Id.
Essentially, subsection (2) includes immaterial variations in the resulting contract if their immateriality is established by the party seeking to include them and if the
other party's "record" does not preclude them. Id. Subsection (3) allows material deviations in the resulting contract if the party seeking to include them establishes that the
other party understood or should have reasonably understood such deviations, and that
they would become part of any resulting contract to which that party expressed assent
through language or conduct. Id. at 355-56. I see many similarities in the draft sections.
Finally, subsection (4) is my version of original section 2-207(3), the contract by
conduct, where exchanged "records" do not form the contract. Id. at 356. The terms of
this contract are the terms upon which the writings agree and the "standard" ("default" or
"supplementary") terms of Article 2. Id.
See id. at 355-56 for the exact terms of subsections (2), (3) and (4) of the draft and
its rationale. While I continue to believe that this initial attempt could be improved, and
while the formation aspects could be moved to other sections as in the NCCUSL draft,
revisiting this effort was rather pleasant insofar as, in general, I became convinced of its
superiority to the NCCUSL draft. This may say more about the deficiencies in the
NCCUSL structure than it says about the desirability of my fledgling draft.

568

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 35:533

intention. The initial question will always be whether the parties intended a contract. The counter offer problem should be
solved by insisting that a reasonable party must understand that
no contract was intended except on the terms included in such a
counter offer. Again, however, assuming the parties' manifested
their intention to be bound to a contract with a sufficient supply
of matching dickered terms, what are the other terms of the
contract?
The erection of a clear hierarchy would remove the complexity
and confusion that attends the current draft. The hierarchy
shouldplace normal Article 2 terms ahead of any standardterms.
Absent other evidence of displacing terms, this analysis would
produce the necessary terms of the contract. These terms would
be displaced only by varying terms that were negotiated (express
terms) or by trade usage, prior course of dealing or course of performance terms that the parties presumably intended to displace
the norms of Article 2. This entire analysis would precede any
consideration of standard terms in a standard form. If the record(s) involved standard terms, the final analysis would determine if any of the standard terms displaced the terms of the
contract. If the standard terms varied nothing in the contract as
previously determined, there is no issue. If the record of the contract consisted of only one standard form, the determination of
whether varying standard terms of that form displaced the terms
of the contract would proceed in accordance with the suggested
modification of new 2-206.196 If there was an exchange of records
involving standard terms in one or both records that varied the
terms of the contract, the only question would be whether the
parties had expressly agreed, by words or conduct, to any- standard terms. Only then would standard terms displace "normal"
Article 2 terms, because only then would they be elevated to the
higher status of "negotiated terms."
Under this analysis, the contract would be evidenced by the
parties' dickered and negotiated terms, terms supplied by trade
usage, prior course of dealing and course of performance, and the
normal terms of Article 2. Again, this analysis would precede
any engagement with standard terms since these determinations
have nothing to do with standardterms or standardforms. The
structure of the new draft suggests that courts must decide
whether negotiated terms ("expressly agreed" terms), trade
usage, course of dealing, course of performance terms and so
called "supplementary terms" provided by Article 2 displace
196.

U.C.C. § 2-206 (Proposed Draft 1996). See text following supra note 181.

U.C.C. § 2-207 (Proposed Draft 1996) would not apply.
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standard terms. But the question is the other way around. The
essential question is: do standard terms replace any of the
already determined terms of the contract? All of these terms
rank above standard terms in the hierarchy of determining the
parties' intention. Unread and unconsciously considered standard terms should have the lowest ranking. A streamlined 2-207
could be very brief and very direct. It could incorporate the new
section on "standard form records" into a section captioned, "The
Effect of Standard Forms and Standard Terms." This single section could clearly state the effect of terms in a standard form and
how a court should decide whether standard terms displace any
of the already determined terms of the contract. The separate
formation concepts could be retained in sections 2-203 and 2-205
with a directive that the effect of standard terms is to be determined under 2-207. This structural change would provide a
highly effective and workable solution.
Curiously, this is apparently what the Drafting Committee is
attempting to say. In the current draft, however, Karl Llewellyn
might wonder, in his stylized way, "whether [they] got it said or
not."197 Any analysis of this nexus of problems requiring the
lengthy analysis of the draft is more than suspect. The draft's
obsession with the issues surrounding the effect of standard
terms creates a structure that is unnecessarily complex and one
that augurs considerable judicial confusion.
Finally, there is no mention in the draft of one of the "two typical situations" at which the original 2-207 was aimed, i.e., the
oral agreement followed by one or more written confirmations
that contain additional or different terms. 198 A note states that
the draft "solves the problem without specifically identifying
it"'99 by following the basic analysis of the original section, which
treats a confirmation as if it is an acceptance and determines
whether any additional or different terms become part of the contract under original section 2-207(2).200 The situation was complicated where the earlier oral agreement was unenforceable under
the Statute of Frauds and the writing with additional or different
terms satisfied the Statute.2 ° ' It was further complicated when
the confirmation expressly conditioned the contract upon agreement to any additional or different terms in the confirmation.2 °2
The illustration suggests that the confirmation problem need not
197.
198.
199.

200.
201.
202.

See Llewellyn, supra note 1 at 117.
U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1 (1995).
U.C.C. § 2-207 illus. D (Proposed Draft 1996).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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be addressed in the statutory language because all of these
problems are automatically solved in the new draft. Thus,
whether a confirmation with different terms satisfies the Statute
of Frauds is resolved by the repeal of the Statute.2 3 Whether an
oral contract was formed will be decided under the general formation (2-203) and offer and acceptance (2-205) sections, and
whether standard terms in a confirmation become part of the
agreement will now be determined by the new 2-207.204 As to

expressly conditioning language in a confirmation, if such language is included as a term of the contract under 2-207(a), it
would be viewed as a proposal to modify the underlying oral contract and subjected to the section on the enforceability of modifi0
cations, which is new section 2-210.2 5

Notwithstanding the logic of this analysis, formation through
an oral agreement that is later confirmed is arguably the most
common form of commercial contracting. It was the premier situation addressed by Karl Llewellyn in the creation of original
section 2-207. To relegate this common practice to guidance
through implication may be imprudent.
IX.

ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS

Three sections of the draft focusing on other aspects of electronic transactions complete part 2 of Article 2 although none
have been reviewed by the Drafting Committee.20 6 In a section
dealing with the formation of such contracts, the dispatch or
"mailbox" rule is rejected.20 7 An electronic response to an offer is
effective only when the party initiating the electronic transaction
receives a message manifesting acceptance. 208 This change may
be justified since an "electronic" offeree will typically know
whether the acceptance has been received, unlike the offeree who
mails an acceptance by depositing it in the mailbox.
Draft section 2-212 is concerned with "attribution" in electronic messages, i.e., when will a party be bound by an electronic
203.
204.
205.
206.
1996).

Id.
U.C.C. § 2-207 illus. D (Proposed Draft 1996).
See infra section IX of this article.
See U.C.C. §§ 2-208, 2-212, 2-213 and accompanying notes (Proposed Draft

207. Id. § 2-208.
208. Id. § 2-208(a). Draft section 2-208(b) recognizes a contract under 2-208(a) even
if no individual was aware of or reviewed the initial message or response. Id. § 2-208(b).

Draft section 2-208(c)(1) states that "receipt" of electronic messages occurs when the
messages enter a designated information system, while 2-208(c)(2) allows "receipt" to
occur when the record enters any information system of the intended recipient where
there is no designated system. Id.

§ 2-208(c)(1),

(2).
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message? 20 9 Attribution to a particular party is proper where
that party sent the message, or where the message was sent on
behalf of that party,21 0 where previously agreed upon procedures
allow the recipient of the message to conclude that the message
is attributable to the initiating party,2 1 ' or where another party
whose relationship with the initiating party enabled such a person to gain access to and use the method employed by the alleged
212
initiating party.
Section 2-213 of the draft deals with errors or omissions by an
intermediary in an electronic message that transmits, logs or
processes data. 213 "[T]he party who sends [the] message is bound
by the terms of the message as received[,] notwithstanding errors
in transmission," unless the recipient should have discovered
such errors by the exercise of reasonable care or failed to use a
verification or authentication system pursuant to the parties'
prior agreement. 1 4 The general rule is that the party who
engages the intermediary is liable for any damage arising
directly from the errors or omissions of the intermediary. 1 3
X.

MODIFICATIONS

Original section 2-209 dealing with modifications is now draft
section 2-210, though the final version may allow this memorable
section to retain its original number. 1 6 While the demand for
improvement of original 2-209 pales in comparison to the
demand for a revision of 2-207, there is enough mystery and confusion in 2-209 to justify change.2 1 7
There was never any real difficulty with the original 2-209(1),
which modifies the pre-existing duty rule by allowing modifica209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. § 2-212.
Id. § 2-212(1).
U.C.C. § 2-212(2) (Proposed Draft 1996).
Id. § 2-212(3).

213. Id. § 2-213. The source of this section is the United Nations Commission on
International Trade (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Electronic Data Interchange (EDI). Id.
214. Id. § 2-213(b).
215. Id. § 2-213(a).
216. U.C.C. § 2-210 (Proposed Draft 1996); U.C.C. § 2-209 (1995). Draft section 2209 is devoted to a definition of "course of performance"-unchanged from the original in
section 2-208. U.C.C. § 2-208(1) (1995); U.C.C. § 2-209(a) (Proposed Draft 1996). A note
indicates that the ABA UCC Article Review Task Force has redrafted original section 1205 to incorporate this course of performance definition and adds that should such revision be approved, there will be no need for the draft section 2-209 (which the draft note
incorrectly identifies as "2-208") in the final draft of the new Article 2. U.C.C. § 2-209
note (Proposed Draft 1996). Since course of performance must be differentiated from
trade usage and prior course of dealing as defined in the original section 1-205, the new 1205 should certainly include the definition of course of performance, which is entirely
misplaced in part 2 of Article 2. See U.C.C. § 1-205 (1995).
217. See MuRRAY, supra note 52, § 64 E.
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tions without consideration. 21 The sole language flaw in the section is the failure to explicitly require modifications to be made in
good faith, though good faith was always implied and a comment
explained this section's limitation to good faith modifications.2 1 90
22
Unsurprisingly, the draft requires "[a] good faith agreement."
It is the remainder of original 2-209 that has caused consternation. The original section 2-209(3) requires the application of
the Statute of Frauds (original section 2-201) to modifications.
Among the unsatisfied 2-209(3) questions is whether a modification in a price or delivery term required a writing even though
such terms require no writing in an unmodified contract under
original 2-201.221 Such questions have been eliminated in the
draft because the Statute of Frauds has been repealed.2 2 2
While the "public" Statute of Frauds has been repealed for
original or modified contracts, the so-called "private" Statute of
Frauds arising from no oral modification ("NOM") clauses in the
original contract continues, albeit in substantially altered
form.2 23 The draft proposes the same general rule of its predecessor that "a term prohibiting modification or rescission except by a
signed record may not be otherwise modified or rescinded," but
carves out two exceptions.2 24
First, it excepts consumer contracts. 22 The original section
required any NOM clause on a form supplied by a merchant to be
separately signed by the other, non-merchant party as another
safeguard against "unfair surprise."2 26 Since consumer contracts
are no longer subject to NOM clauses, this safeguard has been
deleted.2 2 7 Second, the draft precludes one party from asserting
the NOM clause where it is inconsistent with language or conduct inducing the other party to change its position reasonably
218. U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1995).
219. Id. § 2-209 cmt. 2.
220. U.C.C. § 2-210(a) (Proposed Draft 1996).
221. U.C.C. § 2-209(3), 2-201, 2-201 cmt. 1 (1995).
222. U.C.C. § 2-201 note 1 (Proposed Draft 1996).
223. U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (1995); U.C.C. § 2-210(b) (Proposed Draft 1996).
224. U.C.C. § 2-210(b) (Proposed Draft 1996).
225. Id. In definitional sections 2-102(a)(10), (11), and (12), a "consumer" is an
"individual who buys or contracts to buy consumer goods," a "consumer contract" is "a
contract for the sale of consumer goods between a seller regularly engaged in the business
of selling and a [consumer] buyer," and "consumer goods" means goods that, when deliv.

ered to the consumer, are intended primarily for "personal, family or household use." Id.
§ 2-102(a)(10)-(12). The definition of consumer goods conforms to the Article 9 definition,
found in 9-109(1), and the phrase "when delivered" is included in the draft to distinguish
between goods in the hands of a commercial seller, when they are "inventory" under 9109(4), and the same goods delivered to a consumer when they become consumer goods.
U.C.C. § 2-102(a)(12) (Proposed Draft 1996); U.C.C. § 9-109(4) (1995).
226. U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (1995).
227. U.C.C. § 2-210 note 2 (Proposed Draft 1996).
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and in good faith.228 Illustrations suggest grossly unfair situations that can only be cured by such a waiver. 229 Thus, where a
seller orally requests an extension of time after missing a delivery date, and the buyer agrees, but later seeks to invoke the
NOM clause, the clause is "waived" by inconsistent language
that induced reasonable, good faith reliance.23 0
After dealing with the waiver of NOM clauses in 2-210(c), the
final subsection, 2-210(d), is designed to deal with traditional
types of waiver "where NOM clauses are not involved."23 ' Yet,
subsection (d) curiously begins with, "[s]ubject to subsection
(c)...," where NOM clauses are involved.232 Subsection (d) is

clearly intended to overcome confusion in the original section
concerning waiver by ascertaining a statutory recognition that
"[1]anguage or a course of performance between the parties is relevant to show a waiver of any term inconsistent with that language or course of performance."2 3 This subsection is followed
by the familiar concept that waiver of an executory portion of a
contract may be retracted upon notification that strict performance will be required unless the other party demonstrates reasonable and good faith reliance.234
A note explains that this subsection is intended to deal with
three types of waiver.235 Initially, the note explains that "election" waiver, which requires no reliance, occurs where a party for
whose benefit a condition is included elects "not to insist upon
the condition after the time for its occurrence has passed."236 If

the drafters are suggesting that an election not to insist upon a
condition that formed a material part of the agreed exchange is
enforceable absent consideration or reliance, they are breaking
new ground. It is doubtful that this was their intention since
another type of waiver, which they fail to label, excuses conditions "where the condition was not a material part of the agreed
exchange." 2 7 At this point, however, the note becomes obscure
by suggesting that this "waiver" requires a court to find that the
nonoccurrence of the condition would cause "disproportionate
forfeiture" excusing the condition. 23 8 The note cites section 229 of
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. § 2-210(c).
Id. § 2-210(c).
Id.
Id. § 2-210 note 4.
U.C.C. § 2-210(d) (Proposed Draft 1996).
Id.; U.C.C. § 2-210(d) (1995).
U.C.C. § 2-210(d) (Proposed Draft 1996).
Id. § 2-210 note 4.

236. Id.
237.
238.

Id.
Id.
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the. Restatement (Second) of Contracts as support for this proposition.2 3 9 Section 229, however, has nothing to do with a waiver
by one of the parties. Rather, it suggests that a court may excuse
a condition that is not a material part of the agreed exchange if
its enforcement would cause extreme forfeiture.2 4 ° Yet, draft section 2-210(d) is based exclusively upon facts that include a
waiver. 241 Even Karl Llewellyn, who had blinding faith in judicial imagination, might wonder how a court could deal with an
excuse of condition where there is no waiver under a section that
clearly requires a waiver. The last type of waiver in the trio is
the usual waiver of a condition before its time, which can be
retracted absent reliance.24 2
It is not remarkable that the note is puzzling in light of the
judicial confusion surrounding the application of the elusive term
"waiver" and the various types of "waiver."243 There is little justification for continuing the use of that term. It would be highly
preferable to substitute an analysis based on modifications that
may be enforced without consideration or reliance in certain situations. Apart from confusion, as suggested earlier, the note also
delineates applications that the section language is insufficient
to carry.2 4 4 As contrasted with the first three subsections of draft
section 2-210, a copious review and reconstruction of 2-210(d) is
clearly desirable.

XI.
A.

PART

3: GAP

FILLERS AND WARRANTIES

Gap Fillers

Part 3 of the draft retains the caption, "General Obligation and
Construction of Contract."245 Section 2-301 is essentially an
239. U.C.C. § 210 note 4 (Proposed Draft 1996).
240. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 (1979). Illustration 1 to Section
229 is a modification of the facts in the classic opinion of Justice Cardozo in Jacob &
Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (1921), where the contract called for "Reading pipe" to
be used in the construction of house. Jacobs, 129 N.E. at 890; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 229 illus. 1. The builder used pipe of equal quality but a different brand.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTmACTS § 229 illus. 1. The builder brought an action for
the final installment of the price and the owner refused to pay because the condition had
not occurred. Id. In the actual case, the condition was a constructive condition that the
court excused via the doctrine of substantial performance. Jacobs, 129 N.E. at 893-94.

The Restatement Second illustration converts the "Reading pipe" specification to an
express condition and holds it excused to prevent extreme forfeiture. RESTATEMENT (SEC.
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 illus. 1. Neither the actual case nor the illustration involves a
waiver.
241. U.C.C. § 2-210 note 4 (Proposed Draft 1996).
242. Id.
243.

For an analysis, see MuRRAY, supra note 52, § 111 F.

244. U.C.C. § 2-210 note 4 (Proposed Draft 1996).
245.

Id. art. 2, pt. 3.
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unchanged version of original section 2-304 dealing with how the
price is payable. 4 6 Draft section 2-302, the former unconscionability section moved to Part 1,247 replaces original section 2-307,
which provides that unless the contract or circumstances make
delivery in lots reasonable, all goods must be delivered at once.2" s
This analysis is retained but clarified. Thus, where a seller is
required to deliver 10 carloads, but a strike disrupts the transportation of all 10 and alternative transportation costs are high,
the seller is obligated to deliver 3 carloads and the remainder
when transportation becomes available.249 Where the circumstances give either party the right to make or demand performance "in parts over a period of time," the draft continues the rule
that payment can be demanded for each part performance absent
contrary circumstances.25 °
The well-known "open price term" section, original 2-305, is
unchanged in draft section 2-303.251 It is followed by the output
and requirements contract section, 2-304, which appears to modify the original 2-306 only by emphasizing that even where
actual output or requirements occur in good faith, an unreasona252
bly disproportionate quantity may not be offered or demanded.
The "default" term supplying the place of delivery is
unchanged, 253 but a subsection of the "gap-filler" section supplying a "reasonable time" is moved to a section of its own.25 4 Origi246. Id. § 2-301; U.C.C. § 2-304 (1995).
247. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1995); U.C.C. § 2-105 (Proposed Draft 1996).
248. U.C.C. § 2-302 (Proposed Draft 1996); U.C.C. § 2-307 (1995).
249. U.C.C. § 2-302 note 2 (Proposed Draft 1996). Note 2 of 2-302 distinguishes the
operation of this section from draft section 2-616 (formerly 2-614) concerning excusable
nonperformance and substitute performance, i.e., "it takes less disruption to vary a
'default' rule [herein, the rule that the entire performance is required] than to excuse an

agreed performance." Id. § 2-302 note 2.
250. Id. § 2-302(b). Note 3 to 2-302 explains the situation where an entire delivery
is to be paid for on 30 days credit and concludes that where circumstances allow the

delivery to be made in installments, payment for the entire shipment should not be due
until 30 days after the final installment is delivered. Id. § 2-302 note 3.
251. Id. See note to § 2-303.
252. U.C.C. § 2-304 (Proposed Draft 1996); U.C.C. § 2-306 (1995). The original 2306(2) qualification of"lawful" agreements for exclusive dealing is excised from the essentially unchanged 2-304(b). See U.C.C. § 2-306(2) (1995); U.C.C. § 2-304(b) (Proposed
Draft 1996). Presumably the original was concerned about exclusive dealing contracts
that might violate the antitrust laws, particularly Section 3 of the Clayton Act, and sub-

stantially injure competition in a relevant market. Since only "lawful" agreements may
be enforced in any event, the qualification appears unnecessary.
253.
254.

U.C.C. § 2-305 (replacing original 2-308) (Proposed Draft 1996).
Draft section 2-306 retains subsection (1) and (2) from original 2-309, but for-

mer section 2-309(3) is 2-311 in the draft and elaborates the notice requirement for the
exercise of a power of termination, i. e., reasonable notice of termination is required
unless termination is agreed to occur upon the "happening of an agreed event," the parties have agreed upon a notification that is not manifestly unreasonable, or the parties
have agreed to dispense with notification and such elimination of notification is not
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nal section 2-311, which supplied missing terms where the
parties failed to specify particulars of performance, is essentially
2 55 Original 2-325, dealing with the effect of failing to
unchanged.
supply a letter of credit, is moved to 2-308, which incorporates
definitions from Article 5.256
Original sections 2-319 through 2-324 define FOB, FAS, CIF,
C&F, "Ex-Ship," "Overseas" and "No Arrival, No Sale" terms.25 7
The May 1994 draft had deleted all of these terms.2 58 In the current draft, section 2-309 is inserted as "a first step toward filling
the gap on delivery terms."2 5 9
B.

Warranties
(i).

Warranty of Title and Against Infringement

Coincidentally, the warranty sections in the draft retain the
same section numbers as the original. 260 The warranty of title
and against infringement of the original version has produced
precious little litigation. Draft section 2-312 tracks the original
but contains desirable elaborations and clarifications. Thus, the
"seller" who makes the warranty of title now includes an auctioneer or liquidator who fails to disclose its principal, and, more
important, the warranty now covers not only good title and rightful transfer but protection against "contested" titles as well.2 6 '
The warranty of title retains its own disclaimer provision,
thereby continuing to hide its true characterization as an
unconscionable. U.C.C. §§ 2-306; 2-311 (Proposed Draft 1996). The underlying concept is
to afford protection to the terminated party's investment in the contract and his opportunity to reinvest after termination-the more substantial the investment and more difficult the reinvestment process, the longer the period of notification. Id. § 2-311 note 2.
Preceding section 2-310 focuses upon those obligations that survive the termination of a
contract, i. e., "a right based on breach or performance before termination [or]... limitations on the scope, manner, method, or location of the exercise of rights in the goods." Id.
§ 2-310. The definition of "termination" is found in 2-102(40): "an act by a party to a
contract under a power created by agreement or law which ends the contract for a reason
other than for breach." Id. § 2-102(40).
255. Id. § 2-307; U.C.C. § 2-311 (1995).
256. U.C.C. §§ 2-325, 5-102 (1995); U.C.C. § 2-308, note (Proposed Draft 1996).
257. U.C.C. §§ 2-319-2-324 (1995).
258. U.C.C. § 2-309 note 1 (Proposed Draft 1996).
259. Id. Section 2-309 directs FOB, CIF or like terms to be interpreted according to
applicable trade usage, course of dealing or course of performance. Id. § 2-309. In the
absence of such evidence, "the meaning of shipment terms ... may be interpreted by
reference to the Incoterms as published by the International Chamber of Commerce." Id.
260. Id. §§ 2-312-2-315; U.C.C. § 2-312-2-315 (1995).
261. U.C.C. § 2-312(a), 2-312(a)(1), 2-312 notes 1, 2 (Proposed Draft 1996). This is
designed to protect "the buyer against 'colorable clouds' on an otherwise good title." Id.
§ 2-312 note 2. There is no obligation to disclose the principal, but the auctioneer or liquidator gives the warranty of title. Id. § 2-312 note 1.
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"implied warranty."262 The disclaimer need not be in a record, but
the draft provides "safe harbor" language for a recorded disclaimer: "There is no warranty of title or against infringement in
this sale, or words of similar import."26 3 This is obviously
designed to deal with case law that required any disclaimer of
this warranty to be excruciatingly clear.2 84 A new subsection
extends the warranty to "any remote buyer who may reasonably
be expected to buy the goods and who suffers damage from
breach of the warranty."26 5 Such a remote buyer's rights, however, derive exclusively from the contract between the seller and
the immediate buyer.
(ii). Express Warranties
The original 2-313 describes express warranties by promise,
affirmation of fact, description, sample or model. Regardless of
the type of manifestation, however, each is required to become
"part of the basis of the bargain"--a phrase that continues to
mystify courts and scholars. Questions continue as to whether
"bargain" in this phrase was the equivalent of a "bargained-forexchange" or whether it was a different kind of bargain-a con266 sugtinuum. A comment allows post-formation warranties,
gesting a continuous bargain where the precise time of contract
formation is not critical. Comments suggesting that "no particular reliance ... need be shown" 26 7 and "all of the statements of
the seller" become part of the basis of the bargain21 arguably
present a totally new paradigm for the discovery of express warranties. Courts and commentators, however, have struggled
with the section language to meet these and other challenges.2 6 9
After a series of special definitions that apply to sections 2-313
to 2-318,270 section 2-313(b) incorporates the formerly separate
262. Id. § 2-312(b). The only reason this warranty in the original or draft is not
called an "implied" warranty (which it is) is because the disclaimer or exclusion of other
implied warranties (of quality) are governed by 2-316. At its March 1995 meeting, the
Drafting Committee concluded that the disclaimer provision should remain in 2-312
rather than be moved to 2-316. Id. § 2-312 note 5.
263. Id. § 2-312 note 4, 2-312(b).
264. See, e.g., Sunseri v. RKO Stanley Warner Theatres, Inc., 374 A. 2d 1342 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1977).

265.

U.C.C § 2-312(d) (Proposed Draft 1996). Draft section 2-312(d) in the statutory

text (referred to as "(e)" in the notes following the section). Id. § 2-313 note 7.
266. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 7 (1995).
267. Id. § 2-313 cmt. 2.

268. Id. § 2-313 cmt. 8.
269. See, e.g., John E. Murray, Jr., "Basisof the Bargain:" Transcending Classical
Concepts, 66 MINN. L. REv. 283 (1982).

270. U.C.C. § 2-313(aXl) (Proposed Draft 1996). "Damage" is simply defined as all
loss, except injury, to a person or property other than the goods sold or leased; "goods"
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express warranties by affirmation of fact or promise, description,
and sample or model into a definition that replaces "part of the
basis of the bargain" with "part of the agreement," and includes
the familiar guide that no formal words or specific intention to
make an express warranty are necessary. Section 2-313(c) then
provides a test to determine whether any express warranty
becomes part of the agreement: "If the seller establishes that a
reasonable person in the position of the immediate buyer would
believe otherwise or believe that any affirmation, promise, or
statement made was merely of the value of the goods or purported to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the
goods," the alleged express warranty does not become part of the
agreement.
This test conforms to a comment to the original section: "What
statements of the seller have in the circumstances become part of
the basis of the bargain? ...[Aill of the statements of the seller
do so unless good reason is shown to the contrary." 271 Thus, as to
an "immediate buyer," i.e., one in "privity" with the seller, who
proves what the seller affirmed, promised or displayed to the
buyer about the goods, there is an "assumption . . . that they
become part of the agreement unless the-seller establishes" that
a reasonable person would not believe such statements or that
the seller was merely "puffing," i.e., stating an opinion or commendation of the goods.2 72 Such an "immediate buyer" would,
however, have to know of the warranty. Thus, if the buyer did
not "hear" the statement before making the contract, it would not
be "part of the agreement" and would not, therefore, be an
273
express warranty.
"Remote buyers," i.e., buyers from sellers in the distributive
chain other than sellers against whom a warranty claim is
asserted, do not fare as well as "immediate buyers" under the
draft. Such "remote buyers" have the burden of establishing that
the statements were express warranties of which they had
become aware, and that they were reasonable in believing that
the goods would conform to warranties made by the remote
seller.2 74
include a component incorporated in substantially the same condition in other goods;
"immediate buyer" is a buyer in privity of contract with the seller; "remote buyer" or
remote lessee" is a buyer or lessee from a seller in the distributive chain other than the
seller against whom a warranty claim is asserted. Id. § 2-313(a)(1)-(4).
271. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 8 (1995).
272. U.C.C. § 2-313 note 4 (Proposed Draft 1996).
273. Id. § 2-313 note 4. Presumably, if the immediate buyer did not read it, the
result would be the same even in the literature supplied by the seller. Id.
274. Id. § 2-313(dX1). Subsection 2 allows a buyer who meets these requirements to
bring an action directly against the manufacturer. Id. § 2-313(d)(2). It should be noted,
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The notes to this section suggest that several questions
remain: (1) Is the section language clear enough to indicate that
an express warranty made with regard to new goods does not
survive when the goods become used? (2) In "direct response"
sales, i.e., sales made through direct advertising to the public or,
for example, an 800 telephone number or an internet site, should
the buyer be treated as an "immediate buyer," i.e., in privity, or a
non-privity buyer? (3) Should the warranty to the remote buyer,
i.e., the so-called "pass through" warranty, be separately defined
and clarified? 275
The notes might have suggested other questions. The new
"part of the agreement" phrase replacing the nefarious "part of
the basis of the bargain" is in need of further clarification.2 6 Subsection (c) is devoted to this need, but it does not expressly deal
with post-formation warranties. 7 The explanatory note clearly
exempts the seller's statement if the buyer did not hear or
believe it. Suppose the buyer heard or read it after the contract
was formed. Would a post-formation statement by the seller
qualify? Would a statement in the seller's literature qualify if
read by the immediate buyer after the contract was formed? Are
these questions answered by the statutory test: would a reasonable buyer believe that such a statement became "part of the
agreement?" The Article 1 definition of "agreement" continues to
be the "bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language,
or by implication from other circumstances including course of
dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as provided in
this Act."278 Does this "bargain in fact" include post-formation
statements, either heard or read by the buyer?
The draft clearly requires a "remote buyer" to know of and be
reasonable in believing that the remote seller's warranty
attached to the sale.27 9 Thus a remote buyer, including a consumer buyer, would not be entitled to all of the affirmations of
fact or promise or descriptions of goods found in an operating
manual or other literature supplied by a seller if the buyer
became aware of such statements only after the sale was made.
An otherwise clear express warranty in such literature dealing
with one or more features of a new car, computer or other prohowever, that an action for personal injuries or damage to other property may not be
permitted under Article 2, which, under the draft, may be displaced by tort liability. See
infra note 312 and accompanying text.
275. U.C.C. § 2-313 note 1 (Proposed Draft 1996).
276. Id. § 2-313(1)(c).
277. Id. § 2-313 note 1.
278. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1995).
279. U.C.C. § 2-313(d)(1) (Proposed Draft 1996).
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duct would not be an express warranty if the buyer failed to read
that literature before consummating the transaction. Yet, a
buyer might reasonably believe that it is entitled to such features
though it learned of them only after the sale was consummated.
Though the seller had stated these features for all to see, the
seller could successfully defend an express warranty claim by
establishing the buyer's belated knowledge of these statements.
Is the Drafting Committee justifying a seller who states: "Yes,
that is what I said about the quality of the goods, but you did not
read it or hear it in time, and I am, therefore, not bound by this
statement I deliberately made to the public to induce the
purchase of my product?"
These additional questions should be addressed by the Drafting Committee. 0 The substitution of "part of the agreement" for
"part of the 'basis of the bargain'" may be another "emotionally
satisfying incantation"28 ' that avoids a necessary analysis.

(iii). Implied Warranties
Except for insignificant language changes, the draft version of
the implied warranty of merchantability is identical to the original.28 2 The Drafting Committee considered but rejected alternatives such as the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (CISG),8 3 Article 35,2

4

which sug-

280. While the Committee studiously avoids any mention of "reliance" in relation to
its new "part of the agreement" test, if both "immediate" and "remote" buyers must know
of the warranty, this may be an incipient reliance test. Why must they know? If they do
not know, they could not have relied. Another possible underlying notion is the fundamental requirement that one must know about an offer before it can be accepted. This is
the classic requirement of "agreement" and "bargained-for-exchange." Though the current notes to 2-313 do not cite Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., the draft exudes the view
adopted by the court in that case that the buyer's knowledge of the seller's statement
before the consummation of the sale creates a presumption that the statement became
"part of the basis of the bargain." Compare U.C.C. § 2-313 (1995) with Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990) and U.C.C. § 2-313 (Proposed Draft 1996).
This view, however, displays a failure to understand what Llewellyn and friends were up
to in the original section 2-313.
281. See supra note 54.
282. U.C.C. § 2-314 (Proposed Draft 1996); U.C.C. § 2-214 (1995). Language
changes include "Subject to section 2-316" rather than the original "Unless excluded or
modified (Section 2-316);" "To be merchantable, goods, at a minimum must. . . " rather
than the original "Goods to be merchantable must be at least. . . ." Id.
283. CISG applies to transnational contracts for the sale of goods where the parties
are in CISG countries, or private international law would apply CISG. CISG has been
ratified by well over 40 nations including the United States. For a primer on CISG, see
MuRRAY, supra note 52, ch. 14.
284. Article 35(2) of CISG reads in part:
Except where the parties have agreed otherwise, the goods do not conform
with the contract unless they:
(a) are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description would ordinarly
be used; * * * (d) are contained or packaged in the manner usual for such goods or,
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gests the essential standard of merchantability in different language. 28 The notes, however, raise the question of whether a
defect in tort should be coterminous with unmerchantability in
warranty. This becomes important because a subsequent draft
section, 2-319, states that Article 2 does not apply to the extent
that an allegedly unmerchantable product proximately causing
injury to person or property is defective under applicable tort
law. The note suggests that, "in most cases," the tort and
merchantability standard will be the same. It goes on to suggest
that this issue should be resolved in the statutory language of
the new section 2-319 as well as a comment to 2-314.286
Like the merchantability draft, the implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose remains unchanged with the exception
of stylistic language changes. 28 7 The Drafting Committee wisely
avoided any significant modification of either section since both
have proven to be effective.
(iv).

Exclusion or Modification of Warranties

This section begins with a very disappointing start by replicating much of the convoluted language of its predecessor with
respect to the so-called exclusion or modification of express warranties. While the draft is a bit shorter than the original, it manages to maintain all of the unnecessary complexity and
confusion:
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of or tending to exclude
or modify an express warranty must be construed if reasonable as
consistent with each other. Subject to 2-202 with regard to parol or
extrinsic evidence, if such a construction is unreasonable, words
excluding
or modifying an express warranty are inoperative to that
28
extent.

8

What does this mean? The section starts with a reminder of an
ancient rule.of construction: if a court can reasonably construe
seemingly inconsistent expressions of intention as consistent, it
should opt for consistency and retain both. Having stated a truism, we are then greeted with a reminder of the parol evidence
rule: if there is an express warranty prior to the execution of a
writing that reasonable parties "would certainly" have included
where there is no such manner, in a manner adequate to preserve and protect such
goods.
Id.
285. See supra note 7 for Professor Speidel's analysis for the rejection of CISG by
the Drafting Committee.
286. U.C.C. § 2-319 notes 1-3 (Proposed Draft 1996). Further discussion of section
2-319 is found infra in part V at note 306.
287. U.C.C. § 2-315 (Proposed Draft 1996); U.C.C. § 2-315 (1995).
288. U.C.C. § 2-316(a) (Proposed Draft 1996).
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in such a writing, the evidence of such express warranty is inadmissible. This would be true of any prior agreement, express
warranty or other. It has absolutely nothing to do with disclaiming express warranties. Finally, if one cannot reasonably construe an express warranty and a disclaimer of that express
warranty as consistent, then they are inconsistent and the disclaimer is inoperative. It is hard to argue with that truism. So
what does the section mean?
It means what Karl Llewellyn said it means in an earlier draft
of the UCC when the section read, ever so simply, "[i]f the agreement creates an express warranty, words disclaiming it are inoperative." 2 9 Even more simply, it means that you cannot disclaim

an express warranty. You can certainly lose it through inadmissibility via the parol evidence rule just as you can lose any other
prior agreement, but it is impossible to disclaim an express
warranty.
Llewellyn's clear statement did not compute for his critics. He
modified the section to its current convolution and must have
chuckled when the new version was accepted. The absurdity is
suggested by any contract that contains, at a minimum, an
express warranty by description. Thus, in the sale of a described
automobile evidenced by a record that includes a disclaimer of all
express warranties, the seller delivers a cardboard box with
painted wheels. When the buyer objects, the seller points to the
exclusion of express warranties in the signed record. Should the
analysis begin by comparing the express warranty and disclaimer to determine whether they can be reconciled so that both
may be retained? It is impossible to retain both in any situation
in which there is an express warranty and a disclaimer of that
express warranty because you may not disclaim your agreement.
May interpretation questions arise as to whether an express
warranty exists? Of course, but there are interpretation questions in any contract. What does that have to do with disclaiming warranties? The draft version of express warranties sets
forth the criteria to determine whether an expression becomes
"part of the agreement."290 If the criteria are met, an express
warranty exists that it is impossible to disclaim. Why not just
admit that Llewellyn was right early on and adopt his language

289. U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (1952). This was the 1952 version of 2-316(1), which was
replaced by the convoluted current section 2-316(1), which is preserved in draft section 2-

316(a). See id.; U.C.C. § 2-316(1); U.C.C. § 2-316(a) (Proposed Draft 1996).
290. U.C.C. § 2-313(b) (Proposed Draft 1996).
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since that is what the Drafting Committee meant to say,
"whether [they] got it said or not."291
After such a disappointing start, we might hope for soaring
improvements with respect to the disclaimer of implied warranties. Unfortunately, our hope is dashed. After excepting consumer contracts, the draft provides the usual litany of ways in
which the implied warranty of merchantability may be effectively disclaimed. Curiously, however, it begins with disclaimers
through the use of "'as is,"with all faults,' or other language that
under the circumstances calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion or modification of the warranties and states that the implied
warranties have been excluded or modified."292 This language

need not be recorded, i.e., an oral disclaimer using such language
would be effective. Nor is there any requirement that such language be conspicuous. Why is this method of disclaiming implied
warranties found in such a prominent position? The answer is
not long in coming.

The next subsection deals with disclaimers only where there is
a record, i.e., only where there is a writing or electronic record. If
there is a record containing a disclaimer, the familiar requirement of conspicuous language and the use of "merchantability"
or "merchantable" applies. To provide a safe harbor for the
seller's lawyer, the section adds, "[clonspicuous language that
states '[t]hese goods may not be merchantable' or language of
similar import is sufficient."293 If this section is enacted, there is
little doubt as to how implied warranties of merchantability will
thereafter be disclaimed whenever there is a record. Similarly, a
recorded disclaimer of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose in conspicuous language contains its own safe
harbor provision.294
Suppose the language in either merchantability or fitness disclaimers was not conspicuous. It would not be effective under
these subsections, but, if the disclaimer was negotiated, it would
still be effective through "other language."295 There is no provi291. See Liewellyn, supra note 1. For more on this, if you can stand it, see Murray,
Basis of the Bargain: TranscendingClassical Concepts, supra note 269 at 303, where I
also examine the absurdity of courts finding disclaimers of express warranties to be operative after the courts have already decided that no express warranties exist.
292. U.C.C. § 2-316(b)(1) (Proposed Draft 1996).
293. Id. § 2-316(b)(2)(i).

294. Id. § 2-316(b)(2)(ii). "There are no warranties that these goods will conform to
the purposes for which they are purchased made known to the seller,' or words of similar
import is [sic] sufficient." Id.
295. Id. § 2-316(b)(1). "[O]ther language that under the circumstances calls the
buyer's attention to the exclusion or modification of the warranties and states that the
implied warranties have been excluded or modified." Id.
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sion for oral (unrecorded) disclaimers of either implied warranty
except the general disclaimer provision allowing oral disclaimers
through the use of "as is," "with all faults" or other appropriate
language calling the buyer's attention to the disclaimer.296 This
methodology is now supreme. Using this method, the disclaimer
of all implied warranties is effective without any record, conspicuousness or required use of the term "merchantability." It is the
ultimate "safe harbor." The structure predicts a heightened use
of "as is" or "with all faults" or, as many lawyers are wont to do,
both phrases.
The draft continues the disclaimers by examination of the
goods (or refusal to examine) 297 as well as disclaimers by course
of performance, course of dealing or usage of trade.298 Before concluding with a replication of the original subsection reminding
everyone that remedies can be limited,299 the draft deals with the
knotty problem of disclaimers in consumer contracts:
Terms in a consumer contract excluding or modifying the implied
warranty of merchantability or the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose must be contained in a record and be conspicuous.
[The terms are inoperative unless the seller establishes by clear
and
affirmative evidence that the buyer expressly agreed to them.]3 00
The bracketed language had been deleted at the 1995 Annual
Meeting of NCCUSL, but the current draft restores it with some
01

modifications.3

Absent the bracketed statement, the section provides precious
little protection for the consumer buyer. Even with the bracketed statement, the protection is doubtful. Suppose, for example,
that a seller has the consumer sign a record disclaiming implied
warranties. Would that suffice? Suppose the seller has the buyer
separately manifest assent to the disclaimer provision. Would
that suffice? If either would suffice, it is clear that the typical
consumer will still lack anything resembling a complete understanding of the disclaimer. Even if a consumer could prevail,
how many consumers will pursue litigation? How many lawyers
are willing to represent consumers in such matters? The separate consumer protection section in the draft may be a snare and
a delusion, with or without the bracketed statement.
296.

Id.

297. U.C.C. § 2-316(b)(3) (Propoesd Draft 1996).
298. Id. § 2-316(b)(4).
299. Original section 2-316(4) becomes draft section 2-316(f), which follows 2-316(e),
though there is no (c) or (d) in this draft. See U.C.C. 2-316(f) (Proposed Draft 1996);
U.C.C. § 2-316(4) (1995).
300. U.C.C. § 2-316(e) (Proposed Draft 1996).
301. Id. § 2-316 note 3.
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There is the cogent argument that limitations on implied warranties should not be permitted at all in consumer contracts
since consumers do not have a clue as to what they are surrendering.30 2 The implied warranty of merchantability is the norm.
It protects a very basic quality standard-fit for the ordinary
purposes of such goods. It is harsh enough to allow such a basic
norm to be disclaimed or limited with respect to a merchant
buyer. To allow it to be disclaimed as to a consumer buyer borders on the very unconscionability that the draft and its predecessor otherwise preclude. It is time for the Drafting Committee
to bite the bullet and preclude any disclaimer, modification or
limitation of any implied warranty in a consumer transaction.
The Committee apparently spent considerable time on this
section. It is clear, however, that we would be no worse off if the
original section had not been changed.
(v).

Extension of Express or Implied Warranties

After replicating the original section on the cumulation and
conflict of warranties with little change," 3 the draft attacks the
difficult problem of warranty protection for remote parties who
may be affected by the goods and who are damaged; i.e., those
who were characterized as "third party beneficiaries" under the
original section.3 0 4 Not surprisingly, this section caused consider302. In 1975, President Gerald Ford signed the Magnuson Moss Warranty-Federal
Trade Commissions Improvement Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1996). The Act appears
to preclude the disclaimer or modification of "any implied warranty to a consumer." Id.
§ 2308(a). With respect to the written warranty necessary to make the Act operative,
however, such a warranty is allowed to be a "limited" rather than a "fll" warranty. Id.
§ 2303(a). A "limited" warranty may limit the duration of a written warranty "to the
duration of a written warranty of reasonable duration." Id. § 2308(b). Thus, a written
"limited" warranty promising the consumer that any defects will be repaired within 90
days may limit the implied warranty of merchantability to 90 days. Only "full" warranties that meet the requirements of the Act, section 2304, preclude any limitation on
implied warranties. It is difficult to discover any example of a "full" warranty. Every
consumer product with a written warranty appears to be a "limited" warranty. Thus, the
expanded implied warranty protection for the consumer becomes illusory. Moreover, the
technical requirements of a "written warranty," section 2301(6), create threshold barriers
to the application of the Act. See Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 660 F.2d 311 (7th Cir.
1981), cert. den., 456 U. S. 974 (1982). Notwithstanding these serious imperfections, the
question arises as to how a state statute allows implied warranties to be disclaimed with
respect to consumer transactions in the face of a federal statute that precludes such
disclaimers?
303. U.C.C. § 2-317 (Proposed Draft 1996). The change deals with "an implied warranty of merchantability in a consumer contract that is inconsistent with an express warranty." Id. § 2-317 note 1. Under draft section 2-317(3), such an implied warranty is not
displaced. Id. § 2-317. Instead, the requirements of the previous section on the disclaimer of implied warranties must be met.
304. Id. § 2-318. Draft section 2-318 carries the same section number as the original version.
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able discussion and the current draft "is still a 'work in progress."'3 °5 The section begins by continuing the broadest
standard of protection to remote buyers available in its predecessor while introducing several innovations. 0 6 Personal injury concerns are removed from the draft version since they are
addressed in the next draft section, 2-319, in an interesting effort
to reconcile warranty and tort law.3 07 This subsection, however,
deals with only one of the two ways in which a remote buyer (a
"non-privity" buyer) may sue the seller. Here, the remote buyer
derives its rights from the immediate buyer to whom the warranty was made by the seller. Such a remote buyer is a "beneficiary"308 of the contract between the seller and the immediate
buyer and is, therefore, in no better position than the immediate
buyer. Thus, 'it]he seller's obligation to a remote purchaser of or
person affected by the goods.., shall not exceed that owed to the
immediate buyer." Disclaimers and limitations on remedies,
therefore, bind the remote buyer to the same extent that they
bind the immediate buyer. Moreover, even where the contract
fails, for example, to exclude consequential damages and the
remote buyer suffers such damages but the immediate buyer
does not, the remote buyer may not recover consequentials
because the seller's obligation cannot exceed that owed to the
immediate buyer.0 9
The second way in which a remote buyer can recover from a
seller is where the seller made an express warranty to this
buyer. Here, the remote buyer's rights are not derivative and the
305. Id. § 2-318 note 1.
306. Compare U.C.C. § 2-318 (Proposed Draft 1996) with U.C.C. § 2-318 (1995).
Changed language from the draft section is italicized and different language from the
original is in brackets. The remaining language is unchanged:
A seller's express or implied warranty [whether express or implied] made
to an immediate buyer extends to any remote buyer or lessee or person who may be
reasonably expected to purchase, use, [consume] or be affected by the goods and
who is damaged [injured] by breach of the warranty. The rights and remedies
againstthe seller for breach of warranty extended under this subsection are determined by the enforceable terms of the contract between the seller and the immediate
buyer and this [article]. The seller's obligation to a remote purchaser of or person
affected by the goods, however, shall not exceed that owed to the immediate buyer.
[A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section with respect to
injury to the person of an individual to whom the warranty extends.]
See U.C.C. § 2-318(a) Alternative C (1995); U.C.C. § 2-318(a) (Proposed Draft 1996).
307. See infra notes 313-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of draft section
2-319.
308. U.C.C. § 2-318 note 3 (Proposed Draft 1996). Though such remote buyers are
"beneficiaries," note 3 to this section explains that the warranty extension to such parties
is based more upon policy than the usual focus in third party beneficiary contracts, i.e.,
the intention of the parties. Id.
309. Id. The same note also distinguishes cases where an immediate buyer assigns
the warranty to a remote purchaser who then, like any other assignee, is subject to relevant defenses between the seller and the immediate buyer. Id.
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relationship is treated as if there is privity of contract.3 10 Since
remote buyers have nothing to do with the receipt of goods by the
immediate buyer, the time for notice begins for the remote buyer
only when he receives the goods.3 11 As for consequential damages, however, a remote commercial buyer's rights are conditioned upon receiving a tender of the price paid by the remote
buyer [from the seller]. If that complying tender is made, the
remote commercial buyer may not recover consequential damages. A seller is, however, liable to a remote consumer buyer for
3 12
consequential damages regardless of any such tender.
As the notes to this section state, it is clearly a "work in progress" and much more progress is necessary.
(vi).

Warranty vs. Tort Liability

The Drafting Committee confronts the challenge of eliminating confusion between the use of warranty and tort theory in personal injury and injury to property actions through a new
section. 313 After Karl Llewellyn's precocious attempt to include a
comprehensive products liability concept in a very early draft of
the Code was rejected, he managed to retain a semblance of that
theory by simply including recovery for "injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty" in the
definition of consequential damages.3 14 Although the Drafting
Conmiittee considered the simple solution of eliminating this
type of injury from the definition and thereby limiting Article 2
damages to economic losses and relegating such claims to tort
law, this solution was rejected on the footing that products liability law is not uniform and Article 2 may be the prime vehicle for
such recovery in certain states. Thus, the definition of consequential damages in the draft continues to include "injury to person or property proximately resulting from breach of
warranty."3 1 5 Such recovery, however, is subject to the new section that seeks a "less drastic route to harmonization" of tort and
316
warranty theory.
310. Id. § 2-318(b). Note 3 indicates that the same analysis applies if a court or
applicable law dictates that the seller has a direct warranty obligation to the remote
buyer. Id. § 2-318 note 3.
311. Id. § 2-318(c)(1).
312. Id. 2-318 note 4.
313. U.C.C. § 2-319 (Proposed Draft 1996).
314. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (1995). For an appreciation of Llewellyn's precocious
efforts in this regard, see John B. Clutterbuck, Note, Karl Llewellyn and the Intellectual
Foundationsof Enterprise Liability Theory, 97 YALE L.J. 1131 (1988).
315. U.C.C. § 2-706(a)(2) (Proposed Draft 1996).
316. Id. § 2-319 note 3.
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The harmonization begins by narrowly defining "property,"
restricting injuries to property other than to the goods
purchased.3 17 The major innovation, however, restricts warranty
theory to injury to person or property only to the extent that the
goods are not defective under other applicable law.3 18 Thus, if
tort law is applicable because of a defect or failure to warn, Article 2 does not apply. This change raises a fascinating question.
It is certainly possible for goods to be non-defective under tort
law but still violate an express warranty or implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose. If, however, a product contains
no defect, thereby precluding a tort analysis, is a breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability still possible? While the
American Law Institute urges that the answer should be "no"
and the Drafting Committee believes that this will certainly be
the result in most cases, the Committee feels compelled to allow
for the possibility that a non-defective product may still be
unmerchantable. Here, it relies heavily upon a case that threatens to become celebrated.
A plaintiff sought recovery for personal injuries allegedly
caused by a defective vehicle. 31 9 The jury found the vehicle not
defective under products liability law, but found that the vehicle
was not merchantable under the Code and awarded damages of
$1.2 million to the plaintiff. The defendant claimed that the
causes of action were identical, i.e., that "defect" had the same
meaning under tort and warranty law. The New York Court of
Appeals rejected that argument, finding a "subtle" distinction
between the meaning of "defect" as used in tort versus warranty
actions.32 °
317. Id. § 2-319(a)(1). This section defines "property" as "any real or personal property other than the goods purchased." Id. This conforms to the American Law Institute's
proposed Restatement of Products Liability and case law. Id. § 2-319 note 3.
318. Id. § 2-319(b). '[This [article] applies to a claim for injury to person or property
resulting from any breach of warranty to the extent that the goods are not defective under
other applicable law.]" Id. The brackets indicate the lack of final resolution by the Drafting Committee.
319. Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1995).
320. The case was tried in the Federal District Court in the Northern District of
New York and a motion for rehearing was denied. Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 146 F.R.D.
52 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). The defendant then claimed the right to a new trial under Federal
Rule of Procedure 59(a) on the footing that the jury verdicts were irreconcilable. The
Second Circuit certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals. Denny v. Ford
Motor Co., 42 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1994). That court found that the tort standard, "not reasonably safe," focuses upon a risk/utility balance, i.e., weighing the product's benefits
against its risks in accordance with the social policy and risk allocation bases of products
liability law. Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730 (1995). Warranty actions, however, are based on contractual expectations that the product will be minimally safe for
ordinary purposes without regard to whether there were other possible manufacturing
designs that would have made the product safer, or whether the manufacturer was rea-
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The issue has not been finally resolved by the Drafting Committee.3 2 ' If the Committee continues this distinction, Article 2
claims for injury to person or "property" (other than the goods
purchased) will occur only in jurisdictions that agree with this
"subtle" distinction. Even then, the small number of potential
cases reduces the Article 2 analysis to something resembling theoretical importance. Most important, the analysis is circular
under the Committee's current rationale.
The case relied upon by the Committee to maintain the subtle
distinction suggests that a court is not free to merge the tort and
warranty concepts as long as legislative authority exists for a
separate (warranty) theory. 22 Thus, the Committee feels compelled to recognize the case law while the court feels compelled to
maintain the statute, but the statute will not change unless the
Committee recommends such change, which it may not do
because it feels compelled to recognize the case law. The Committee would perform a considerable service by adopting the
alternate simple solution which it considered: "delete Section 2706(a)(2) which defines consequential damages to include 'injury
to person or property proximately [resulting] from breach of
warranty.'"3
Assuming the "subtle distinction" remains, i. e., that there are
claims for injuries to person or property caused by products that
are non-defective under tort law but unmerchantable under Article 2, the draft removes obstacles and clarifies former confusion.
It expressly rejects the requirement of notice within a reasonable
time after acceptance under original 2-607(3)(a) since aggrieved
parties such as third party beneficiaries have nothing to do with
acceptance of the goods.324 The draft also renders any agreement
to exclude or limit consequential damages for injury to the person unenforceable, though a note explains that warranty disclaimers may still be effective. 325 The draft then confronts the

statute of limitations problem.
sonable in marketing the product in an unsafe condition. The court suggested that products liability is closer to a negligence standard whereas warranty theory is much more a
pure strict liability standard. Denny, 662 N. E. 2d at 736. There is a comprehensive dissenting opinion. Id. at 739 (Simons, J., dissenting). Based upon this decision, the Second
Circuit affirmed the judgment. Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 79 F.3d 12, affg 146 F.R.D. 52
(N.D.N.Y. 1993).
321. See U.C.C. 32-319 (Proposed Draft 1996).
322. See Denny, 662 N.E.2d at 319.
323. U.C.C. § 2-319 note 2 (Proposed Draft 1996).
324. Id. § 2-319(c)(1). Comment 5 to the original 2-607 recognized this anomaly.
See U.C.C. § 2-607 cmt. 5 (1995).
325. U.C.C. § 2-319(c)(2) note 3 (Proposed Draft 1996).
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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The original Article 2 statute of limitations requires actions for
breach to occur within four years after the cause of action
accrues, i. e., from the time of breach, which occurs when tender
of delivery is made, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of
knowledge of the breach.3 26 Thus, it provides four years from the
time of delivery to discover a breach. Clearly designed as a statute of limitations to protect expectation interests under a contract theory, the absence of any guidance on the application of
the statute to warranty actions for personal injury or injury to
property could and has led to absurd results. Thus, where a
third party beneficiary suffered injury caused by an unmerchantable product that had been delivered to the buyer more than four
years prior to the injury, the statute barred a recovery by the
beneficiary even though she had nothing to do with the delivery
or acceptance of the product more than four years earlier. 327 Once
the alternative tort theory became available, with a torts statute
of limitations providing two years from the time of the injury, the
same beneficiary could recover essentially by changing the caption atop its complaint. If a beneficiary had the sheer good fortune of being injured by a product delivered to the buyer less
than four years from the time of the injury, a cause of action
would lie under Article 2. If the same beneficiary had an alternative action under, e. g., Section 402A of the Restatement Second
of Torts, but failed to file an action within the two year torts statute, she could, nonetheless, resort to a warranty claim for the
same injuries if the product happened to be delivered to the
buyer less than four years from the filing of such action.
There were judicial attempts at symmetry and glimpses of recognition that original section 2-725 was not designed to deal with
tort-like injuries. 328 Yet, even courts that recognized the absurdity of applying 2-725 to personal injury cases involving benefi326. U.C.C. § 2-725(1)-(2) (1995).
327. See Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 291 N.Y.S. 2d, 94 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1967), affd 253 N.E.2d 207 (N.Y. 1969).
328. See John E. Murray, Jr., ProductsLiability-Another Word, 35 U. Prrr. L. REV.
255 (1973). See also Hahn v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 625 F.2d 1095 (3d Cir. 1980). For
example, original section 2-725(2) states that "[a] cause of action accrues when the breach
occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of
warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made .... " U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1995) (emphasis
added). The only possible aggrieved party when tender of delivery is made is the buyer,
since an "aggrieved party" is defined as a party entitled to assert a claim. Id. § 1-201(2).
A third party beneficiary who may have never met the buyer or saw the product until she
was injured by it could not possibly be an "aggrieved party" until the injury occurred. A
buyer, however, is an aggrieved party upon tender of delivery even though the buyer has
no knowledge of the breach at that time. Id. § 1-725(2).
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ciaries found other barriers in the section to justify absurd
results.3 2 9
Shorter statutes of limitations for tort actions are commonplace and justifiable for the usual reasons including the gathering of evidence. They are predicated upon the type of injury
suffered by the plaintiff, not upon the etiology of a theory
allowing such recovery. Recovery of tort-like damages under a
warranty theory, therefore, should be limited to the same torts
statute of limitations that would apply if the action had been
brought under a tort products liability theory. 330 There is not a
scintilla of support for applying 2-725 to such actions in the statutory language or its history, which deals exclusively with
defeated expectations and loss-of-bargain injuries. Yet, courts
felt compelled to apply the statute of limitations in Article 2 to
any action within that Article. This problem had to be addressed
in the draft.
For loss-of-bargain actions, the draft statute of limitations
retains the four-year period from the time the cause of action
accrues, i. e., when the breach occurs, even though the aggrieved
party had no knowledge of the breach. A breach occurs when the
seller tenders delivery. If the warranty expressly extends to performance of the goods after delivery, the cause of action accrues
when the buyer discovered or should have discovered the
breach. 33 ' The draft, however, carves out an exception for injury
to persons or property resulting from breach of warranty under
2-319(c): "A cause of action accrues when the purchaser discovers or should have discovered the breach. An action must be
commenced within four years after the cause of action has
" 332
accrued.
329.

See, e.g., Williams v. West Penn Power Co., 467 A.2d 811 (Pa. 1983). In Wil-

liams, the court recognized that original section 2-725 should not be applied to beneficiaries, but felt compelled to apply the statute to a buyer who suffered personal injuries.
Williams, 467 A.2d at 818. Both a buyer and beneficiary were injured by the same product in the same episode. Id. at 813. The court reasoned that since it had to apply the

four-year statute to the buyer, justice required that it apply the same statute to the beneficiary, notwithstanding its recognition that the statute should not be applied to the beneficiary. Id. at 818. There was really no need for the court to apply the statute to the
buyer, much less the beneficiary, but the court could not analyze its way to that desired
result.
330. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1964). It is an open secret that warranty theory was used to circumvent the excessive burdens placed on plaintiffs to prove
negligence prior to the Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which was first
announced only in 1964 and required years to be adopted by courts throughout the
country.
331. U.C.C. § 2-714(a)-(c) (Proposed Draft 1996).
332.

Id. § 2-319(c).
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Substituting a "discovery" statute for tort-like actions under a
warranty theory is clearly desirable. Why, however, should a
party enjoy a longer statute of limitations than he would enjoy
under a tort statute, i.e., why "four years?" Remembering that
this entire structure is designed to deal only with the exceptionally rare case of personal injury or property damage where there
is a breach of warranty but no "defective" product under products
liability law (assuming that distinction holds), there is still a
total absence of justification for a longer statute of limitations.
Where in the world did they get "four years?" Was that period
derived from the original statute that remains for contract
breaches having nothing to do with personal injury or property
damage and is limited to four years from the time of delivery?
What possible justification can the Drafting Committee assert for
this innovation?
The new statute of limitations section also contemplates an
exception for warranty of title claims. 333 "The risk is high that in
sales of art work or antiques the limitation period will run before
a 'true' owner makes a claim to the goods. Since there is no
longer a warranty of quiet possession, the buyer will have no
claim against the seller."334
XIII. PART 4: TRANSFERS, IDENTIFICATION ET. AL.
The draft continues a section on the passing of title with the
same recognition of its predecessor that "the location of title is
largely irrelevant under Article 2 ."33' The essential reason for
this section has not changed, i. e., to deal with questions arising
beyond Article 2 such as tax issues under appropriate statutes.
Draft section 2-402 moves the critically important concept of
"identification" from its former abode in part 5.336 Beyond stylistic changes for a "clear focus," the section remains essentially
unchanged. The advantages of identification are not found in the
section language, but a desirable note that should become a comment lists the advantages.337
333. See id. § 2-714(a) (excepting actions subject to sections 2-312(e) and 2-319(c)).
There is no 2-312(e) in the current draft. A note referring to that subsection is obviously
dealing with 2-312(d) concerning the extension of a seller's warranty of title to a remote
buyer, removing the privity barrier.
334. Id. § 2-714 note 2.
335. Id. § 2-401 note 2.
336. U.C.C. § 2-501 (1995).
337. U.C.C. § 2-402 note 4 (Proposed Draft 1996). Advantages to the buyer: (1)
acquisition of "goods oriented" remedies against the seller under 2-707 (specific performance) and 2-724 (prepaying buyer's right to goods); (2) protection against seller's creditors
under 2-405 (rights of seller's creditors against goods sold); (3) earlier status (in some
jurisdictions) as a buyer in the ordinary course of business as defined in original section 1-.
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Since part 4 deals, inter alia, with "transfers," new 2-403
incorporates 2-210 dealing with assignment of rights and contains no changes in substance. The draft, however, covers delegation of performance earlier in 2-211, which a note to 2-403
suggests should be integrated into 2-403. a88 Good faith purchasing and entrusting principles are found in 2-404, which clarifies
the essential concepts in original 2-403.
Draft section 2-405 revises original 2-402 by making the rights
of "creditors of the seller" rather than just "unsecured creditors"
subject to a prepaying buyer's right to goods or a buyer's right to
specific performance. 9 The purpose is to expand the goods-oriented remedies of the buyer against creditors of the seller,
including secured and lien creditors, without disrupting the
rights of an Article 9 secured creditor of the seller against a
buyer. Thus, the revision protects only the buyer's right to
recover the goods against the creditor. It does not "cut off" the
security interest. The original section was subject to the original
2-502, which provided a narrow right to a buyer who had paid
part or all of the price of identified goods where the seller had
become insolvent within ten days after receipt of the first installment payment. That section has been completely transformed by
2-724, which simply states:
A buyer who pays all or a part of the price of goods identified to the
contract, whether or not they have been shipped, on making and
keeping good a tender of full performance, has a right to recover them
from the seller
if the seller repudiates or fails to deliver as required by
340
the contract.
This is the product of an analysis that first considered repealing 2-502 because the insolvency requirement created a major
risk of invalidation in bankruptcy. On second thought, however,
simply repealing 2-502 would relegate a prepaying buyer to specific performance or replevin. The solution provides a parallel
right in 2-724, which removes the "unsecured creditor," insolvency and "ten day" conditions, thereby allowing the prepaying
buyer to recover the goods upon "full performance" against even
201(9); (4) right to inspect the goods under 2-513; (5) standing to sue parties who cause
injury to identified goods under draft section 2-713. Advantages to the seller: (1) shipment
under reservation under 2-508(a) [2-505]; (2) resale under 2-719(a) [2-706]; (3) possible
excuse where goods identified at time of contracting suffer casualty under 2-615 [2-613];
(4) possible action for the price though goods have not been accepted under 2-722(a)(2) [2709(1)(b)]; (5)(sic) standing to sue third parties who cause injury to identified goods, 2-713
[2-722].
338. U.C.C. § 2-403 note 1 (Proposed Draft 1996).
339. Id. § 2-405(a).
340. Id. § 2-724.
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if the buyer is a buyer in the ordinary course of
secured creditors
34 1
business.
Original section 2-326 deals with sale on approval
("approval"), sale or return ("return"), consignment sales and
related creditor's rights, while 2-327 addresses "special incidents" of "approval" and "return" sales. 342 Section 2-406 incorporates all relevant concepts including "special incidents."3 43
Section 2-407 is relegated to the issues of consignments and
creditor's rights formerly dealt with in 2-326. More recently,
however, the Drafting Committee has decided to move draft section 2-407 to Article 9. Moreover, 2-406(e) states that both
"approval" or "return" sales are subject to 2-407, which makes
goods valued at more than $1000 and not delivered to an auctioneer subject to claims of creditors while they are in possession of a
person who deals in goods of that kind, under a name other than
the name of the person making delivery of the goods, for the purpose of sale.344
XIV.

A.

PART 5: PERFORMANCE

Service Contracts

Part 5 of the draft opens with a series of sections designed to
deal with service, support and maintenance contracts. Original
section 2-301 stated the general obligation of the seller to transfer and deliver and the obligation of the buyer to accept and pay
for the goods in accordance with the contract.3 45 Section 2-501(a)
broadens that general obligation language to allow for service
contracts3 46 and proceeds to constructively condition a party's
duty of performance on substantial performance by the other
341. Note 4 to section 2-724 indicates that the issue of when the buyer becomes a
buyer in the ordinary course of business must still be resolved. Id. § 2-724 note 4. For
the purposes of 2-724, the note suggests that if the seller is in possession of identified
goods and all other conditions are satisfied, i.e., seller's retention is not fraudulent
against its creditor under 2-405(b) or the identification is not a preference under 2405(c)(2), the buyer becomes a buyer in the ordinary course of business when the seller
repudiates or fails to deliver. A buyer in the ordinary course of business takes free of a
security interest under 9-307(1) or 2-404(c) (entrusting). If a prepaying buyer under 2724 is not a buyer in the ordinary course of business, such a buyer has a right to possession of the goods but is still subject to secured creditors. The note suggests that in such
cases, "the buyer, after tendering full performance, should arrange a subordination agreement with the creditors before paying the price due." Id. Section 2-724 remains subject
to further discussion between the Article 2 and Article 9 Drafting Committees.
342. U.C.C. §§ 2-326, 2-327 (1995).
343. U.C.C. § 2-406 (Proposed Draft 1996).
344. U.C.C. § 2-407(a) (1995).
345. U.C.C. § 2-407(a) (Proposed Draft).
346. Id. § 2-501(a). "Parties to a transaction subject to this article are obligated to
perform in accordance with the contract and this article." Id.
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party. 34 7 "Substantial performance" is clearly designed to reflect
its true nature under draft section 2-602, which unsurprisingly
adopts the traditional material breach analysis as the equivalent
of the "substantial impairment of value" analysis .3 Thus, basic
contract law is reaffirmed in the requirement of a material
breach to justify the refusal of the aggrieved party to perform. A
nonmaterial breach requires the aggrieved party to continue performance notwithstanding such party's right to pursue appropriate remedies.
Section 2-502 provides a "default" rule for performance quality
in service contracts: "[T]he party shall render performance of a
quality that is reasonable and no less than average under the
circumstances." This is the quality standard absent displacing
terms. It obviously does not apply to express or implied war3 49
ranty standards that set forth the quality standard for goods.
Section 2-503 provides guidance with respect to support contracts and sets forth the general rule that the seller is not
required to provide support or instruction for the buyer's use of
the goods after delivery unless the seller agrees to supply such
support, which the seller must then make available at a time,
place and quality consistent with the terms of the contract or, in
the absence of such terms, in a commercially reasonable and
workmanlike manner. If the support contract is breached, the
buyer has remedies for breach under part 7 of Article 2, but the
seller's breach does not justify buyer's cancellation of the contract concerning the goods unless the breach substantially
impairs the value of the contract to the buyer. 5 °
Section 2-504 is a form of the seller's right to "cure" defects in
goods as applied to replacement, repair, maintenance or similar
services pursuant to an agreement. If the seller agrees to provide such services for a limited time and in lieu of a warranty,
the seller is contracting to complete its delivery of goods by providing such services in accordance with the contract and in a
timely manner.3 51 If a party simply agrees to provide services, it
must do so in a timely and workmanlike manner in accordance
with commercially reasonable standards, though such an agreement does not, in itself, guarantee that the services will correct
347.

Id. § 2-501(b).

348. Id. § 2-602(b). This section utilizes standard Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (material breach) criteria to determine whether a breach constitutes a "substantial impairment of the value of the contract."
349. Id. § 2-502.
350. U.C.C. § 2-503 (Proposed Draft 1996).
351. Id. § 2-504(a)(1).
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defects.38 2 The party receiving services is under a constructive
condition of cooperation and may seek remedies for breach of a
maintenance or repair contract under part 7 of Article 2. The
buyer may not cancel the contract upon breach of such a contract
absent a substantial impairment of value to the buyer.3 54
B.

Waiver of Objection
Original section 2-605 precludes reliance on a defect that was
reasonably ascertainable, but not stated in connection with rejection of the goods where the seller could have cured had the defect
been seasonably stated or, between merchants, where the seller
made a written request for a full and written statement of all
defects upon which the buyer proposed to rely. This concept
seems to be incorporated in a new and broader section 2-505,
"Waiver of Objection,"3 5 that begins with a subsection on waiver
of breach where a party accepts performance notwithstanding a
breach and fails to object within a reasonable time. 56 There is,
35 7
however, a later replication of 2-605 in part 6 of the draft.
C. Seller's Tender and Delivery
Since the draft repeals original sections 2-319 through 2-323,
which deal with delivery terms in favor of a flexible interpretation standard, 8 the new section on the manner of the seller's
tender of delivery takes on added significance.3 59 The draft, however, suggests only minor modifications to its predecessor.3 6 0
Thus, a seller is not required to deliver at a particular destination "unless required by a specific agreement or by the commercial understanding of the terms used by the parties."3 61 This
language is also designed to favor the "shipment" contract as the
normal contract by creating, in effect, a presumption against the
"destination" contract.
Where the goods are in possession of a bailee and are to be
delivered without being moved, tender occurs where the seller
either tenders a negotiable document of title covering the goods
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

Id. § 2-504(a)(2).
Id. § 2-504(b)-(c).
U.C.C. § 2-504(d) (Proposed Draft 1996).
Id. § 2-505(b).
Id. § 2-505. Failure to object, however, does not preclude any other remedy for

breach unless a party is prejudiced by the aggrieved party's inaction. Id. § 2-505(a).
357. Id. § 2-604. This section is identified as a particularized application of 2-505.
358. See supra notes 258 and 259 and accompanying text discussing draft section 2309.
359. U.C.C. § 2-506 (Proposed Draft 1996).
360. U.C.C. § 2-503 (1995).
361. U.C.C. § 2-506(c) (Proposed Draft 1996).
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or procures acknowledgment by the bailee of the buyer's right to
possession of the goods. A question arises with respect to the latter method of tender, i.e., acknowledgment by the bailee to
whom? If the acknowledgment is to the seller, the buyer is unaware of it. The identical issue arises when the question is
whether risk of loss has passed to a buyer in such a bailee transaction, i. e., does the risk pass when the bailee's acknowledgment
is to the seller, or only when it is "to the buyer?"" 2 The draft
resolves this issue in the tender of delivery section and in the
new risk
of loss section by adding the phrase "to the buyer" to
363
both.

As to the seller's shipment duties, draft section 2-507 replicates its predecessor, 2-503, notwithstanding criticism that the
section's requirement on the seller to make arrangements 3for
6
shipment is allegedly abnormal in the real commercial world. '
Similarly, the only change in original section 2-505 dealing with
the seller's shipment under reservation is its new section
number, 2-508, and the same is true of original 2-506, which
becomes 2-509 concerning the rights of a financing agency. Original 2-507 concerning the effect of the seller's tender, however, is
modified in the draft to emphasize that the seller must be the
first party to tender performance, 365 and to emphasize that the
seller's right to reclaim the goods is subject to the limitations on
that right of reclamation as detailed in another section.366
D. Payment and Inspection
While the seller must be the first to tender, tender of payment
by the buyer is a condition to the seller's duty to complete a delivery. This principle as well as other tender of payment rules in
original section 2-511 are unchanged in draft section 2-511.367
The next section, "Payment by buyer before inspection," is a
362. This precise issue arose in a risk of loss context under original section 2509(2)(b) in Jason'sFoods, Inc. v. PeterEckrich & Sons, Inc., 774 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1985).
363. U.C.C. §§ 2-516(d)(1) (Proposed Draft 1996).
364. See id. § 2-507; U.C.C. § 2-503 (1995). Allegedly, real world commercial deals
do not require the seller to make shipping arrangements unless required by the contract
or commercial practice. Note 1 to draft section 2-507 states, "[tihis issue should be
resolved." U.C.C. § 2-507 (Proposed Draft 1996).
365. U.C.C. § 2-510(a) (Proposed Draft 1996).
366. Id. § 2-510(b). Section 2-510(b) is subject to 2-716 dealing with the seller's
right to reclaim goods after delivery to the buyer. Id. Draft section 2-716 replaces original section 2-702. Id. § 716.
367. Id. § 2-511. Here, the section numbers are identical because original 2-509
dealing with risk of loss is moved to draft section 2-516, and original 2-510, which
changed the original 2-509 risk of loss rules in breach situations, has been repealed. Id.
§ 2-516. See infra notes 369 to 382 and accompanying text for an analysis of the new risk
of loss section.
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duplicate of original 2-512, as are 2-513, the buyer's right to
inspect goods, and 2-514, concerning the delivery of documents
against which a draft is drawn. The only change8 in 2-515 dealing
36
with time for payment is the section number.
E.

Risk of Loss

Up to this point, part 5 of the proposed revision to Article 2 has
been thoroughly unexciting because its sections are so often virtual or precise replications of its predecessors. In the last section
of part 5, however, the Drafting Committee pursues a radically
new paradigm of considerable interest. Section 2-516, simply
captioned, "Risk of Loss," is the sole risk of loss section. It
replaces the original 2-509, which is captioned, "Risk of Loss in
the Absence of Breach," to distinguish it from the next section in
the original, 2-510, "Effect of Breach on Risk of Loss." Any surface impression that the draft simply merged the two former sections is immediately overcome. The draft repeals original section

2-510.369
Though it may be almost shocking to students of the original
risk of loss process where there has been a breach, only one "remnant" remains: the seller continues to assume the risk of loss
until cure or acceptance where the goods or documents fail to
conform to the terms of the contract, including those supplied by
Article 2.70 Other rules relying upon the extent of insurance coverage where the buyer rightfully revoked acceptance or repudiated before risk of loss passed to the seller are excised.
The Drafting Committee concluded that the effect of breach on
risk of loss rules is largely irrelevant 37' and the notion that risk
of loss should be reallocated in breach situations is dubious at
best, particularly where there is no causal connection between
the breach and casualty to the goods. Moreover, the application
of reallocation rules based upon the extent of insurance coverage
is unclear in original sections 2-510(2) and (3). The underlying
concept that these subsections operated as "anti-subrogation"
368. U.C.C. § 2-515 (Proposed Draft 1996) (replacing U.C.C. § 2-310 (1995)).
369. Id. § 2-516. The second sentence of the notes following 2-516 reads: "Section 2510 dealing with the effect of breach on risk of loss has been repealed." Id.
370. Id. § 2-516(3); U.C.C. § 2-510(1) (1995).
371. U.C.C. § 2-516 note 1 (Proposed Draft 1996). Where S agrees to sell a haystack to B located in a place controlled by S's agent, who is not an independent bailee, the
goods are identified to the contract though B never expects to take possession. Id. B
intends to resell the hay to another who will take possession. Id. Here, when S tenders
deliver under 2-506(a), B, though not in possession, has control of the goods and risk of
loss has passed. Id. The fact that B may have breached the contract after tender but
before possession is taken is irrelevant. Id.
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provisions has not been shown to have had any effect on insurance companies or calculated premiums. 2
The new risk of loss section emphasizes the fundamental principle that risk of loss passes when the buyer receives or takes
control of the goods."' The distinction between merchant and
non-merchant sellers in original 2-509(3) is excised. 4 The basic
distinction between "shipment" and "destination" contracts
remains. In "shipment" contracts, the risk passes to the buyer
when the goods are tendered and delivered to the carrier as
required by sections 2-506 and 2-507. In "destination" contracts,
the risk of loss passes when the goods are tendered at that destination as required in 2-506 to enable the buyer to take delivery.3 Unfortunately, the Committee fails to correct a defect in
the original by not inserting in the section language the presumption that the "shipment" contract is the normal contract in
the absence of specific contract language to the contrary. Rather,
it relies upon an earlier statement dealing with the seller's manner of tendering delivery that "in effect" creates such a presumption. 76 Since it would have been relatively simple to include this
presumption in the statutory language, its absence suggests
another illustration of what "we are attempting to say, whether
we got it said or not."
Similarly, it is left to notes to explain that "carrier" as used in
"shipment" contracts refers to independent carriers rather than
transportation facilities operated or controlled by the parties to
the contract. 7 While this has been the clear assumption under
the original section, why not characterize such carriers as
"independent" in the section language?
As suggested earlier, the confusion concerning acknowledgments by bailees is overcome by the insertion of the phrase "to
the buyer,"3 78 while questions concerning the application of the

appropriate subsection to sellers who become bailees are properly left to the notes.37 9 Finally, the entire section is subject to 2372. Id. § 2-516 note 4.
373. Id. § 2-516(a).
374. Id. Under original section 2-509(3), the risk passes to the buyer upon his
receipt of the goods if the seller is a merchant, but upon tender of delivery if the seller is
not a merchant. U.C.C. § 2-509(3) (1995). The Drafting Committee sees no merit in this
distinction, which it rejects in favor of the general principle that the seller is in the best
position to avoid loss or insure against it until the buyer takes possession or control of the
goods. See U.C.C. § 2-516 note 1 (Proposed Draft 1996).
375. U.C.C. § 2-516(b) (Proposed Draft 1996).
376. Id. § 2-516 note 2 (referring to U.C.C. § 2-506(c) (Proposed Draft 1996)).
377. Id. § 2-516 note 2.
378. See supra notes 362-63 and accompanying text.
379. U.C.C. § 2-516 note 3 (Proposed Draft 1996). Note 3 explains that "bailee"
typically refers to a third party such as a warehouse or a carrier. Id. But if S sells a
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406 dealing with "approval" or "return" sales. 8 0 Under a "sale on
approval," risk of loss does not pass to the buyer until acceptance
of the goods, i. e., use of the goods on a trial basis is not "acceptance" of the goods.3 8 ' Under a "sale or return," presumably the
risk is on the buyer. Since the section is unnecessarily silent on
this question, this conclusion must be implied from the absence
of express risk of loss language with respect to such sales, as contrasted with "approval" sales. The same implication was necessary in the original section that includes a comment to confirm
the distinction.8 2
Notwithstanding the criticism of certain elements in this
effort, the Drafting Committee has clearly succeeded in presenting an improved risk of loss analysis.
XV.

A.

PART

6:

BREACH, REPUDIATION AND EXCUSE

Breach, Substantial Impairment,Material Breach

The two sections of original Article 2 that list seller and buyer
remedies each begin with the ways in which the other party may
breach the contract 83 The Drafting Committee begins its latest
version of part 6 with a definition of breach, thereby eliminating
other more specific definitions. 8 4 This definitional section is followed by a new section called "Breach of the Whole Contract;
Substantial Impairment,"8 5 which sets forth traditional criteria
from the Restatement (Second) of Contracts to determine
horse to B, who pays the price and leaves the horse to be boarded with S, S then becomes
a bailee. Id. Here, the risk of loss should be determined under either 2-516(a) (did the
buyer have "control" of the goods?), or 2-516(c) before S becomes a bailee. Id. Section 2516(b) would not apply since no shipment was contemplated. Id. Thus, the risk should
remain on S absent a contrary agreement with B. Id.
380. U.C.C. § 2-516(d) (Proposed Draft 1996). See supra notes 347-48 and accompanying text for a discussion on the terms "approval" and "return" sales.
381. U.C.C. § 2-406(b) (Proposed Draft 1996).
382. U.C.C. § 2-327 cmt. 3 (1995). Original section 2-326 also dealt with "approval"
and "return" sales. Id. § 2-326.
383. U.C.C. §§ 2-703, 2-711 (1995). The former (seller's list of remedies) includes
the buyer's wrongful rejection or revocation of acceptance, failure to make a payment, or
repudiation. Id. § 2-703. The latter (buyer's list of remedies) includes seller's failure to
deliver or repudiate or buyer's rightful rejection or revocation. Id. § 2-711.
384. U.C.C. § 2-601 (Proposed Draft 1996). In 2-601(b)(1), a seller breaches "if it
fails to deliver or to perform an obligation, makes a nonconforming tender of performance,
repudiates the contract, or exceeds a contractual limitation." Id. § 2-601(b)(1). In 2601(b)(2), a buyer breaches "if it wrongfully rejects a tender of delivery, wrongfully
revokes acceptance, repudiates the contract, fails to make a required payment or to perform an obligation or exceeds contractual limitations." Note 2 to this section reminds us
that conduct that would otherwise be a breach is not a breach if it is excused under one of
the later sections (2-615 through 2-618). Id. § 2-601 note 2.
385. Id. § 2-602.
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whether a breach is "material."8 6 There is an express recognition
that these criteria are to be applied to determine whether there
is a substantial impairment of the value of the contract, thereby
eliminating any vestige of doubt that "substantial impairment of
value" and "material breach" criteria and analyses are coextensive. Moreover, when this section is juxtaposed with the new
"substantial performance" section that opens part 5 of the draft,
the unified analysis is, again, confirmed.38 7
B.

"PerfectTender Rule"

The introduction to these sections postpones the appearance of
original 2-601 dealing with rightful rejection until 2-603, which
is otherwise remarkably similar to the original and retains the
phraseology, "if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any
respect to conform to the contract."388 Thus, the "perfect tender"
rule is preserved, but only to the extent it was preserved under
the original. The otherwise "absolute" right to reject is made
subject to 2-507(b), which does not permit rejection for a nonconforming tender if the nonconformity is a failure to notify the
buyer of shipment or to make a proper contract where neither
causes a material delay or loss. 3 8 9 Like its predecessor, the "absolute" right to reject is also subject to 2-611, which does not permit
rejection of nonconforming installments for "any" nonconformity,
but only for those where substantial impairment of value can be
shown. Beyond these stated qualifications of the "perfect
tender"/"absolute" right to reject rule, this section can be varied
by the agreement of the parties under the general freedom of
contract principle set forth earlier in the draft.390 Similarly, other
generally accepted limitations on the "perfect tender rule" are
recognized in the notes following the section such as: "good
faith," the seller's right to cure, and acceptance of the goods,
which can only then be revoked under a substantial impairment
of value standard rather than rejected for any nonconformity. 39 '
386. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 241 (1979).
387. U.C.C. § 2-501 (Proposed Draft 1996). See text accompanying supra notes 35152. It has long been an open secret that substantial performance and material breach are

identical analyses with different etiologies. See MuRRAY,supra note 52, § 108.
388. U.C.C. § 2-601(a) (Proposed Draft 1996).
389. Id. This replicates the last paragraph of original section 2-504, which curiously
remains otherwise unidentified. Id.
390. Id. § 2-109(a). See supra text prior to note 62. The original section 2-601
includes a reminder of the freedom to vary this provision through the usual "unless otherwise agreed" phrase. U.C.C. § 2.601 (1995). The draft does not include such a reminder
though note 2 suggests that the parties may "vary the rejection standard by agreement."
U.C.C § 2-603 note 2 (Proposed Draft 1996).
391. U.C.C. § 2-603 note 2 (Proposed Draft 1996).
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Since these limitations have been established under the original
version, and the Drafting Committee wishes to continue them,
they could easily be listed in the section language to become part
of the enacted law rather than commentary support.
Finally, the section incorporates the requirement of notice of
rejection within a reasonable time, which is part of a separate
section in the original Article 2 on the manner of rejection.392
C. Duty of Care-Rejection and Revocation of Acceptance
If a buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance of
goods, the buyer must hold the goods with reasonable care at the
seller's disposition for a sufficient time to allow the seller to
remove them.393 Where the buyer uses such goods in a manner
inconsistent with the seller's ownership, the draft clarifies the
effect: the seller has the option of treating such use as an acceptance or conversion of the goods. 94 Even where the rejection is
wrongful, thereby precluding acceptance, the buyer is subjected
to the same duties as if the rejection were rightful. Use of goods
retained after rejection or revocation of acceptance may not constitute acceptance; it may be a justifiable use as where a buyer
cannot effect cover for some time and uses nonconforming goods
in its business. The draft includes a new subsection allowing for
this situation, providing that the buyer has not accepted the
goods under such circumstances, but is liable for the reasonable
value of such use.39 5
The next section effectively merges and clarifies two original
sections dealing with further duties of the buyer and the buyer's
option as to salvaged goods where the goods have been rejected
or acceptance was revoked.396
D. Acceptance, Notice of Breach, Revocation of Acceptance and
Cure
(i). Acceptance
What constitutes acceptance of goods by the buyer? The
answers are largely unchanged under the draft. 97 There is, however, an important clarification with respect to an acceptance
392. U.C.C. § 2-603(b) (Proposed Draft 1996); U.C.C. § 2-602(1) (1995).
393. U.C.C. § 2-605(a) is similar to U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(b) (1995).
394. U.C.C. § 2-605(b)(1) (Proposed Draft 1996); U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(a) (1995).
395. U.C.C. § 2-605(b)(2) (Proposed Draft 1996).
396. Id. § 2-606; U.C.C. §§ 2-603, 2-604 (1995).
397. U.C.C. § 2-607 (Proposed Draft 1996) (replacing original U.C.C. § 2-606 (1995)).
Draft section 2-607 provides that after a reasonable opportunity to inspect, one of the
following three actions may take place: (1) buyer signifies that it accepts the goods, (2)
fails to make an effective rejection under 2-603, or (3) "does any unreasonable act incon-
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that occurs through the buyer's actions. The draft distinguishes
between a buyer's reasonable acts and unreasonable acts inconsistent with the seller's ownership. A buyer's reasonable acts
will not constitute acceptance. 9 s Moreover, the buyer's reasonable acts may occur before or after rejection or revocation of
acceptance.3 9 9
(ii).

Rightful, Wrongful, Effective, Ineffective Rejections

An interesting note to this section reflects the Drafter's contemplation about the continuation of rightful but ineffective
rejections and wrongful, but effective, rejections. Where the
buyer discovers a nonconformity, but fails to notify the seller in
time, the rejection is rightful, but ineffective, and acceptance
occurs. Yet, there is no acceptance where the rejection is wrongful because there is no nonconformity and the buyer effectively
rejects. While the buyer can be sued for wrongful rejection, there
is no acceptance. The note asks, "[d]oes this make sense? Why
not state simply and clearly that a wrongful rejection under Section 2-603(a), even though effectively communicated under Sec400
tion 2-603(b), is an acceptance?"
One rationale for the continuation of the wrongful but effective
rejection precluding acceptance is the efficiency in allowing the
seller, who normally sells such wrongfully rejected goods, to dispose of them and recover damages from the breaching buyer.
The buyer has not, in fact, accepted the goods. Calling an effective, but wrongful, rejection an acceptance would allow a forced
sale as the seller could sue for the price under draft section 2722. Since the seller can be made whole without this remedy,
there is no compelling need to call the effective but wrongful
rejection an acceptance.
(iii). Notice of Breach-Accepted Goods
There is an important change in the next section dealing with
the effect of acceptance, notice of breach as to accepted goods, the
burden of establishing breach and notice of claims or litigation to
an answerable person. 40 1 Original section 2-607(3)(a) requires
the buyer to notify the seller of breach as to accepted goods
within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers, or should
sistent with the seller's ownership of buyer's claim of rejection or revocation of acceptance
and seller ratifies that act as an acceptance." Id.
398. Id. § 2-607(3). Thus, a buyer who continues to use the goods after rejection or
revocation of acceptance may be reasonable in that use. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id. § 2-607 note 1.
401. Id. § 2-608 (replacing original U.C.C. § 2-607 (1995)).
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have discovered, such breach. Failure to comply with this notice
requirement bars the buyer from any remedy. The important
draft change bars the buyer from a remedy "only to the extent
that the seller establishes that it was prejudiced by the failure."
Supported by Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 229,
the note explains that the statutory notice condition should be
excused "where the failure is not material and implementation
would result in 'disproportionate forfeiture.' 4 °2
Still another issue involves the content of the notice. While
the original section requires notice of "breach," a comment suggests that, on the one hand, the "content of the notification need
merely be sufficient to let the seller know that the transaction is
still troublesome and must be watched." On the other hand, the
same comment ends with the statement that the "notification
which saves the buyer's rights under this Article need only be
such as informs the seller that the transaction is claimed to
involve a breach ....403 Perhaps the best-known case dealing
with the content of notice is EasternAir Lines, Inc. v. McDonnellDouglas Corporation,404where a long-term contract to supply jet
aircraft was plagued by a series of delays." Since it would have
been impracticable for the buyer to switch suppliers in this marriage-like contract, the buyer's notices of delays appeared to meet
the standards of the first part of the comment ("troublesome"),
but did not mention "breach."406 The court seemed to understand

the buyer's dilemma in cajoling performance rather than threatening litigation, but still found the content of the notice
insufficient. 4°7
The draft continues the statutory requirement of a notice of
breach 408 and the note following the section states that the notice
"need state only that the buyer is claiming a breach."40 9 This

requirement, however, must be viewed in light of the significant
change already discussed, i.e., the failure to provide any notice at
all will not bar a remedy unless the seller establishes that it was
prejudiced by the failure. 410 Thus, if notice of "trouble that must
402.

U.C.C. § 2-608 note 2 (Proposed Draft 1996).

403. U.C.C. § 2-607 cmt. 4 (1995).
404. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir.
1976).
405. Eastern Airlines, 532 F.2d at 864.
406. Id. at 976 n.62.
407. Id.
408. U.C.C. § 2-608(c)(1) (Proposed Draft 1996). The section provides: "The buyer
...shall notify the seller of the claimed breach." Id.
409. Id. § 2-608 note 2.
410. Id. This is described in note 2 to 2-608 as "amiddle position between an absolute bar and requiring proof of material prejudice." Id.
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be watched" is given, it may be extremely difficult for the seller to
establish that it was prejudiced by the failure of the notice to
include that nasty word "breach" or other threats of litigation.
(iv). Revocation of Acceptance and Cure
While the draft section on revocation of acceptance is
unchanged,41 ' the next section enlarges the right of the seller to
cure even after revocation of acceptance.412 There has never been
any justifiable reason to preclude cure after revocation of acceptance where "contract time" remains. Thus, an acceptance could
be signified before the buyer reasonably discovers a substantial
nonconformity giving rise to revocation of acceptance. Assuming
a perfect tender can be made within the original time for performance, the seller should have the right to cure, i. e., that right
should not be curtailed simply because of an early "acceptance" of
the goods. The original section, however, speaks exclusively in
terms of cure after rejection.413 The change in the draft is not
only desirable, but necessary as are its qualifications.
If a buyer accepts goods on the reasonable assumption that the
nonconformity will be cured, and it is not cured, the seller will
not receive a second chance to cure under this section. Nor will
the section apply if an agreed remedy fails of its essential
purpose.
(v). Cure After "Contract Time"
Beyond its enlargement to include cure after revocation of
acceptance, the new cure section insists on a "rightful" rejection,
which an accompanying note explains must be both "rightful"
and "effective."41 4 As for a "cure" beyond what the original section
calls "contract time," the draft suggests a considerable liberalization: "If the agreed time for performance has expired, the seller
may provide a cure that is appropriate in the circumstances if
the buyer has no legitimate interest in refusing the cure and the
cure is effected within a reasonable time."415
While this may be a very desirable'change, it raises a number
of questions. Who must establish that the cure is appropriate in
411. Id. § 2-609 (designed to replace U.C.C. § 2-608 (1995)).
412. Id. § 2-610.
413. U.C.C. § 2-508 (1995).
414. U.C.C. § 2-610 (Proposed Draft 1996). This section begins, "[if the buyer rightfully rejects . . . ." Id. § 2-610 note 2. Note 3 states that this means a "rightful" and
"effective" rejection, that the note calls a "proper" rejection. The section would be more
clear if "effective" were included along with "rightful." Id. § 2-610 note 3.
415. Id. § 2-610(2). The original requirement that the seller have "reasonable
grounds to believe" that its nonconforming tender "would be acceptable with or without a
money allowance" in original section 2-508(2) is excised from the draft. Id. § 2-610.
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the circumstances? Presumably the seller has that burden, but
this should be stated. Who must establish that the buyer has no
legitimate interest in refusing the cure? The question should be
clearly answered. A note to the section suggests an illustration
of a ten-day delay in performance and summarily concludes that
a second late tender by the seller is not appropriate in the circumstances.416 Is this true even where the delay does not prejudice the buyer who has no legitimate interest in refusing such a
cure? The requirement that the buyer have no legitimate interest in refusing a cure appears to be a species of the pervasive
good faith requirement. As such, it should predominate in determining whether a cure after "contract time" must be accepted.417
E. Installment Contracts
Draft section 2-611 "clarifies the definition of installment contracts" to include contracts that allow "either party the right to
make or demand delivery in lots," 418 and where installment deliveries will be made though payment is in lump sum. 419 The section

is enlarged to include nonconforming installment payments by
the buyer as well as nonconforming installment deliveries by the
seller. 20 Rejection continues to require substantial impairment
of the value of an installment or of the "whole contract."42' Like
its predecessor, the section states that power to cancel the "whole
contract" is waived "if the aggrieved party accepts a nonconforming installment" and does not notify the seller of cancellation,
installments or
and "brings an action" only with "respect to past
422
demands performance" of future installments.

F. Adequate Assurance-AnticipatoryRepudiation
While there are no changes in the section providing a right to
demand adequate assurances,423 the anticipatory repudiation
section modifies its predecessor by including a non-exclusive defi416. Id. § 2-610 note 2.
417. Id. Note 1 to this section states: "Additional research and thought will be
devoted to new Section 2-610 and its implications." Id. § 2-610 note 1.
418. Id. § 2-611 note 1 (pursuant to U.C.C. § 2-302 (Proposed Draft 1996)).
419. U.C.C. § 2-611(a) (Proposed Draft 1996). A contract requiring delivery in one
lot with payment in installments is not, however, an installment contract under this section. See id. § 2-611 note 1.
420. Id. § 2-610(b). It should be noted, however, that a delay in payment as contrasted with a breach by the seller cannot be cured though a seller will have every incentive to accept a delayed payment. See id. § 2-610 note 2.
421. Id. § 2-610(b), (c).
422. Id. § 2-610(c).
423. Id. § 2-612 (formerly U.C.C. § 2-609 (1995)).
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nition of "repudiation." 424 A repudiation continues to require substantial impairment of the value of the contract to the other
party. 425 A note to the section suggests that a qualified statement such as "I will not continue to perform until our 'good faith'
dispute over the interpretation of the contract is resolved" may
be a repudiation in one sense, but arguably does not substantially impair the value of the contract and is not, therefore, a
repudiation under the section. 2 6 The notes also alert us to
changes in the installment contract section allowing "repudiation
of an installment" not yet due to "constitute a substantial impairment of the entire contract."427 There are no revisions to the next
" 4 28
section, "Retraction of Anticipatory Repudiation.
G. Excuse-Casualty, Impracticabilityet. al.
The draft section on casualty to identified goods opens with a
change in language, as it provides "[i]f the parties to a contract
assume the continued existence and eventual delivery to the
buyer of goods identified when the contract is made,"429 instead
of "[w]here the contract requires for its performance goods identified when the contract is made .. ."430 The new phraseology is
preferable, at least because of its similarity to the commercial
impracticability section which continues the original language,
"basic assumption on which the contract was made."' 3 ' The section, itself, is otherwise unchanged. A note, however, suggests
that this is a default rule, i. e., where "the parties have not otherwise agreed."43 2 It then suggests that in a contract for goods not
identified at the time the contract is made, evidence of whether
424.

U.C.C. § 2-613(b) (Proposed Draft 1996). The section provides: "Repudiation

includes but is not limited to language that one party will not or cannot make a performance still due under the contract or voluntary affirmative conduct that reasonably
appears to the other party to make a future performance impossible or apparently impossible." Id.
425.
426.

Id. § 2-613(a).
Id. § 2-613 note 1. This is an important distinction that the section or com-

ments thereto should make clear. If performance is suspended because of a good faith
dispute over the interpretation of the contract, it is difficult to understand why this would
be a repudiation in any sense.
427.

Id.

See U.C.C. 2-611(c) (1995). Original section 2-610 requires repudiation of

the contract rather than an installment to constitute substantial impairment of the entire
contract. U.C.C. § 1-613 note 1 (Proposed Draft 1996).
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.

U.C.C. § 2-614 note 1 (Proposed Draft 1996).
Id. § 2-615 (emphasis added).
Id. § 2-613 (emphasis added).
Id. § 2-617(aXl); U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (1995).
U.C.C. § 2-615 note 1 (Proposed Draft 1996).
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the parties nonetheless "assumed their continued existence
should be considered."

433

There are no revisions in the "Substituted Performance" section, 4 but the proposed commercial impracticability section,
"Excuse By Failure of Presupposed Conditions," allows buyers as
well as sellers to pursue the "slim" chance that they can establish
this excuse. 3 5 The section uses the rubric, "frustration of purpose" for buyer excuse, and substitutes "unless otherwise agreed"
for "assumed a greater obligation" in the original section.436 The
"Procedure on Notice Claiming Excuse" is modified to provide for
buyer notification to the seller concerning a material delay or
non-performance in payment.43 7
Part 6 ends with a replication of original section 2-515 fostering adjustments of claims or disputes by setting forth rules for
the ascertainment of facts and preservation of evidence.438 A different placement, e. g., near the buyer's right to inspect in section 2-513, seems more appropriate.
XVI.

A.

PART

7:

REMEDIES

Structure-GeneralPrinciples

The draft divides part 7 into subparts: Subpart A contains
general remedial policies to which subparts B (seller's remedies)
and C (buyer's remedies) are subject. Subpart A opens by expressing this thought. A note, however, states that "[t]he Committee
on Style strongly recommends that 2-701 be deleted as a superfluous 'roadmap' and the sections be renumbered. This will be
done in the next draft."43 9 Section 2-702, called "Breach; Proce-

dures," states that a party can pursue the remedies available to
433. Id. The note suggests that in a contract for growing crops not required to be
grown on the seller's land, a drought affecting such crops should still be considered as a
possible excuse for nonperformance if"both parties assumed the[ir] continued existence
for performance."
434. Id. § 2-616; U.C.C. § 2-614 (1995).
435. U.C.C. § 2-617(a) (Proposed Draft 1996). Note 2 confirms the "slim" nature of
the opportunity to be excused. Id. § 2-617 note 2.
436. Id. § 2-617 notes 1-2. Draft section 2-617 provides:
(a) Subject to Section 2-616 [Substituted Performance] and subsection (b)
[a requirement of notification of delay or nonperformance to the other party], delay
in performance or nonperformance by either party is not a breach if performance as
agreed has been made impracticable or a party's principal purpose is substantially
frustrated by: (1) the occurrence of a contingency whose nonoccurrence was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made; or (2) compliance in good faith with
any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation, statute, or order,
whether or not it later proves invalid, which both parties assumed would not occur.
Id. § 2-617(a)(1)-(2).
437. Id. § 2-618 (modifying U.C.C. § 2-616 (1995)).
438. Id. § 2-619.
439. Id. § 2-701 note 1.

1997

The Emerging Article 2: The Latest Iteration

609

it and pursue arbitration if it was agreed to by the parties. Since
two earlier sections define "breach" and "default,""40 it would be
merciful for the Style Committee or other official group to recommend the deletion of this section since it is of marginal benefit at
best.
(i). Purpose
Part 7 should begin with what is now section 2-703 in the
draft, "Remedies in General," primarily because that section
opens with a restatement of the critical albeit traditional purpose
of U.C.C. and contract remedies: "[P]lacing the aggrieved party
in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed."" 1
The section also contains the important mitigation principle" 2
while continuing the general policy of cumulation of remedies,
but precluding a party from recovering more than once for the
same injury. It adds the critically important limitation on the
cumulative nature of remedies, i. e., a party should not be free to
choose a remedy that will violate the overriding expectation principle. Unfortunately, the language suggests judicial discretion:
"A court may deny or limit a remedy if, under the circumstances,
it would put the aggrieved party in a better position than if the
other party had fully performed. 4 3 Why "may?" Is there a situation where the aggrieved party ought to be placed in a better
position than if the other party had fully performed? If, for
example, a buyer makes a "cover" purchase at a favorable price,
should that buyer ever be permitted to choose to recover damages for nondelivery or repudiation that would enhance the
buyer's position? It is essential that this limitation have the
same status as the limitation preventing a double recovery.4
Section 2-704 is rather mysteriously called "Damages in General" because it is designed as a supplement to allow recovery of
damages where normal Article 2 remedies "fail to put the
aggrieved party in as good a position as if the other party had
440.
441.
442.
443.

U.C.C. § 2-601, 2-602 (Proposed Draft 1996).
Id. § 2-703(a) (restating the same principle found in U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1995)).
Id. § 2-703(b).
Id. § 2-703(c) (emphasis added).

444. Id. § 2-703(c) note 4. Section 2-703(c) now reads:
The rights and remedies provided in this article are cumulative, but a
party may not recover more than once for the same injury. A court may deny or
limit a remedy if, under the circumstances, it would put the aggrieved party in a
better position than if the other party had fully performed.
Id. § 2-703. A simple change in this draft would accomplish the desired result. For example, a provision stating: "The rights and remedies provided in this article are cumulative,
but an aggrieved party may neither recover more than once for the same injury nor pursue a remedy that would put the aggrieved party in a better position than if the other
party had fully performed."
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fully performed." For example, a party who is unable to establish
general or "direct" damages may still recover incidental and consequential damages. Protection of reliance or restitution interests may fall within this section. It would be extremely helpful if
the section expressly recognized the protection of such interests.
It should then be merged into the previous section, "Remedies in
General."
(ii).

Incidental and ConsequentialDamages

Incidental and consequential damages are defined in original
Sections 2-715(1) and (2). They contemplate recovery of such
damages only by buyers. The draft allows their recovery by buyers or sellers, but does so in separate sections. Except for this
change, the new incidental damages section replicates the substance of its predecessor. 44 5 The draft section on consequential
damages effects the same change, 6 but there is another critically important change in this section.
In addition to the classic limitations on consequential damages
of foreseeability, factual causation, mitigation and reasonable
certainty that are stated in the section, the new section includes
still another limitation: recovery of consequential damages is
precluded if they are "unreasonably disproportionate to the risk
assumed by the breaching party." 47 This additionallimitation is
designed to control "the risk of uncertain and potentially heavy
consequential damages ... to sellers," and "should be limited to
cases where there is an extreme disparity between the price
charged by the seller and the foreseeable loss caused to the buyer
(this suggests that the price was not intended to cover the risk)
or there is an 'informality of dealing, including the absence of a
445.

U.C.C. § 2-705 (Proposed Draft 1996).

446. Id. § 2-706. Illustrations of a seller's recovery of incidential and/or consequential damages include: (a) a seller making a special expenditure in preparation to perform,
not to be reimbursed by buyer's full performance, buyer breaches and seller cannot salvage the investment, seller may recover this expenditure as consequential damages; (b)
at the time of formation, buyer was aware of seller's profitable business opportunity that
depended upon buyer's prompt payment of the contract price, buyer was also aware that
substitute financing would probably not be available to the seller, seller's lost profits, if
reasonably certain, are recoverable as consequentials, had seller been able to obtain sub-

stitute financing at some rate of interest, "the interest paid would be consequential rather
than incidental damages;" (c) seller borrowed money at a certain rate of interest to
finance performance of the contract with the buyer, "the loan was to be repaid from the
contract price," buyer's late payment results in consequential damages, i.e., the interest
paid between the time buyer promised to pay the contract price and the time it was paid.
Id. § 2-706 note 1.
447. U.C.C. § 2-706(1) (Proposed Draft 1996).
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detailed written contract, which indicates that there was no careful attempt to allocate all of the risks.'"" 8
The recognition that the classic limitations on the recovery of
consequential damages may be insufficient in certain cases is, on
balance, desirable. If the additional "unreasonably disproportionate" limitation is part of a new Article 2, however, there can
be no doubt that it will spawn considerable case law. In its pure
form, the "unreasonably disproportionate" standard is necessarily uncertain and could be seen as still another manifestation of
the war against unconscionable results. At the very least, special
efforts should be made to provide clear illustrations on the use of
the additional limitation in the new comments to this section.
(iii). Specific Performance
Under the original version, the seller can obtain what is sometimes called a specific performance remedy through its action for
the contract price. This, however, was a remedy "at law" for
damages. 44 9 The true specific performance remedy in the original
version limits that extraordinary relief to buyers. 4 50 The first
major change in the draft version expands the remedy to sellers,
allowing courts to provide in personam directives to a defendant
to perform a contract, e. g., a long term supply contract. 451 While
such relief is not unknown in the courts, it is now recommended
4 52
for codification in the draft.
The second major change in the specific performance section is
more radical. The draft section allows the parties to expressly
provide for the remedy of specific performance in their contract
with the expectation that a court will grant such remedy,
notwithstanding the availability of adequate remedies "at
law."4 53 Whether this specific relief is granted necessarily
depends upon the discretion of the court. 5 4 A note explains that
this change "is consistent with a growing consensus that specific
performance is, in most cases, a more efficient remedy than damages."45 5 Concerns that this change may force buyers, particu448. Id. § 2-706 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF
449. U.C.C. § 2-709 (1995).
450. See id. § 2-716.
451. U.C.C. § 2-707 note 1 (Proposed Draft 1996).
452. Id. § 2-707 note 1.
453. Id. § 2-707(a).

CONTRACTS §

351 cmt. f (1981)).

454. Id. This section reads: "A court may, in its discretion, decree specific performance if the parties have expressly agreed to that remedy or the goods or the agreed performance of the breaching party are unique or in other proper circumstances." Id.
455. Id. § 2-707 note 1 (citing Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees Prefer Supra
CompensatoryRemedies: An Analysis of Contractingfor Damage Measures, 10 YALE L.J.
369 (1990)). Note 2 also mentions that specific performance is the preferred remedy
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larly consumer buyers, to take and pay for goods that are not
needed or desired are overcome by the policy that unless resale is
not reasonably available, the seller cannot recover the price of
identified goods that the buyer has not accepted.45 6 In such a
case, a court should, in its discretion, deny the remedy of specific
performance.4 5 7 The section ends with a continuation of what the
original version calls a replevin remedy,46 8 though that term is
missing from the revision.4 5 9
(iv).

Cancellation

Like their predecessors," ° the draft sections listing seller and
buyer remedies include the remedy of "cancellation,"4 6 1 a remedy
that is rarely understood. If one "cancels" a contract, do remedies survive such "cancellation?" The Drafting Committee
answers this and other relevant questions in a new section
describing the remedy and its effects. 6 2 Thus, while cancellation
discharges executory obligations,'4 3 any right based on previous
default survives cancellation, as does any limitation on the exercise of rights in goods, any limitation of disclosure of information,
any obligation to return goods or any remedy for default of the
whole contract. 464 Moreover, unless a contrary intention clearly
appears, expressions such as "cancellation," "rescission" or
"avoidance" of the contract are not construed as a discharge
of
any claim in damages for antecedent breach. 6 5 Cancellation is
not effective until the canceling party sends notice of cancellation
to the other party, 466 and an aggrieved party may cancel a contract when the usual conditions for breach are met, giving rise to
other seller and buyer remedies. 6 7
This new section is one of the more desirable additions in the
draft.
under CISG, Articles 46 and 62. Id. § 2-707 note 2. While CISG is not a dominant influence in the draft (see note 7, supra), its influence has been felt to a limited degree.
456. U.C.C. § 2-722(a)(3) (Proposed Draft 1996).
457. Id. § 2-707 note 1.
458. U.C.C. § 2-703(f) (1995).
459. U.C.C. § 2-707(c) (Proposed Draft 1996) (designed to replace U.C.C. § 2-716(3)
(1995)).
460. U.C.C. §§ 2-703(f), 2-711(1) (1996).
461. U.C.C. §§ 2-715(8), 2-723(a)(2) (Proposed Draft 1996).
462. Id. § 2-709.
463. Id. § 2-708(d).
464. Id. § 2-708(e).
465. Id. § 2-708(f).
466. U.C.C. § 2-708(b) (Proposed Draft 1996).
467. Id. § 2-708(a).

1997
(v).

The Emerging Article 2: The Latest Iteration

613

Modifications of Remedy-Failure of Essential Purpose

Under the original Article 2, parties are free to modify the
remedies provided by Article 2.6 8 They may add to or subtract
from the normal or "default" remedies set forth in part 7.469 They
may substitute repair and replacement remedies for those that
would normally flow from breaches of warranty 470 and limit remedies to return of the goods and repayment of the price. 471 The
difficult question is, when do substituted remedies become excessive, operating as a penalty or are inadequate, failing to provide
even minimal relief? It is a truism that excessive agreed damages clauses creating penalties will not be enforced.47 2 On the
other hand, what is the remedial "floor," i. e., when does an
agreed remedy fall below an acceptable minimum?
A comment to the original section states the general principle
that "it is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least
minimum adequate remedies be available."4 7 3 Again, however,
what is a minimal remedy? Relying upon case law that has
allowed wide latitude to the parties in commercial cases,4 74 the
Drafting Committee could not improve upon the quoted comment
to the original section, i. e., "[an agreed remedy . . . may not
operate to deprive the aggrieved party of a minimum adequate
remedy under the circumstances."4 75 A note suggests that the
minimum should be not less than restitution of the goods or the
purchase price.47 6 Thus, anything above this "floor" will depend
upon the circumstances.
When an agreed remedy "fails of its essential purpose," the
original section allows the aggrieved party to ignore the agreed
remedy and to pursue the "default" remedies available under
Article 2, but the application of this section has been problematic. If, for example, an agreed repair or replacement remedy
fails because it has not been performed at all, has been delayed
or fails to achieve the desired result, a buyer is clearly permitted
to seek a default remedy such as cover or other appropriate Article 2 remedies. 478 If the agreed remedy, however, excluded conse468. U.C.C. § 2-719 (1995).
469. Id.
470. Id. § 2-719(i)(a).
471. Id.
472. U.C.C. § 2-718 (1995); U.C.C. § 2-710 (Proposed Draft 1996).
473. U.C.C. § 2-719 cmt. 1 (1995).

474.
475.
476.
979 F.2d
477.
478.

E.g, Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 973 F.2d 988 (1st Cir. 1992).
U.C.C. § 2-709(2) (Proposed Draft 1996); U.C.C. § 2-719 cmt. 1 (1995).
U.C.C. § 2-709 note 1 (Proposed Draft 1996) (citing McDermott, Inc. v. Iron,
1068 (5th Cir. 1992)).
U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1995).
See id. § 2-719(1).
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quential damages, the question is whether the failure of the
agreed remedy not only allows substitution of a typical default
remedy but also excises the clause excluding consequentials to
allow their recovery.47 s Judicial reactions to such a situation
range from the excision of the consequential damages clause to
its continued enforcement absent unconscionability. The result
480
could hinge upon how a clause was drafted.
The draft addresses this problem in non-consumer cases as follows: "[T]he aggrieved party may, to the extent of the failure,
resort to remedies provided in this article, but is bound by any
other agreed remedy that is not dependent upon the failed
remedy."41
The Drafting Committee is clearly convinced that an exclusion
of consequential damages is typically not dependent upon a
failed agreed remedy such as a repair or replacement remedy.48 2
Thus, in commercial cases, the consequential damages clause
would continue to be enforceable unless it was unconscionable or
its enforcement would deprive the aggrieved party of a minimum
adequate remedy, which is extremely unlikely. 48 3
The draft allows an aggrieved consumer to reject goods or
revoke acceptance, and if the agreed remedy fails of its essential
purpose, the consumer may choose another buyer's remedy. 8 4
The last subsection expressly allows consequential damages to
be limited or excluded by agreement, except for injury to the person, unless the exclusion or limitation is unconscionable." 5
(vi). Liquidated Damages
The draft continues the basic policy of its predecessor by
allowing damages to be liquidated in an amount that is reasonable in light of the actual or anticipated loss caused by the breach
and the difficulties of proof of loss in the event of breach.48 6
There is no longer a requirement, however, that the liquidation
479. See id. § 2-719(2).
480. For a case analyzing these questions, see Cooley v. Big Horn Harvestore Sys.,
Inc., 813 P.2d 736 (Colo. 1991).
481. U.C.C. § 2-709(b)(1) (Proposed Draft 1996).
482. See id. § 2-709 note 2.
483. Id. Recognizing the difficulty of a merchant establishing unconscionability, the
note adds, "iin commercial cases, however, neither of these outcomes is probable." Id.

484. Id. § 2-709(b)(2) (referring to the listing of buyer's remedies in U.C.C. § 2-723
(Proposed Draft 1996)).
485. Id. § 2-709(c). Since it is impossible to limit or exclude consequential damages
for injury to the person, there is no longer any need to continue the original distinction
that treated such exclusions in consumer goods as "prima facie unconscionable." U.C.C.
§ 2-719(3) (1995).
486. U.C.C. § 2-710(a) (Proposed Draft 1996) (designed to replace U.C.C. § 2-718(1)
(1995)).
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be reasonable in light of the difficulties in obtaining a remedy. 48 7
The draft also changes the original by prohibiting the enforceability of unreasonably small, as well as unreasonably large,
amounts. 48
The notes emphasize a distinction between liquidation and
limitation of damages. 4 9 Thus, if parties fix $5000 as a reasonable amount of liquidated damages, but the actual damages
amount to $100,000, the note states that the agreement may be
enforceable even though the damages were underliquidated with
respect to actual loss. 49 If, however, absent any thought of liquidating damages, the parties agree that in no event will the
seller's damages exceed $5000, this is not an agreed damages
provision governed by section 2-710. 4 91 It is a limitation (arbi-

trary fixing) provision that is governed by the preceding section
on modification of remedies, section 2-709.492

The draft clarifies a breaching party's right to restitution after
the aggrieved party's damages have been calculated and paid.493
Thus, a breaching buyer is entitled to restitution in the amount
by which its payments exceed the amount to which the seller is
entitled under any agreed damages clause.494 The draft follows
its predecessor in allowing an offset to the buyer's restitutionary
recovery of any amount of damages established by the seller and
the amount of value of any benefits received.4 95
(vii). Proof of Market Price Not Readily Available
After a section allowing all Article 2 remedies to be pursued for
material misrepresentation or fraud,496 the draft tackles the
problem of determining market price if evidence of a price is not
readily available. 49 7 The common sense solution found in the

draft allows evidence of prevailing prices within any reasonable
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
said to be

U.C.C. § 2-710 note 1 (Proposed Draft 1996).
Id.
See id. § 2-710 note 2.
Id.
Id.
See U.C.C. § 2-709(c) (Proposed Draft 1996). Specifically, this hypothetical is
covered by 2-709(c), which states that consequential damages may be limited or

excluded. Id.
493. See id. § 2-710(b).
494. Id. There is no longer an alternative such as now exists in 2-718(2)(b), i. e.,
"twenty per cent of the value of the total performance for which the buyer is obligated
under the contract or $500 whichever is smaller." U.C.C. § 2-718(2)(b) (1995).
495. U.C.C. § 2-710(c) (Proposed Draft 1996) (which replicates U.C.C. § 2-718(3)
(1995)).
496. Id. § 2-711.
497. See id. § 2-712.
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time before or after the time described. 49 The prevailing price at
any other place that is reasonable in terms of usage of trade or
commercial judgment can be used, 499 as can reports in official

publications, trade journals, periodicals and other published
reports in general circulation. 00 A party offering evidence of a
reasonable price must give the other party notice to avoid unfair
surprise.501
The section is designed to replace original sections 2-723 and
2-724.o2 The Drafting Committee, however, decided to delete
original section 2-723(1), which measures market price at the
time the aggrieved party "learned of the repudiation" if an action
based on anticipatory repudiation comes to trial before the time
for performance. 0 3 Yet, where an anticipatory repudiation
occurs, the aggrieved party may, among other options, await performance for a commercially reasonable time. 0 4 The Drafting

Committee decided that this standard makes a great deal of
sense for the measurement of damages where there is no resale
or cover, i.e., where the aggrieved party brings an action for the
difference between the contract and market prices.5 05 The Committee recommends the repeal of 2-723(1) and a new measure
where the case comes to trial before the agreed time for performance, i. e., measuring the market price a commercial reasonable
period after the aggrieved party learned of the repudiation. 0 '
This is a desirable change.
B.

Seller's Remedies

After a section replicating original section 2-722, dealing with
liability of third parties for injuries to goods, 0 7 and a section
dealing with the statute of limitations discussed earlier, 08 the
draft proceeds to "Part B. Seller's Remedies," starting with a section listing all of the remedies of the seller. 50 9 There is no significant change from the original, though the preamble of events
that trigger these remedies is removed since "breach" is earlier
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.

See id. § 2-712(a)(1).
Id.
U.C.C. § 2-712(b) (Proposed Draft 1996).
See id. § 2-712(a)(3).
See id. § 2-712 note 1.
U.C.C. § 2-723(1) (1995).
U.C.C. § 2-613(a)(1) (Proposed Draft 1996); U.C.C. § 2-610(a) (1995).
U.C.C. § 2-613 note 1 (Proposed Draft 1996).

506. See id.

§ 2-721(a)(2)

(seller's damages); Id. § 2-726(a)(2) (buyer's damages).

507. U.C.C. § 2-713 (Proposed Draft 1996).
508. See id. § 2-714. See also supra notes 328-36 and accompanying text.
509. U.C.C. § 2-715 (Proposed Draft 1996) (which would replace U.C.C. § 2-703

(1995)).
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elaborated in 2-601 and 2-602.510 While the remedies remain
cumulative, the notes remind us of the critical limitation on
remedial choices expressed in 2-703(c): to place the party in no
better position than such party would have been in had the contract been performed.
The next section is 2-716, the seller's right to reclaim goods.5 11
The section quite sensibly combines parts of two original sections
dealing with the two historic grounds for a seller's reclamation:
the seller's right to reclaim from a buyer who received goods on
credit while insolvent, 512 and reclamation in the "cash sale"
where payment is due upon delivery. The seller may reclaim
goods upon a demand made within a reasonable time after discovering that the buyer has failed to pay.51 3 The section ends
with the usual caveat that reclamation is subject to the rights "of
a buyer in the ordinary course of business or other good faith
purchaser for new value that arise before the seller takes posses514
sion" pursuant to its timely demand for reclamation.
Section 2-717 replicates 2-704, allowing sellers to identify
goods to the contract to enable the seller to pursue appropriate
remedies. 15 Though there are structural changes in 2-718,
already noted, 516 there are no substantial revisions of predeces510. U.C.C. § 2-715 (Proposed Draft 1996); U.C.C. § 2-703 (1995).
511. U.C.C. § 2-716 (Proposed Draft 1996).
The section's full caption appears
redundant: "Seller's Right to Reclaim Goods After Delivery to Buyer." See id. It is pretty
hard to reclaim goods before their delivery to buyer. Presumably, the drafters sought to
distinguish this section from the original 2-702, which is much broader, "Seller's Reme-

dies on Discovery of Buyer's Insolvency," and opens with the right of the seller to refuse
delivery except for cash where the seller discovers the buyer to be insolvent. U.C.C. § 2702(1) (1995). That subsection has been moved to draft section 2-718, which combines this

seller's right to refuse delivery in draft section 2-718(a) with a replication of the original
2-705, the seller's stoppage of delivery in transit of otherwise. The result is a long caption
for 2-718: "Seller's Refusal to Deliver Because of Buyer's Insolvency; Stoppage in Transit

or Otherwise." U.C.C. § 2-718 (Proposed Draft 1996). Draft section 2-718 changes the
original 2-705(1) requirement that the shipment must be a carload, truckload or planeload. That language is deleted. A substantial breach is not required.
512. U.C.C. § 2-716(a)(1) (designed to replace U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1995)). The seller's

right continues to be limited to reclamation only if a demand is made within 10 days after
the buyer received the goods absent misrepresentation of solvency made in a record to the

seller less than three months before delivery. Where misrepresentation has occured,
instead of ten days, the seller has a reasonable time after delivery to make its demand.
513. Id. § 2-716(a)(2) (Proposed Draft 1996) (designed to replace U.C.C. § 2-507(2)
(1995)). The notes to this section explain that this subsection does not apply where, after
delivery in such a "cash sale," the buyer discovers a nonconformity in the goods and stops
payment on the check.
514. Id. § 2-716(b). Like its predecessor, U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1995), this subsection
reminds us that successful reclamation preclude all other remedies with respect to the
reclaimed goods. Id.
515.
516.

U.C.C. § 2-717 (Proposed Draft 1996); U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1995).
See supra note 516.
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sor section 2-705 concerning the seller's right to stop goods in
transit or otherwise.5 1 7
The seller's resale remedy in section 2-719 removes a notice
requirement in a private resale found in the original section. 1 '
The Drafting Committee reasoned that the buyer in the typical
resale is not a debtor and has no interest in the goods.5' 9 The
draft also replaces "public sale" in the original with "public auc520
tion" because there is no practical difference between the two.
A replication of original 2-707 identifying a "person in the position of a seller"52 ' is followed by the seller's damage remedy for
buyer's "nonacceptance, failure to pay or repudiation." 522 The
draft reflects the Drafting Committee's significant change concerning the determination of market price if the case comes to
trial before the agreed time for performance, i. e., pursuant to an
anticipatory repudiation. 2 3 If the case comes to trial after the
agreed time for performance, the formula changes the original.
The measure of damages under the draft is the "contract price
less the market price of comparable goods at the time and place
for tender" as contrasted with the measure in the original section, "the difference between the market price at the time and
place of tender and the unpaid contract price.... 24
The draft's choice of "contract price less market price" rather
than the "difference between" seems innocuous. The deletion of
"unpaid," however, is based upon the restitutionary concepts of
525
2-710 discussed earlier.
Original section 2-708(2), which allows a seller to collect lost
profits and incidental damages where the normal contract price/
market price differential would be inadequate, is replicated in 2517. U.C.C. § 2-718 (Proposed Draft 1996); U.C.C. § 2-705 (1995).
518. U.C.C. § 2-706(3)(c) (Proposed Draft 1996).
519. Id. § 2-719. "The Drafting Committee ... decided to limit the notice requirement to sale made to enforce a security interest created by agreement or clearly imposed
by statute." Id.
520. Id. § 2-719(c).
521. Id. § 2-720 (designed to replace U.C.C. § 2-707 (1995)).
522. Id. § 2-721 (designed to replace U.C.C. § 2-708 (1995)). Since the draft has
gone to a great deal of trouble to define "breach" in sections 2-601 and 2-602, the caption
might be simplified through the use of that term. See id. § 2-601, 1-602.
523. U.C.C. § 2-721(a)(2) (Proposed Draft 1996). Market price is determined at the
time when a commercially reasonable period following the seller's knowledge of the repudiation has expired. See supra notes 506-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of
this change in relation to draft section 2-712.
524. U.C.C. § 2-721(a)(1) (Proposed Draft 1996). Both draft section 2-721(a)(1) and
original 2-708(1) also allow recovery of consequential and incidental damages less
expenses avoided as a result of the breach. Id.; U.C.C. § 2-708(1) (1995).
525. U.C.C. § 2-710 (Proposed Draft 1996). See supra notes 490-91 and accompanying text.
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721(b). 2 6 The calculation of "reasonable overhead" that both versions allow in addition to lost profits is simplified by a note that
suggests the subtraction of seller's total variable costs, actual or
estimated, from the contract price.5 27 The notes also emphasize
the overriding philosophy of 2-703(c) in the use of any of these
remedies to preclude the seller from being placed in a better position than it would have been in had the contract been
performed.5' 2
The seller's action for the price under original 2-709 is
unchanged except for a clarification. 29 The original allows the
seller to recover the contract price of goods accepted or goods
identified to the contract if the seller is unable to resell or the
circumstances indicate that resale would be unavailing.5 30 The
original section also allows the seller to recover the price of conforming goods lost or damaged "within a commercially reasonable time after risk of their loss has passed to the buyer."53' The
draft clarifies the "commercially reasonable time" limitation:
"[B]ut if the seller has regained control of the goods, the loss or
damage must occur within a commercially reasonable time after
the risk of loss has passed to the buyer.... 532 Thus, the "commercially reasonable time limitation applies only where
the
5 33
seller has retained or regained possession of the goods."
C. Buyer's Remedies
This section begins with a listing of buyer's remedies designed
to replace original section 2-711.13 ' The draft adds a familiar
remedy to the list that was inadvertently omitted in the 2-711
526. U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (1995); U.C.C. § 2-721 (Proposed Draft 1996). The provision
sets forth:
A seller may recover damages measured by other than the market price
including: (1) lost profits, including reasonable overhead, resulting from the breach
determined in any reasonable manner, together with incidental and consequential
damages; and (2) reasonable expenditures made in preparing for or performing the
contract if, after the breach, the seller is unable to obtain reimbursement by salvage, resale, or other reasonable measures.
U.C.C. § 2-721(b) (Proposed Draft 1996). This measure is appropriate for "lost volume"
sellers, sellers who do not have completed goods on hand (jobbers and middlemen) and
sellers who stop work and salvage under 2-717(b). See U.C.C. § 2-721 note 5 (Proposed
Draft 1996).
527. U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (1995); U.C.C. § 2-721 (Proposed Draft 1996). See U.C.C.
§ 2-721 note 5 (Proposed Draft 1996).
528. U.C.C. § 2-703(c) (Proposed Draft 1996).
529. U.C.C. § 2-709 (1995).

530. Id.
531. Id. § 2-709(1)(a).
532. U.C.C. § 2-722(a)(2) (Proposed Draft 1996).
533. Id. § 2-722 note 1.
534. Id. § 2-723.
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list-the buyer's remedy for breach of warranty in regard to
accepted goods. 535 The draft also replicates the buyer's statutory
security interest in goods in the buyer's possession after rightful
536
rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance.
Following the section protecting a prepaying buyer's right to
goods discussed earlier,5 37 the draft "cover" remedy appears with
no substantial modifications to its predecessor. 3 8 It requires the
"cover" buyer to procure "comparable" goods and, consistent with
a language change in other remedies sections, dismisses the original "difference between" contract price and cover price language
in favor of "cost of covering less the contract price."53 9 There is an
express recognition that a buyer need not choose the cover remedy, but a recovery of, e.g., market damages, can be overcome by
the seller's proof that such a recovery would place the buyer in a
better position than full performance by the seller. 5 1 °
The next section deals with market damages, the buyer's
"hypothetical cover" or "fall back" remedy. If the case comes to
trial after the agreed time for performance, a buyer who does not
cover, but does seek damages for nondelivery will receive the
market price for comparable goods at the time the buyer learned
of the breach, less the contract price together with incidentals
and consequentials less expenses saved by the breach.5 4 1 A note
explains that if the seller failed to ship as agreed on October 1,
but buyer did not learn of this failure until October 4, market
price is determined as of October 4-when the buyer learned of
542 If, however,
the breach.
the breach is by repudiation rather
than nondelivery, the formula changes the market price to the
agreed time for performance. Thus, if the buyer learned of an
anticipatory repudiation on September 15 and chose not to cover
or take other remedial action, market price is determined as of
October 1, the agreed time for performance, rather than the date
the buyer learned of the repudiation.5 43
535. See id. Original section 2-711 failed to list this remedy, which appeared in
original section 2-714. See U.C.C. §§ 2-711, 2-714 (1995). The listing omission is cured in
U.C.C. § 2-723(5) (Proposed Draft 1996).
536. U.C.C. 2-723(c) (Proposed Draft 1996) (designed to replace U.C.C. § 2-711(3)
(1995)).
537. See supra note 340 and accompanying text for a discussion of U.C.C. § 2-724
(Proposed Draft 1996).
538. U.C.C. § 2-725 (Proposed Draft 1996) (designed to replace U.C.C. § 2-712
(1995)).
539. Id. § 2-725(b).
540. Id. § 2-725(c) note 4.
541. Id. § 2-726(1)(i) (designed to replace U.C.C. § 2-713(1) (1995)). Again the "difference between" language in the original is replaced. See id.
542. Id. § 2-726(1) note 2.
543. U.C.C. § 2-726(1)(ii) (Proposed Draft 1996); see id. § 2-726 note 2.
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If the case comes to trial before the agreed time for performance, the measure is "the market price of comparable goods at
the time when a commercially reasonable period after the buyer
has learned of the repudiation has expired less the contract
price" plus incidentals and consequentials, less avoided
expenses. 44 This is consistent with the same formula applied to
other remedies. 545 The place for the determination of market

price is unchanged.546
Where the buyer accepts goods that are nonconforming, the
original version allows the buyer to recover all foreseeable losses,
and the measure of damages for breach of warranty of quality is
the difference between the value of the goods accepted and the
value they would have had if they had been as warranted. 47
Draft section 2-727 adds a condition to the basic formula:
"unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount."5 48 Where, for example, the seller warrants that
a device will be fit for particular purposes, but the delivered
device fails to meet those purposes, the measure of damages is
the difference in the market value of the delivered system and
549
the value of a hypothetical system that will meet the purposes.
The draft also substitutes "a measure" for "the measure" of
damages. Recognizing that such damages are generally measured by "the value of goods as warranted less the value of the
goods accepted,"55 0 a note explains that damages have been measured in different ways depending upon the circumstances. 551
Thus, goods that are nonconforming, but usable without repairs
suggest damages measured by the difference in market values.
Damages for goods not usable without repairs are measured by
the reasonable cost of repairs. Damages for goods not usable
under any circumstances are measured by the difference in the
market value of the scrap and the cost of purchase (market
value) of the goods as warranted. 552 Thus, the Drafting Commit544. Id. § 2-726(2).
545. See supra note 509 and accompanying text. See also U.C.C. § 2-721(a)(2) (Pro-

posed Draft 1996) discussed in text accompanying supra note 527.
546. U.C.C. § 2-726(b) (Proposed Draft 1996); U.C.C. § 2-713(2) (1995).
547. U.C.C. § 2-714(1)-(2) (Proposed Draft 1996). Incidental and consequential
damages are also recoverable under original section 2-714(3). See U.C.C. § 2-714(3)
(1995).
548. U.C.C. § 2-727(b) (Proposed Draft 1996).
549. Id. § 2-727. See id. § 2-727 where the notes cite Hospital Computer Systems,
Inc. v. State Island Hospital, 788 F.Supp. 1351 (D.N.J. 1992)).

550. Again, the "difference between" language of the original is replaced.
551.

U.C.C. § 2-727 note 4 (Proposed Draft 1996).

552. U.C.C. § 2-727(b); Id. at note 3.

Duquesne Law Review

622

Vol. 35:533

tee prefers "a measure" rather than "the measure" for this
section.
Part 7 ends by reproducing original section 2-717, which
allows a buyer to deduct all or any part of the damages resulting
from any breach from any part of the price still due under the
same contract.

553

While the draft of this part of Article 2 demonstrates relatively
modest changes, the recommendations of the Drafting Committee are beneficial.
XVII.

CONCLUSION

There are some very desirable clarifications, elaborations and
modifications in this draft of a new Article 2, but there are also
disappointments, and some are major disappointments. The
Drafting Committee did a lot of tinkering and moving things
around, but assumed few risks. When the Committee came eyeball to eyeball with anything resembling a radical change, except
for the courageous repeal of the Statute of Frauds and the elimination of the cumbersome risk of loss analysis in original section
2-510, the Committee blinked.
While part 7 dealing with remedies contains several important
changes and clarifications, a review of the conspicuous changes
effected in the draft reveals limited creativity. In general, the
beneficial changes are obvious. Beyond a tightening here, a loosening there, the questionable insertion of a standard analysis of
materiality of breach, substantial performance or a desirable,
but nonexclusive, definition of "repudiation," the "battle of the
forms" consumed a lot of time and effort. Unfortunately, the
result is obviously the product of a Committee that thought it
discovered the solution by separating this elusive admixture of
frustrating concepts into different sections-a solution that may
prove illusory.
Modifications in sections dealing with warranties and disclaimers of warranties reveal a tentative approach. The products
liability challenge was met with uncertainty. The necessary
inclusion of the "electronic" material may have seemed difficult,
but the product is rather pedestrian. Most of the desirable
changes were so obvious that their absence would have been
indefensible. For example, should a new Article 2 permit cure
after revocation of acceptance? The question scarcely survives
its statement. Unlike its predecessor, the draft is anything but a
radical new paradigm.
553.

Id. § 2-728; U.C.C. § 2-717 (1995).
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In mitigation, it is important to recognize how extremely difficult it is to improve upon the genuinely radical paradigm of the
precocious and ingenious Karl Llewellyn. His Article 2 has
proven so highly workable over almost half a century that only a
few sections require a complete overhaul. Moreover, among
those sections in obvious need of change, the need was not
always proximately caused by the sections themselves, but by
the distortions generated by limited judicial imagination and
554
creativity.
It is equally important to recall Llewellyn's disappointment
with his final product that manifested so much compromise.
Llewellyn knew it could have been better-much better. But he
also knew how critically important it was to assure the acceptance of a radical new design that would react much more effectively to the felt needs of commercial society. 55 5 Like his
creation, the draft manifests a dangerous degree of compromise
that operates as the enemy of the pristine. It is not unwarranted
to assume that the Drafting Committee is well aware of the high
price of enactability. Such awareness, however, cannot erase the
frustration of not "getting the words right."5 5 6 There will be a
new Article 2 that will probably look very much like this draft.
Unfortunately, those who draft it will be called upon to explain
what557
they were "attempting to say, whether [they] got it said or
not."

554. Llewellyn severely overestimated "the ability of the collective judicial mind to
achieve [his goals]." See Murray, The Revision of Article 2: Romancing the Prism, supra
note 130 at 1468.
555. Speaking before the Tennessee Bar Association, Llewellyn said:
I am ashamed of the [U.C.C.] in some ways; there are so many pieces that I
could make a little better; there are so many beautiful ideas I tried to get in that
would have been good for the law, but I was voted down. A wide body of opinion
has worked the law into some sort of compromise after debate and after exhaustive
work. However, when you compare it with anything that there is, it is an infinite
improvement.
Karl Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 TENN.L. REV.779, 784 (1953).
556. When Ernest Hemingway was asked why he felt compelled to rewrite the last
page of "A Farewell to Arms" thirty-nine times, he is said to have replied that he was
"getting the words right." See THEODORE A. REES CHENEY, GETTING THE WoRDs RIGHT:
How To REVISE, EDIT AND REWRITE, at page three of the Introduction (1983).
557. LLEWELLYN, supra note 1.

